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ARTICLE

The Liberal Limits of Environmental Law:
A Green Legal Critique
MICHAEL M’GONIGLE*
LOUISE TAKEDA**

I.

ABSTRACT

The field of environmental law embodies a deep
contradiction—it is a product of the state, yet the state is the
primary agent of development. This contradiction infuses statesupported resource regimes (energy, forestry, agriculture, water
use) that have long been agents of environmental erosion while
they have remained resistant to progressive reform. It also
underpins the theoretical framework for proposed reforms today,
ecological modernization. The result is that environmental law
extends, rather than resolves, society’s underlying environmental
“problematic.” This can now be seen in institutional responses to
climate change and the “green economy.” To address this
situation, the authors apply a critical new approach—green legal
theory (GLT)—to analyze these historical resource regimes and
today’s emerging issues.
GLT does so by expanding the
conception of law to address the “constitutive” or “regulatory”
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effects of those “system dynamics” that set the larger economic,
political, and cultural conditions for social/environmental
relations. In this task, GLT aims to help move “legal” analysis
into the pursuit of the systemic re-formations that exist beyond
the liberal limits of environmental law.
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III.

INTRODUCTION

Barack Obama had been in office barely one year when the
British petroleum-owned Macondo well exploded in the Gulf of
Mexico on April 20, 2010. Eventually unleashing more than 200
million gallons of oil, much of which washed ashore in Louisiana,
this was to become the worst environmental disaster in American
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history and the world’s largest accidental oil spill. An assault on
a fragile environment and an affront to big business, the spill was
also an impeachment of the regulatory credibility of government.
This article addresses the historical and contemporary nature of
the dynamics of the state and its economic partners, and what
these portend for a new approach to “regulation” that looks
beyond the limits of environmental law.
Speaking at a White House press conference, President
Obama acknowledged the problem: “For years there’s been a
scandalously close relationship between oil companies and the
agency that regulates them. . . . [T]he oil and gas industry has
leveraged such power that they have effectively been allowed to
regulate themselves.”1 The President pointed to the industrytailored law that allows only thirty days for the Interior
Department to review an exploration plan, far too little time to
conduct an environmental review.
Instead, environmental
reviews are routinely waived. In contrast to the common
criticisms of “over-regulation,” Obama pointed to “the oil
industry’s cozy and sometimes corrupt relationship with
government regulators [that] meant little or no regulation at
all.”2 When questioned whether this situation could be attributed
to the Bush Administration when his own administration had
continued to give drilling permits under questionable
circumstances, Obama admitted that the culture “in which oil
companies were able to get what they wanted, without sufficient
oversight and regulation” had not yet “fully” changed.3

1. Presidential News Conference on the Gulf Oil Spill, 2010 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 2 (May 27, 2010) [hereinafter The President’s News Conference],
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201000422/pdf/DCPD201000422.pdf (referencing a recent Inspector General’s report detailing
widespread corruption within the Minerals and Management Service, the
agency in charge of approving permits and enforcing laws, during the Bush
years); see Donald C. Hubbard, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT –
ISLAND OPERATING COMPANY ET AL. CASE NO. PI-GA-09-0102-I (Feb. 29, 2009),
available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/15844/features/documents/2010/
05/25/document_gw_02.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (this investigative report
was initially created in response to routine Freedom of Information Act
requests; however, it was made public by the Department of Interior shortly
after the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
2. The President’s News Conference, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Id. at 9.
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Even more pointed was the question as to whether he
regretted his decision, announced only three weeks prior to the
disaster, to open up offshore drilling in previously protected
areas.4 Obama’s answer revealed a telling conundrum: “[T]o the
extent that we’re using oil, it makes sense for us to develop our oil
and natural gas resources here in the United States and not
simply rely on imports. That’s important for our economy; that’s
At the same time, he
important for economic growth.”5
acknowledged the increasing expense and risk involved with
extracting ever-dwindling oil reserves:
The fact that oil companies now have to go a mile underwater
and then drill another three miles below that in order to hit oil
tells us something about the direction of the oil industry. . . . And
we as a society are going to have to make some very serious
determinations in terms of what risks are we willing to accept. 6

Like the recent financial crisis, this latest environmental
crisis would, in his opinion, force Americans “to do some soul
searching.”7
At the time, the BP spill had all the makings of a gamechanger.8 As Hoffman and Jennings point out, public awareness
of the negative environmental effects of human activities was
higher than ever in the age of climate change—the public was
skeptical of high-profile players like BP, an oil company that had
been aggressively rebranding itself as “green” (“Beyond
Petroleum”), and its partner in the Gulf, Halliburton Co., a name

4. These included parts of Alaska, the eastern Gulf of Mexico, and parts of
the Atlantic coast. This was the biggest expansion of offshore oil drilling in the
U.S. in fifty years.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Andrew J. Hoffman & P. Devereaux Jennings, The BP Oil Spill as a
Cultural Anomaly? Institutional Context, Conflict, and Change, 20 J. MGMT.
INQUIRY 100, 101 (2011) (“When an event or issue poses a potential challenge to
a dominant technological or economic institutional order, conflict ensues over
the nature, meaning and response to the event. If this challenge is significant
enough to generate substantial conflict, the event can become a ‘cultural
anomaly’ for the current order.”).
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almost synonymous with Dick Cheney.9 As the spill ravaged Gulf
Coast communities, it rekindled old feelings of shame for the
bureaucratic incompetence and compassion for the political
indifference that followed the devastation wrought on New
Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. Once again, unethical behavior
and corruption were alleged against a federal agency, the
Minerals Management Service. All the while, an underwater
geyser of oil gushed uncontrollably, threatening an ecological
Armageddon and eroding the faith in engineering and technology
upon which future energy development depended.
But there was still a source of hope. Barack Obama, the
“most environmentally-friendly president ever,”10 assured
everyone that his administration would do whatever was
necessary to protect and restore the Gulf Coast. Quickly, the
President announced a six-month moratorium on drilling new
offshore oil wells and a halt to the controversial environmental
waivers.11 He also committed to putting in place “aggressive new
operating standards and requirements for offshore energy
companies.”12 In addition, his administration would suspend
planned exploration off the coast of Alaska, cancel proposed lease
sales in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Virginia, and
suspend action on thirty-three deepwater wells currently being

9. Id. at 103-04; see also HENRY A. WAXMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON GOV. REFORM,
FACT SHEET: HALLIBURTON’S IRAQ CONTRACTS NOW WORTH OVER $10 BILLION
(Dec. 9, 2004), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070 426011102/http:/
oversight.house.gov/documents/20050916123931-74182.pdf (Dick Cheney was
the CEO of Halliburton from 1995 until 2000 when he retired to run for U.S.
Vice President. However, ties between Cheney and Halliburton were shown to
remain, leading to controversy when Halliburton was awarded several major
contracts worth more than $10 billion in connection with the 2003 Iraq War).
10. Sandip Roy, Sierra Club’s Carl Pope: BP Has Gulf in a ‘Hostage
Situation’, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, July 13, 2010, http://newamericamedia.
org/2010/07/carl-pope-on-bp-oil-spill.php.
11. See Tim Dickinson, The Spill, The Scandal and the President, ROLLING
STONE, June 8, 2010, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-spill-thescandal-and-the-president-20100608 (the moratorium would purportedly affect
only thirty-three deepwater wells or less than one percent of drilling operations
in the Gulf. In addition, records indicated that both waivers and permits
continued to be granted with at least six waivers granted in the first four weeks
after the moratorium was announced); see also Ian Urbina, Despite Moratorium,
Drilling Projects Move Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2010, at A1.
12. The President’s News Conference, supra note 1, at 2.
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drilled.
Moreover, he would provide a new safeguard by
separating those issuing permits to the oil industry from those
regulating it.13
As news coverage stretched from days to weeks, the media
expanded its focus beyond the impacts of the spill on the marine
ecology to its effect on the economy and, by extension, the
political survival of Barack Obama. A report by the International
Energy Agency noted that regulatory changes to offshore drilling
could jeopardize nearly one million barrels of new crude
production daily.14 A spokesperson for the American Petroleum
Institute remarked, “It would be unfortunate if this accident were
to cause implementation of laws, rules or regulations that reduce
US production, cost American jobs or reduce energy security.”15
Meanwhile, analysts at JP Morgan Chase saw a silver economic
lining in the disaster, noting that the massive cleanup effort from
the spill might even offset the negative economic impacts of a
two-month drilling moratorium and actually boost U.S. economic
growth.16 And, as weeks turned to months, the prospect of
cultural soul-searching gave way to a Popular Mechanics-style
fascination with the sci-fi wizardry of the “junk shot” or “top kill”
that might cap the spill.17
After eighty-seven days of continuous gushing, on July 14,
2010, BP succeeded in temporarily capping the well. Three weeks
later, the government released findings from a report that

13. Id.
14. Nathan Vander Klippe, Spill Could be “Game Changer” for Oil, GLOBE &
MAIL (June 10, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/energy-and-resources/spill-could-be-game-changer-foroil/article1599917/.
15. Shawn McCarthy, Fate of US Drilling Hinges on Spill Resolution, GLOBE
& MAIL (May 26, 2010, 7:13 PM), http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/
business/article1582170.html.
16. Luca Di Leo, Oil Spill May End Up Lifting GDP Slightly, WSJ BLOGS REAL TIME ECONOMICS (June 15, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/2010/06/15/oil-spill-may-end-up-lifting-gdp-slightly/) (citing a JP
Morgan report, the article notes that 4,000 unemployed people hired for cleanup
efforts could be worth between $3-6 billion. “If realized, this would likely mean
a near-to-medium-term boost to activity that might offset the drags.”).
17. See Gillian Grace, Top kill? Junk shot? A Primer on BP’s Wacky Oil Spill
Terminology, NAT’L POST, May 31, 2010, http://news.nationalpost.com/2010/05/31
/top-kill-junk-shot-a-primer-on-bps-wacky-oil-spill-terminology/.
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claimed that 74% of the oil had either evaporated or been burned,
skimmed, recovered from the wellhead or dispersed much of
which is in the process of being degraded.18 Broadcast across the
national morning news, it suggested that all might soon be well,
despite imperfect technology, engineering, and politics. One
commentator remarked that this was “a public relations coup for
a White House eager to get the oil spill story off the front pages,
reassert control over a narrative that had gotten away from them,
and calm fears.”19 Two weeks later, there was much less fanfare
when the study’s lead author, Bill Lehr, retracted these
assurances and admitted in congressional testimony that “most of
[the oil] is still in the environment.”20
When the well was permanently capped in September 2010,
so too were any lingering challenges to oil exploration and
extraction. By mid-October the government announced new rules
for offshore drilling and lifted the drilling moratorium. With the
Obama Administration proclaiming a new, safer, and more
cautious era of drilling, the oil industry proceeded apace with
production. Even with the moratorium and stricter regulations,
the national rig count for November 2010 totaled 1,683, an

18. See JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., NOAA, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET:
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OIL? (2010), available at http://www.noaanews.noaa.
gov/stories2010/PDFs/OilBudget_description_%2083final.pdf (unmentioned were
the unprecedented 1.84 million gallons of the oil dispersants, Corexit 9580 and
9500A, applied during the cleanup effort and the many concerns over the
adverse health effects of the dispersants); see Krishnan Sriram et al.,
Neurotoxicity Following Acute Inhalation Exposure to the Oil Dispersant
COREXIT EC9500A, 74 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1405 (2011); Stacey E.
Anderson et al., Potential Immunotoxicological Health Effects Following
Exposure to COREXIT 9500A During Cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill, 74 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1419 (2011).
19. Dan Froomkin, Questions Mount About White House’s Overly Rosy Report
on Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST, May 25, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/08/20/overly-rosy-report-on-oil_n_688142.html.
20. Suzanne Goldenberg, BP Scientist Retracts Assurances Over Success of
Cleanup, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 2010, 4:34 PM, http://www.guardian.co.
uk/environment/2010/aug/19/bp-oil-spill-scientist-retracts-assurances; see also
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, NOAA SCIENTIST: RELEASE OF OIL SPILL
REPORT DONE BY WHITE HOUSE, NOT NOAA (2010), available at http://
oversight.house.gov/noaa-scientist-release-of-oil-spill-report-done-by-whitehouse-not-noaa/ (Dr. Lehr informed congressional investigators that the report
“was released by White House officials and not scientists at the NOAA.”).
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increase of 576 or 52% over the same time the previous year.21
By February 2011, BP reported fourth quarter profits of $5.6
billion, a 30% increase from a year earlier, and resumed its first
dividend payouts to shareholders since the disaster.22
The BP disaster could have kicked off a critical examination
of the dominant economic and political order.
But its
containment and astute political management meant that a
serious challenge to America’s oil addiction never appeared on the
public radar. After all, to challenge oil is to challenge what oil
fuels—a growing economy that demands cheap and reliable
primary resource inputs. Centuries of economic achievement
have produced the cultural expectation of an ever-expanding
economy flowing seamlessly from its past. Economic growth,
coupled with productivity-enhancing technology, has answered
the demands of labor not by redistributing the economic pie, but
by increasing its overall size. And stable economic management
lies at the core of modernist state politics with its attendant need
for ever more energy, ever more consumption, and ever more
extractions from nature, all at the least possible cost. Thus does
a seemingly irresolvable conundrum between economic
production and environmental protection pervade the modern
state—in the oil fields and the world’s great forests, in
mountainous rivers and coastal estuaries? This is not just an
economic or political problem, but a cultural one as well, with
centuries of material progress providing the foundation for an age
of high consumption that has defied critical evaluation.
Environmental law was born not to resolve this conundrum
but to bolster one side of it by providing a bulwark against
ecological erosion. Such a rebalancing, it was believed, could
overcome specific challenges through governmental intervention
and legal adjustment, as Obama so dexterously achieved in the
wake of a potential environmental catastrophe. But what if
something more fundamental is at stake? In what could have
been a description of the background to the BP oil spill (except
21. See Baker Hughes Announces November Rig Counts, BAKER HUGHES (Dec.
7,
2010),
http://investor.shareholder.com/bhi/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID
=535481.
22. BP Profit Rises to $5.6 billion US, CBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, 11:58 AM,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/02/01/bp-quarterly-profit.html.
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that it was written years before), Mary Wood writes that the
bureaucratic scale of the modern “administrative state is geared
almost entirely to the legalization of natural resource damage . . .,
the majority of agencies spend[ing] nearly all of their resources to
permit, rather than prohibit, environmental destruction.”23
Understanding this conundrum, and how it has shaped the whole
character of environmental law, requires a critical debate about
the legal field, its relation to larger structural dynamics, and
broader discourses that draw on contemporary theoretical
knowledge and critiques. It requires discussions of the nature of
well-worn legal strategies, not only whether they are efficacious
for the immediate challenges at hand, but also how they might
affect more fundamental changes to the contexts that give rise to
these challenges.
This is the starting task of what we call “green legal”
analysis and critique. The present paper begins (Part II) by
reviewing briefly diverse legal regimes that regulate a range of
resource sectors, looking at the interaction between state
interests, economic objectives, and regulatory designs, and what
this interaction has meant for environmental law. In each case,
state agencies are faced with the contradictory mandate of
protecting the very resources that the state relies on for royalties,
export revenues, industrial development, and economic growth.
And the state has not merely been an incidental participant or
disinterested manager in the process of the construction of these
diverse industrial structures—it has been central to their design
and construction. A survey of legal literature reveals that critical
thought about these relations is slight in both directions,
environmental law paying scant attention to critical legal theory
while such critical legal theory pays little heed to the role of
nature in economic and political life. In Part III, we interrogate
the field’s inherited liberal foundations and many of its prized
strategies, particularly its embrace of the economistic theory of
“ecological modernization.”
In doing so, we bring to light
ideological and institutional assumptions underpinning the field,
23. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to
Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I):
Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 55
(2009).
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and consider whether these are consistent with, or
counterproductive to, the ambitions of the field. Continuing with
this inquiry, Part IV examines what we call the “contradictions”
in environmental law, and looks at how these play out today in
strategies to overcome climate change and promote “green”
alternatives.
We conclude in Part V with a preliminary
explication of a larger, theoretically-grounded, critical vision of
law and social change that can take us beyond environmental
law, what we call “green legal theory” (GLT).24 GLT attempts to
address the structural character of the environmental
“problematic” which, unlike environmental law, it treats as
“constitutional” in nature but not only in the limited meaning of
that word. Instead, GLT seeks to open up the broader and more
powerful “constitutive” processes of institutional and cultural
“regulation” some of which are made apparent throughout this
article. These processes are of a de facto “legal” (i.e. socially
regulative) character but are captured neither by environmental
law nor, any form of “legal” law. It is our hope to initiate a
conversation toward this broader approach that will provide both
a counterpoint for, and critical reach beyond, environmental law.
IV. HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Legacy of Reform
Environmentalists have put a great deal of struggle and hard
work into establishing the vast array of environmental laws that
we know today. These laws have had an enormous practical
impact, from removing lead additives in gasoline to protect brain
development in children, to making many previously polluted
streams and rivers drinkable, and protecting large swaths of

24. We define “green legal theory” as an approach to “social regulation” that
moves nature from the periphery to the center of political, economic, and
cultural life. See generally R. Michael M’Gonigle & Paula Ramsay, Greening
Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Reformation, 14 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 342 (2004); R. Michael M’Gonigle, Green Legal Theory: A New
Approach to the Concept of Environmental Law, 4 OKOLOGISCHES WIRTSCHAFTEN
34 (2008); R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE, EARTH RULES: ON THE LAWS, BEHIND THE
LAWS, THAT HOLDS US TO ACCOUNT (forthcoming 2014).
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wilderness to facilitate biodiversity conservation. Though the
field may be “ramshackle, replete with inconsistencies and
paradoxical gaps, and surrounded by critics urging its
fundamental redesign,” nevertheless, notes Richard Lazarus, it
has internalized “discernible evolutionary convergences in
regulatory approaches based on decades of actual experiences
with what works well and what does not [so that] the basic
architectural features of U.S. environmental law seem essentially
in place.”25 Its scope is certainly huge, and this section will
necessarily be limited in the detail of its analysis of
environmental laws. Its goal is rather to make clear the
conundrum posed by the interaction of the liberal
economic/political context with its environmental regulatory
constraints. As we discuss below, this leads to what might be
called environmental law’s “problematic.”
Although some important environmental laws in the United
States reach back sixty years,26 environmental law in its modern
guise is commonly seen to have taken shape in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. This was marked by the passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969, the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, and the
avalanche of legislation that followed, including the Clean Air Act
(CAA), Clean Water Act (CWA), Endangered Species Act (ESA),
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA). Early successes in resource conservation include the
Wilderness Act of 1964, the Land and Water Conservation Fund
Act of 1964, and the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Systems of
1968.27 Between 1960 and early 2000, the National Park System
more than tripled in size from 25 million acres to over 83 million
acres. Since 1964, Congress has set aside 106 million acres of
land and designated over 10,800 protected miles of rivers. The
Endangered Species Act of 1973 has been characterized as “one of

25. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 206-07 (2004).
26. See KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 1945-1970 38ff (2009) (tracing the earliest environmental
laws to shortly after World War II).
27. MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS 177-82 (4th ed.
2006).
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the strongest federal environmental laws” that “symbolizes the
nation’s commitment to resource conservation goals.”28 Its most
celebrated successes include recovery of the American bald eagle,
the peregrine falcon, and the California grey whale. By 2006, the
Fish and Wildlife Service had designated 470 critical habits, and
it had developed over 500 habitat conservation plans and around
1,000 approved recovery plans.29
Natural resource management has become a burgeoning field
that has changed the nature of raw material extraction, whether
of renewable resources like forests and fisheries or nonrenewables such as minerals and oil and gas.30 Legislation
designed to conserve natural resources and reduce ecological
damage include the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, the
Forest Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 and
1978, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the
National Forest Management Act of 1976, the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act of 1978.
Each imposes both procedural
obligations shaping planning and development, as well as
substantive standards that such development must adhere to.
Environmental regulations have had a direct effect on human
health, for example, by decreasing urban smog and improving
water quality. The EPA’s 2008 Report on the Environment
reported a 96% drop in lead levels between 1980 and 2006; a
decline of 75% in the anthropogenic carbon monoxide emissions
between 1980 and 2002; a decrease of 41% of ambient
concentrations of nitrous oxides between 1980 and 2006; and a
decline of 37% in sulphur dioxide emissions between 1990 and
2002.31 The decline of nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide has
resulted in a decrease in acid rain across most of the U.S., which
in turn has lowered the acidity of many rivers and lakes. In
addition, between 1970 and 1985, the Clean Water Act led to a

28. Id. at 192.
29. Id. at 47.
30. Note that the term “natural resource” derives from a utilitarian
understanding of the earth that shapes and limits related analysis and
discussion.
31. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2008 REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 2-14,
available at http://www.epa.gov/roe/docs/roe_final/EPAROE_FINAL_2008.pdf.
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32% increase in the number of people served by wastewater
treatment plants, resulting in a 46% drop in the annual release of
organic wastes in the U.S.32 The Safe Drinking Water Act,
moreover, has led to improvements in drinking water quality,
particularly in cities, with the worst point-source water pollution
mostly eliminated.33
Many more laws have indirectly improved human health, for
example, by changing the nature of the materials allowed in
consumer products. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 led
to the review of more than 50,000 existing chemicals by the EPA.
In addition, EPA reviews approximately one thousand new
chemicals each year and regulates their manufacture, sale, use,
and disposal to prevent “unreasonable risk of injury to health or
The 1986 Emergency Planning and
the environment.”34
Community Right to Know Act requires manufacturers to report
annually to the EPA the quantity of more than 650 toxic
chemicals that have been released by them into the air, water,
and land.35
Some of these regulations have been aimed
specifically at changing industrial and market processes to
improve their resource efficiencies, to mandate resource recovery
and recycling, or to shape patterns of consumption. The National
Energy Act of 1978, for example, led to an array of tax credits to
improve energy efficiency in homes and increased taxes on gas
guzzling cars. As a result, appliances became 75% more efficient
from the late 1970s to early 1990s, while passenger automobiles
increased their gas mileage from fourteen to twenty-two miles per
gallon between 1973 and 1991.36 The Pollution Prevention Act of
1990 helped usher in comprehensive state-level recycling laws
and innovative municipal programs leading to an increase in

32. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 32.
33. RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 281 (1999).
34. LAZARUS, supra note 25, at 73.
35. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lcra.html (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013); see KRAFT, supra note 27, at 36; R. Michael M’Gonigle et al.,
Community Right to Know: Improving Public Information about Toxic
Chemicals, 5 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 95 (1995).
36. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 164-65.

13

1018

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

recycling of municipal waste from 6% in 1960 to 33% in 2005.37
Similarly, generation of hazardous waste decreased by nearly
20% between 1999 and 2005.38
The breadth, depth, and diversity of what the environmental
law hath wrought is impressive. Yet, amidst these successes,
many serious environmental problems have persisted or gotten
worse.
For example, despite achievements in wilderness
conservation, ecologically critical wetlands continue to be lost to
development,39 with the amount of developed land in the U.S.
increasing by 47% between 1982 and 2002.40 The Endangered
Species Act may be the hallmark of environmental commitment
in America, yet relatively few species have made it off the
endangered list since the passage of the Act in 1973. And while a
wide array of resource management statutes impose planning
requirements and environmental standards, the implementing
agencies are given “great discretion to interpret and implement
the statutes” as they attempt to juggle economic exploitation of
public resources with environmental protection.41
In terms of air and water quality, atmospheric concentration
of greenhouse gases went up by 16% between 1990 and 2005.42
While reduction of nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide led to a
drop in acid rain, high nitrogen and phosphorous concentrations
affect 30% of shallow streams.43 Incidentally, the Clean Water
Act fails to target non-point sources of nitrogen and phosphorous,
deriving primarily from agricultural runoff. Likewise, the EPA
reported in 2008 that around 60% of shallow wells tested in
agricultural areas contained pesticides.44 And despite thousands
of chemicals now being regularly reviewed and regulated,

37. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT: HIGHLIGHTS OF
NATIONAL TRENDS 21 (2008) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT],
available at http://www.epa.gov/roehd/pdf/roe_hd_layout_508.pdf.
38. Id. at 23.
39. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 212.
40. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 20.
41. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 179, 181.
42. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 8.
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 12.
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extensive chemical use continues in ways that put public health
and the environment at risk.45
Some inroads were definitely made with fuel efficiency. At
the same time, the Gas Guzzler Tax excluded small trucks,
leading to an explosion in the market for inefficient minivans and
SUV’s. By 2004, this loophole allowed for an average level of fuel
efficiency that was less than what had been achieved almost two
decades earlier.46 Likewise, the size, expanded functions, and
sheer abundance of appliances have cancelled out many of the
gains made by efficiency standards for home appliances.
Although pollution prevention laws help to increase recycling, the
amount of waste generated in the U.S. regularly increases in pace
with consumer spending.47 As a result, the amount of solid waste
generated per person has remained the same at about four and a
half pounds per day.48 Richard Andrews notes:
[W]ith few exceptions – leaded gasoline, PCBs, and a very few
pesticides – none of these policies were designed to systematically
reduce the actual production and use of serious pollutants. Nor
were they designed to manage more pervasive causal factors in
human behavior patterns and economic activity, such as the
continuing urbanization of the landscape and its ecosystems and
the increasing use of energy and materials per capita. 49

A systematic analysis of how diverse underlying economic
and political forces have created the environmental problem is
critical to understand what might be called the “problematic” of
environmental law.
This term generally refers to the
“configuration of theoretical concepts presupposed in a text of
discourse” thus defining “the ‘field’ of questions which can be
posed and the forms the answers must take.”50 The occasional
45. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 35.
46. TERRY TAMMINEN, LIVES PER GALLON: THE TRUE COST OF OUR
ADDICTION 71 (2006).
47. KRAFT, supra note 27, at 40.
48. REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 37, at 21.
49. ANDREWS, supra note 33, at 253.
50. BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIAL THOUGHT
(William Outhwaite & Tom Bottomore eds., 1994) (our usage adapts
meaning to refer to the underlying configuration of power relations
intellectual frameworks that create a “problem,” and that then sets
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acknowledgement of the need to address root causes, or carping
about the development of the “consumer society” points to an
implicit recognition of the existence of an underlying
environmental problematic. But environmental law itself does not
address this problematic; it operates within it. In the next
section, we will therefore consider the economic and political
context of these environmental problems, highlighting the
structure of production and consumption, and the role of law
within that structure.
B. Structures from History
In contrast to the limited focus of most environmental law, it
is important to cast back to reveal the structural dynamics that
create the environmental “problem.” This entails a broader
understanding of law in its economic and political context, that is,
seeing law through a lens that can make visible those larger
constitutive processes of which the regulatory regimes are just
one part. This is the lens of political economy. When political
economy gives prominence to the place of nature, it is known as
political ecology. What follows might then be characterized as a
political ecology perspective, one that is designed to illuminate
the problematic that shapes environmental law rather than the
problems that environmental law addresses. To do this, the
following section will briefly review the history of law and policy
in five primary resource sectors: oil and gas, biofuels, forestry,
agriculture, and water.
a.

Oil and Gas

When President Obama announced his “Comprehensive Plan
for Energy Security” in the spring of 2010, many of his
environmental supporters were shocked to hear that large areas
of U.S. coastal waters in the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and

boundaries that limit the discourse about the nature of those relations and their
resolution).
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the Arctic would be opened to oil and natural gas drilling.51
Obama told his audience:
This is not a decision that I’ve made lightly. . . . But the bottom
line is this: Given our energy needs, in order to sustain economic
growth and produce jobs and keep our businesses competitive,
we’re going to need to harness traditional sources of fuel even as
we ramp up production of new sources of renewable, home grown
energy.52

George Bush put it more bluntly in his 2006 State of the
Union Address stating: “We have a serious problem: America is
addicted to oil. . . .”53 Addiction is a well-chosen word because it
recognizes something that is fundamental to character, long
established, self-destructive—and difficult to change. The U.S. is
the world leader in per capita oil consumption, which with only
4.6% of the world’s population, produces 21% of the global GDP,
and consumes 26% of its oil.54 But the addiction is worldwide
with every national government committed to the economic
growth and increased productivity that oil enables. Such goals
are only achievable with an ever-swelling use of energy and
growing consumption of resources. As the oil and gas industry
has warned U.S. administrations since the 1930s, “unless the
federal and state governments worked with the oil and gas
industry to increase production . . . [the] U.S. oil and gas industry
would decline and the nation would become more dependent on
foreign oil.”55
In the United States, domestic energy policy from the late
nineteenth century to the present has been based on a
fundamental link between the level of energy production and

51. Remarks by the President on Energy Security at Andrews Air Force Base,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-energy-security-andrews-air-force-base-3312010.
52. Id.
53. State of the Union Address by the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 31,
2006) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/.
54. DAVID HOWELL & CAROLE NAKHLE, OUT OF THE ENERGY LABYRINTH:
UNITING ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO AVERT CATASTROPHE 68 (2007).
55. See Alex Mills, Obama Energy Policies Bring Rationale Questions, GO SAN
ANGELO, Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.gosanangelo.com/news/2009/oct/17/obama
energy-policies-bring-rationale-questions/?print=1.
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gross domestic product. In general, as more energy is produced,
prices remain stable or relatively low and the GDP grows to
increase general welfare.56 As a result, low oil prices amount to
the best prescription for an inflation-free economic boom. This is
reflected by business cycles, the rises and falls of which have
since 1973 echoed the patterns of oil prices. Until 1998, oil prices
played a stronger and statistically more significant role than
Profit
interest rates in American unemployment levels.57
margins widen dramatically as the price of energy falls.58
Demand gains strength fuelling rising stock markets and higher
wages. And, of course, voters reward politicians for all of these
things—low inflation, high employment, and booming economic
growth.
Energy law and policy, and the environmental law and policy
related to it, are thus framed by the overriding commitment to
economic development and growth based on access to cheap
energy resources. Important degrees of difference exist (for
example, between more collectivist European and more
individualist American approaches), but access to stable and ascheap-as-possible energy animates the energy and environmental
policies of all major players on the world stage.
While
conservation measures and environmental regulations can
mitigate some of the negative impacts of growth, they do not
challenge the broad goal of expanding production to allow
increased consumption.59
This productionist orientation of energy industries, markets,
and regulation in the U.S. assumed the shape it has today nearly
a century ago. For example, the common law developed the “rule
of capture,” which allocated ownership of oil to the person who

56. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 383
(2004).
57. JOHN BACHER, PETROTYRANNY 259 (2000).
58. Id. (the economic boom from 1993 to 1999 has sometimes been attributed
to the “tech” revolution, but others now argue that it was the product of an oil
glut and breakdown of OPEC discipline).
59. MATTHEW ALAN CAHN, ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTIONS: THE TENSION
BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
105 (1995).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

18

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1023

found and took control of it.60 This spurred landowners to “drill
as many holes as possible so as to extract . . . oil and gas before
his neighbor.”61 Two provisions in the Tax Act were later
introduced in an effort to increase domestic oil and gas
production. The expensing of intangible costs of drilling and dry
holes was introduced in 1916, allowing oil and gas producers to
write off a significant portion of the costs incurred in “bringing a
well to production.”62 The percentage depletion allowance came
into effect in 1926 enabling producers to deduct 27.5% of revenue
from their gross income annually, even allowing deductions in
excess of the cost of their investment.63 These and many other
tax breaks reduced effective tax rates and ultimately the costs of
production, thereby increasing exploitation.64 Royalties may also
be reduced or waived to encourage oil exploration and
development in difficult physical conditions.65 In addition, the
60. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (1840) (“That the person who
owns the surface may dig the rein, and apply all that is there found to his own
purposes at his free will and pleasure.”); Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson,
The Rule of Capture - An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005)
(the rule of capture was also applied to groundwater, game animals, and
minerals).
61. Kramer & Anderson, supra note 60, at 899.
62. SALVATORE LAZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33578, ENERGY TAX POLICY:
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT ISSUES 5-6 (2008) (intangible drilling costs include
such things as labor and material costs, equipment repairs, hauling and drilling
site preparation. Dry holes make up about 80% of all wells drilled. Expensing
of these costs, provided through the Tax Act, allows them to be deducted against
other types of income).
63. Id. at 6.
64. See Joseph Mandarino, A Survey of Federal Energy Tax Incentives, 14
DIALOGUE 6 (2006); GILBERT METCALF, MIT JOINT PROG. ON SCI. & POL’Y OF
GLOBAL CHANGE NO. 142, FEDERAL TAX POLICY TOWARDS ENERGY (2007);
TAMMINEN, supra note 46, at 60 (estimating the annual value of credits or
subsidies for 2006 as follows: 2005 Energy Policy Act, $6 billion; depletion
allowance, $784 million to $1 billion; fuel production tax credit, $769-900
million; enhanced oil recovery tax credit, $26-100 million; foreign tax credit, $13 billion; foreign income “deferral,” $183-318 million; and accelerated
depreciation allowance, $1-4.5 billion).
65. See, e.g. JOHN DUFFIELD, OVER A BARREL: THE COSTS OF U.S. FOREIGN OIL
DEPENDENCE 75-76 (2007) (the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty
Relief Act of Nov. 1995 reduced or eliminated royalties in existing leases of oil
and gas resources in deep-water areas, and suspended royalties on new leases in
specified water depths in the Gulf of Mexico for five years. Likewise, the
government issued new regulations in 1996 that lowered royalties on federal
lands that produced heavy oil).
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U.S. federal government spent more than $100 billion on energy
research and development between 1974-2000.66
In fact, the energy sector is one of the world’s most subsidized
industries, receiving total government handouts of between $240$310 billion per year.67
According to a report by the
Environmental Law Institute, federal fossil fuel subsidies in the
U.S. totaled $72.5 billion between 2002-2008.68 The majority of
subsidies were made up of just a handful of tax breaks, the two
most significant for that period being the Foreign Tax Credit at
$15.3 billion and the Credit for Production of Nonconventional
Fuels at $14.1 billion.69 These were followed by exploration and
development expensing at $7.1 billion, percentage over cost
depletion at $5.441 billion, and the credit for enhanced oil
recovery at $1.575 billion.70 Although earning record profits, oil
companies are nevertheless expected to receive more than $32.9
billion in handouts between 2008-2013.71

66. Id. at 76 (at its peak spending between 1978-1981, nearly 75% of this
budget went to research on synthetic fuels from coal and oil shale despite their
low net energy potential and highly toxic byproducts. By contrast, 14% of R&D
spending went to traditional oil and gas research leaving only around 10% for
alternative energy).
67. “Global Green New Deal” Environmentally-Focused Investment Historic
Opportunity for 21st Century Prosperity and Job Creation, UNITED NATIONS
ENV’T PROGRAMME (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.unep.org/Documents.
Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=548&ArticleID=5957&l=en.
68. ADEYEYE, ADENIKE ET AL., ENVTL. L. INST., ESTIMATING U.S. GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIES TO ENERGY SOURCES: 2002-2008, 6 (2009), available at http://www
.elistore.org/Data/products/d19_07.pdf.
69. Id. at 3-18.
70. Id.
71. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, BIG OIL, BIGGER GIVEAWAYS (2009), available at
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/93/72/4/447/FoE_Oil_Giveaway_Analysis_200
8.pdf. The $32.9 billion subsidy includes tax benefits, royalty relief, research
and development subsidies as well as accounting gimmicks such as the “last in,
first out” method which reduced income taxes in times of inflation by recording
the most recently produced items as sold first. There is a chance that these
subsidies could be tempered in the future in light of the recent congressional
fights over the defeated Ending Big Oil Tax Subsidy Act, H.R. 601, 112th Cong.
(2011), and President Obama’s announcement in September 2011 of a deficit
reduction plan that includes eliminating $41 billion in subsidies (tax loopholes)
to the oil and gas industry. See Daniel Weiss & Valeri Vasques, Big Oil’s
Mountain of Cash, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/ big_oil_cash.html.
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Thus the true costs of fossil fuel dependence are buried in the
law beneath a myriad of formal (direct and indirect) public
subsidies. On top of these, however, are a variety of informal or
implicit subsidies including countless so-called environmental
“externalities,” such as air pollution, acid rain, oil spills, health
impacts, and premature deaths, which have long been treated as
manageable economic costs.72 Almost as significant, but in
different ways, is the massive subsidy provided through the
maintenance of active military support, a subsidy that skews the
whole orientation of federal budgets, expenditures, foreign
relations, and “military-industrial” politics.73 In addition, Oil
Change International reports that the U.S. Congress provided
more than $15.6 billion in international “oil aid” financing
between 2002-2007.74 While often presented as “development
assistance,” such aid commonly amounts to a subsidy for some of
the wealthiest oil corporations.75 The details of energy law and
policy may vary with the political persuasion of governments, but
the general orientation does not.76
72. These externalities are not fully manageable and, in monetary terms, are
not fully measurable. This is clearly the case with, for example, climate change,
the costs of which some have conservatively estimated to be $1 trillion per year
or more. See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: HOW TAX
DOLLARS CAN UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 80-81 (2001).
According to the 2006 U.K. governmental report The Economics of Climate
Change, “solving” climate change (by holding the increase in CO2 in the
atmosphere to 500 ppm, even though the consensus level that is needed to
stabilize the climate is the much lower figure of 350 ppm) would take an
estimated 1% of global GDP. See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xiv (2007).
73. The largest financial subsidy that is unaccounted for in American energy
policy is military intervention that helps provide security for oil operations in
countries such as Iraq, Colombia, and oil-rich regions of Central Asia and West
Africa. U.S. military interventions, particularly under the umbrella of the war
on terror, have worked to establish favorable conditions for implementing the
U.S.-directed projects in Iraq and Colombia that have opened up oil reserves for
exploitation by multinational oil corporations. See GARRY LEECH, CRUDE
INTERVENTIONS: THE UNITED STATES, OIL AND THE NEW WORLD (DIS) ORDER 4
(2006).
74. Steve Kretzmann, Aiding Oil, Harming the Climate, OIL CHANGE INT’L
(Dec. 6, 2007), http://priceofoil.org/2007/12/06/aiding-oil-harming-the-climate/.
The $15.6 billion in “oil aid” is in addition to domestic subsidies
75. Id.
76. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 56, at 70-72. The authors note the
similarities in energy policies from Reagan and Clinton through to Bush
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On the other side of the production equation, the modern
state that facilitates production profits directly from it.
According to the Tax Foundation, between 1981 and 2008, oil
producers paid an average of $14.37 billion per year to federal
and state governments in corporate income taxes and almost
double the amount to foreign governments.77 Over the same 27year period, the industry paid a total of $1.1 trillion in excise and
sales taxes.78 In the never-ending circle that is the modern
capitalist economy, these excise taxes go directly to support
highway maintenance that, in turn, subsidize automobile
purchases and use.79 For governments, the promise of incoming
investments, taxes, and/or export dollars drives all governments
to support the outgoing costs of developing the energy industry
with incentives and subsidies. In Canada, for example, energy
exports reached $133 billion in 2008, the highest value ever, and
a record of 28% of all merchandise trade.80 Canada surpassed
Saudi Arabia as the largest single exporter of oil to the U.S. in
2001. The vast “tar sands” in northern Alberta receive strong
government support for growth in production despite their low
net energy returns and high environmental costs.81 As the
illustrating that despite differences in rhetoric, all adhere to the basic fossil fuel
production model. Id. at 30.
77. Scott Hodge, IEA Study Ranks Nations’ Subsidies to Fossil Fuel
Consumption, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2010), http://taxfoundation.org/article/ieastudy-ranks-nations-subsidies-fossil-fuel-consumption.
78. Id.
79. More recently, approximately 15% goes to fund mass transit. See
METCALF, supra note 64, at 5; PAMELA JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30304, THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON GASOLINE AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND–
A SHORT HISTORY (2006).
80. See STATISTICS CANADA, CANADA YEAR BOOK 2009 137 (2009). This
includes exports of crude petroleum, natural gas, coal, petroleum and natural
gas products, and electricity (hydro and nuclear). However, crude oil alone
accounted for $41.8 billion. As parts of Canada also import energy, the net
energy exports for 2008 were $73 billion. Note that energy exports decreased to
$79.9 billion in 2009 due to the recession and the fall in prices, with a
corresponding decline in net exports to $46 billion. See STATISTICS CANADA,
CANADA YEAR BOOK 2010 143 (2010).
81. One barrel of bitumen oil from the tar sands emits three times as much
greenhouse gas as one barrel of conventional oil. To extract each barrel of tar
sand oil also requires three barrels of water, 90% of which ends up in toxic
tailing ponds. This has led to groundwater contamination and high rates of a
rare cancer in a downstream community. Each day, the industry also uses the
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world’s largest energy project, investments in the tar sands now
total approximately $200 billion, attracting nearly 60% of all
global oil investments.82 Yet no comprehensive assessment has
been conducted of the environmental, economic, or social
impacts.83 This kind of pattern applies in spades in developing
nations that receive critical foreign investment and trade dollars
from their oil and gas sales. In Nigeria, for example, petroleum
revenues constitute 90-95% of the state’s total budget revenues.84
For that reason, the Nigerian government has been willing to
take extreme measures to protect the interests of the oil industry
in their country.85
From a GLT perspective, one can assess the environmental
problematic and its attendant processes in new ways. For one
thing, of concern here are not specific “legal” laws but complex
regimes of power and law. In this light, specific regulatory
initiatives that might restrain production confront an established
and successful economic (and political) “dynamic” that limits
what can be done. This dynamic and the underlying logic that
gives effect to it constitutes a “deeper” level of “regulation” that
must be understood in new ways, with new tools, and with very
different approaches not to “legal reform” but to “systemic reformation.” Here we can see how production is controlled by
large, capital-intensive, integrated and centralized private firms,
equivalent amount of natural gas required to heat four million homes. If
development proceeds as projected, it will “destroy or industrialize a forest the
size of Florida.” See ANDREW NIKIFORUK, TAR SANDS: DIRTY OIL AND THE FUTURE
OF A CONTINENT 1-4 (2d ed., 2010). A report by the International Institute for
Sustainable Development estimated that the tar sands receive $1.59 billion
annually in subsidies from the federal (Canada) and provincial (Alberta)
governments. Production in 2008 was 442 million barrels, or about 42% of all oil
production in Canada, with an export value of $37 billion. This production is
expected to double by 2018. See DAVE SAWYER & SETON STIEBERT,
ENVIROECONOMICS, INC., FOSSIL FUELS – AT WHAT COST? 22 (2010), available at
http://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/ffs_awc_3canprovinces.pdf.
82. NIKIFORUK, supra note 81, at 2.
83. Id.
84. Abiola Morgan-Anyakwo & Craig Withers, B2B Opportunities in Nigeria’s
Oil and Gas Industry, AFRICA J., Winter 2006, at 14.
85. One tragic case is that of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists
who led a non-violent campaign against the extreme environmental damage in
the Niger Delta caused by the multinational petroleum industry, especially
Shell. All were hanged in 1995 by the military government.
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all of which are publicly regulated by large government agencies
such as the Department of Energy in the United States, with the
activities of both fuelling the macro-economy. This model dates
from a time when constraints to production could be overcome
with technology and capital, and the goal of government was to
ensure that these were available.
Environmental concerns
arrived later on the government agenda, emanating from
separate legislation situated in specialized (and different)
agencies, and provoking limited bureaucratic movement. The
dominant goal of policy was, and continues to be, overcoming
constraints to production in order to support on-going economic
growth.
Despite recent developments like global warming,
regulatory authorities do not take seriously those who call for a
“new economy” designed to work within energy and
environmental constraints rather than overcome them. For a
green legal theorist, this conundrum points beyond the formal
law the true sources of social regulation (and ‘re-form’).
In contrast, the task of environmental law has and remains
that of mitigating the impacts of production. And mitigation is a
big and complex job—from setting standards for exploitation and
development, to protecting sensitive areas from development, to
limiting the impacts of production on air and water quality.86
86. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act addresses the injection of
fluids for oil and gas extraction under its Underground Injected Control
Program while the Clean Water Act addresses discharges of surface water by
exploration and production activities. The Clean Air Act sets concentration
limits for specific airborne pollutants as well as seven hazardous pollutants.
Interestingly, however, none of the National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Airborne Pollutants apply to oil and gas exploration and production.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EXEMPTION OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION WASTES FROM FEDERAL HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATIONS (2002),
available at http://epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oil/oil-gas.pdf.
In
addition, a wide range of laws are administered by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency that address energy production including the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, and
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Prior to 2008, there was a congressional
moratorium on drilling on much of the outer continental shelf of the U.S.,
though this ban was allowed to expire in 2008. Contrary to his position during
the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama began to open these waters to drilling
in April 2010 before largely reversing his decision following the oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico. The Arctic National Refuge has also been protected from oil and
gas extraction, though this status is an ongoing political controversy. Its
continuing protection from development is far from assured particularly under a
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The regulatory goal is not to change social patterns in order that
we might leave oil and coal in the ground, and rivers undammed,
but to make their development less harmful to an implicit, and
unchallengeable, social trajectory. This is why policy is usually
justified in terms of greater ‘efficiency’ in use rather than restructured reductions in ‘demand’. Cars were not banned from
the city, and massive conversions not made to public transit and
bicycles. Energy users were not penalized with fines for above
average consumption. Consumer culture was not challenged with
the purchase of larger appliances and profligate energy use
penalized. Quite the opposite. The 1980s and 90s (when
conservation was a public priority) saw the greatest boom in
consumerism and energy use in planetary history. Of course,
many environmentalists and environmental lawyers would like
nothing better than to see the pace of energy development slowed
or even stopped. But that is not possible within the structure in
which environmental law is embedded—and there is nothing in
the lexicon of this field of regulation to help one think outside, let
alone get outside, that structure that puts production as the
priority, with environmental regulation pulling up the rear.
Thus, beyond greater efficiency, the orientation of energy and
environmental law and policy is toward making new, and risky,
forms of supply workable. For example, exploiting remote and
hard-to-access oil deposits in sensitive ecosystems like the Arctic
or under the deep ocean, manufacturing dirty oil from the tar
sands, creating hydrogen fuels and expanding existing sources of
electricity to produce them (including nuclear energy), developing
problematic new technologies to create “clean coal” and sequester
their greenhouse gases underground and—despite its claims of
being something new—bringing on stream so-called “alternative”
or “green” renewable energy.

Republican majority in the House of Representatives. In terms of international
standards, the American Petroleum Industry maintains about 400 voluntary
standards which are widely used in the U.S. and globally, and were historically
seen as the industry standard.
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Biofuels

This GLT approach directs attention to the problematic (in
both senses of the word) promise of “alternative” energy, such as
biofuels.
Facing rising scarcity and higher costs for
hydrocarbons, the use of biofuels has increased dramatically over
the past two decades. In 2009, the U.S. alone produced 10.75
billion gallons of ethanol, more than double the 5.6 billion gallons
The U.S. Energy Security and
it produced in 2006.87
Independence Act of 2007 created federal renewable fuel
mandates of 36 billion gallons by 2022.88 To meet this, the
government estimates that 527 new biorefineries requiring $168
billion in investment will be needed.89 The EU’s Renewable
Energy Directive sets binding targets for 20% of all energy and
10% of transport fuels to come from renewable sources by 2020.90
The same kind of trend can be seen worldwide.91 Yet, to replace
10% of the gasoline in the U.S. with ethanol and biodiesel would
require 43% of current U.S. cropland to be allocated to biofuel
production.92 To meet a substitution rate of 10% liquid biofuels
87. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA REGIONAL BIOFUELS ROADMAP TO MEETING
BIOFUELS GOALS OF THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2022 AS SET OUT IN
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007 2 (2010), available at
http://www.usda.gov/documents/USDA_Biofuels_Report_ 6232010.pdf; ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030 8
(2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2008).pdf.
88. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 87, at 18.
89. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 87, at 7.
90. Directive 2009/28/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy From Renewable Sources
and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and
2003/30/EC.
91. Canada requires all gasoline to have a 5% average renewable fuel content
and, since July 1, 2010, has mandated a 2% biofuel content for diesel fuel and
heating oil. India aims for 20% of its fuels to derive from ethanol by 2017,
Brazil has a minimum ethanol mandate of 18-20% (reduced from 25% in 2010),
and China is aiming for a 10% biofuel mandate for 2020. For a listing of biofuel
mandates in fifty-two countries, see Jim Lane, Biofuels Mandates Around the
World, BIOFUELS DIGEST (July 21, 2011), http://biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/
2011/07/21/biofuels-mandates-around-the-world/; see also Ethanol from Around
the World, BIOFUELS ASS’N OF AUSTL., http://www.biofuelsassociation.com.
au/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=86 (last visited
Feb. 26, 2013).
92. C. Ford Runge, The Case Against Biofuels: Probing Ethanol’s Hidden
Costs, YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/the_case_
THE
THE
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globally could require an area equivalent to 36% of the world’s
arable land.93 These statistics point to the challenge and
potential conflicts implicated in meeting current targets for
biofuel production.
Despite such findings, the biofuel boom continues to be
generously sponsored by government subsidies. Canada, the
U.S., and the EU spent $11 billion on biofuel subsidies in 2006
alone, with such spending predicted to rise to $25 billion per year
by 2015.94 Subsidies include tax concessions and direct support
such as exemptions from fuel excise taxes, loans, and grants for
investment in productive capacity.95 The U.S. spent $16.8 billion
subsidizing corn-based ethanol between 2002-2008, totaling more
than half of all subsidies to renewable energy.96 As of 2011,
against_biofuels_probing_ethanols_hidden_costs/2251/. Twenty-four percent of
the corn harvest in the U.S. was used for ethanol production in 2007, yet
contributed only 1.3% toward national liquid fuel use. See Robert Howarth et
al., Rapid Assessment on Biofuels and Environment: Overview and Key
Findings, in BIOFUELS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH
CHANGING LAND USE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS
OF THE ENVIRONMENT (SCOPE) INTERNATIONAL BIOFUELS PROJECT RAPID
ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (Robert Warren Howarth & S. Bringezu eds., 2009), available
at http://cip.cornell.edu/DPubS/Repository/1.0/Disseminate?view=body&id=pdf
_1&handle=scope/1245782000.
93. See Howarth et al., supra note 92. Estimates of required agricultural
land range from 118-508 million hectares depending on the crop used and
assumed level of productivity. If a combination of jatropha and sugar cane, (the
two preferred crops in terms of greenhouse gas benefits) were used, the total
land required to meet a 10% biofuel substitution target globally would be an
estimated 243 million hectares or 17% of the current 1,400 million hectares of
arable land globally. See N.H. Ravindranath et al., Greenhouse Gas Implications
of Land Use and Land Conversion to Biofuel Crops, in BIOFUELS
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH CHANGING LAND USE,
supra note 92, at 117.
94. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., BIOFUEL SUPPORT POLICIES: AN
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 111, 147 (2008), available at http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5108121e.pdf?expires=1337981432&id=i
d&accname=ocid177125&checksum=D9299B33850EEE0A3D1B187D29B1E4A9.
95. See RONALD STEENBLIK, GLOBAL SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE, BIOFUELS-AT WHAT
COST? GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR ETHANOL AND BIODIESEL IN SELECTED OECD
COUNTRIES: A SYNTHESIS OF REPORTS ADDRESSING SUBSIDIES FOR BIOFUELS IN
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
2 (2007), available at http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/oecdbiofuels
.pdf.
96. ENVTL. LAW INST., ENERGY SUBSIDIES BLACK, NOT GREEN (2009), available
at http://www.eli.org/pdf/Energy_Subsidies_Black_Not_Green.pdf.
Biofuel
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blenders in the U.S. received a tax credit of $.45 per gallon of
ethanol blended into conventional gasoline and $1 per gallon of
biodiesel blended into fossil diesel.97 In 2009, these biofuel tax
credits in the U.S. amounted to $6 billion.98 There are also a
variety of agricultural schemes such as the EU’s Energy Crop Aid
which pays 45 Euros per hectare for non-food crops. Government
funding for research and development (R&D) has also poured into
the commercialization of biofuel technologies. The U.S. spent
$800 million on R&D related to biofuels from 1993-2004.99 The
EU allocated around 139 million Euros for biofuels and
biorefinery research in 2007 and 2008.100 Canada has invested
$145 million (Cdn) into its Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation
Program to support R&D to advance its bio-based economy,101 a
small portion of the $2.2 billion allocated to programs to boost
domestic production.102
Energy security remains a strong
justification for such government spending, but the USDA’s
involvement underlines the push for new market outlets and
additional demand for American agricultural products to raise
farm incomes and stimulate economic growth.103
While biofuels are often promoted as eco-friendly and a
weapon against climate change, evidence to the contrary is
growing.104 Studies are showing some biofuel production systems
Watch reported that biofuels comprised 80% of all “renewable energy” subsidies
in the U.S. and add up to $5.5 to $7.3 billion per year. Almuth Ernsting, From
Agrofuels to Biochar, BIOFUEL WATCH (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.biofuelwatch.
org.uk/docs/agrofuels_and_biochar_article.pdf.
97. This is down from $0.51 cents ethanol tax credit set in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. See STEENBLIK, supra note 95, at 33. Both the ethanol and biodiesel
tax credits were due to expire at the end of 2011. While the biodiesel tax credit
was extended, the ethanol tax credit was allowed to expire.
98. RONALD WILLIAM GECAN ET AL., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, USING BIOFUEL
TAX CREDITS TO ACHIEVE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY GOALS vii (2010),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11477/07-14-Biofuels.pdf.
99. Id. at 36.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 36.
102. Id. at 34.
103. This is underlined by the involvement of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture in biofuel policy. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra
note 94, at 27.
104. See G. Phillip Robertson et al., Agriculture - Sustainable Biofuels Redux,
322 SCI. 49 (2008) (discussing the sustainability of biofuel production).
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to result in a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions,
particularly when nitrous oxide emissions from the use of
nitrogen fertilizer are taken into account.105
Even more
concerning are the greenhouse gas emissions that result from
conversion of native ecosystems, particularly forests and peat
One study using a world-wide
lands, to biofuel crops.106
agricultural model to estimate emissions from land-use change
found that corn-based ethanol nearly doubled greenhouse gas
emissions over 30 years, with emissions continuing to increase for
the next 167 years.107 Another study found that conversion of
rainforests with peat soils to palm plantations could increase net
emissions of greenhouse gas emissions by a factor of twenty
relative to the use of fossil fuels.108
This is particularly
concerning as the biofuel boom has lifted palm oil prices by nearly
half, contributing to the state-supported expansion of plantations
in both Indonesia and Malaysia at the expense of carbon-rich peat
swamps and tropical rainforest.109
Expansion of biofuel production also comes up against the
growing demand for food. According to David Mitchell, a lead
economist with the Development Prospects Group of the World
Bank, the 53% rise in food prices between March 2007 and March
2008,110 and 140% increase in food prices between January 2002

105. Nitrous oxide is 300 times more potent in its global warming effect than
carbon dioxide. See Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 3-4.
106. Id. at 4.
107. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-use Change, 319 SCI. 1238
(2008).
108. Life cycle analyses that do not take into consideration the emissions from
land-use changes misleadingly report an 80% saving in greenhouse gases for
palm oil in comparison to fossil fuels. See Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 5; E.
Minichetti & M. Otto, Energy Balance and Greenhouse Gas Emissions of
Biofuels from a Life-Cycle Perspective, in BIOFUELS ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITH CHANGING LAND USE, supra note 92.
109. E.B Fitzherbert et al., How Will Oil Palm Expansion Affect Biodiversity?,
23 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 538, 539 (2008); ASBJØRNE EIDE, THE RIGHT
TO FOOD AND THE IMPACT OF LIQUID BIOFUELS (AGROFUELS) 22 (2009), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap550e/ap550e.pdf.
110. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SOARING FOOD PRICES AND
FOOD SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/153710ec68d2068ad0a8d29a1e2bd6630fce96.pdf; see EIDE, supra, note 109, at 14;
Steven Sexton et al., Food Versus Fuel: How Biofuels Make Food More Costly
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and February 2008 was due, in large part, to biofuels
production.111 In addition to increasing food prices, biofuel
production weakens access to food for vulnerable populations by
concentrating land for plantation-type production resulting in
evictions or the marginalization of vulnerable inhabitants and
increasing competition for water.112 Water for irrigation is
already in short supply and may soon be inadequate to meet the
demand for food in many regions.113 The perverse impact of
biofuel production is, thus, to pit the world’s 800 million wealthy
car owners against the world’s 2 billion poorest people.114
It is, as one commentator noted, “a sad irony of the biofuels
experience that resource alternatives that seemed farmer-friendly
and green have turned out so badly.”115 At the same time,
however, the policies surrounding biofuel production are framed
not by environmental and social concerns, but by the same
overriding commitment of energy policy more generally: to ensure
access to stable and as-cheap-as-possible energy in order to keep
the economy growing.
While conservation measures and
environmental regulations might mitigate some of the worst
impacts of energy production, whether biofuels or oil and gas,
they do nothing to challenge the environmentally harmful goals
of expanded production and increased consumption. This is the
real, yet hugely neglected, systemic locus of social “regulation”
that drives specific legal laws, from land tenures and subsidy
programs to fuel content rules.
c.

Forestry

Just as the primary goal of energy policy has been to
maintain access to affordable supplies, so too is forestry policy
driven by the need to maintain a steady level of supplies, and at
the right price. And as with energy, timber subsidies abound.
and Gasoline Cheaper, 12 AGRIC. & RES. ECON. UPDATE 1, 2 (Sept./Oct. 2008),
available at www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/extension/update/articles/v12n1_1.pdf.
111. Mitchell calculated that three-quarters of the 140% price rise was due to
biofuel production. See EIDE, supra note 109, at 14.
112. Id. at 4.
113. Howarth et al., supra note 92, at 8.
114. EIDE, supra note 109, at 12.
115. Runge, supra note 92, at 3.
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With 84% of the world’s forests publicly owned,116 governments
have enormous constitutional power to facilitate industry growth
through grants of land tenure, land use regulations, operating
licenses, financial subsidies, enforcement practices, procurement
policies, and so on. At every step of the way, governments
oversee forest conversion.
The original subsidy to the logging industry was the granting
of inexpensive and even free rights to cut timber. In the U.S.,
public forestlands were sold or given away through railroad land
grants.117 In the nineteenth century, Congress granted huge
tracts of land to many railroad companies in what is now
considered to be one of the biggest public land giveaways in U.S.
history. The justification for it was to provide railroad companies
a base on which to raise the capital needed to build a
transnational railway system needed to open up the frontier,
connect new towns and cities, transport commodities and
consumer goods, and spawn economic growth.118 The Northern
Pacific railroad land grant, signed into law in 1864, gave some 40
million acres of public lands to Northern Pacific on the condition
that all lands would be opened for homesteaders within five years
of completion of the railroad.119 In the case of financial failure,
all remaining grant lands were to be sold at local auction.120
Northern Pacific did fail twice in 1873 and 1893, but the grant
lands were never legitimately sold at local markets.121 Neither
116. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES
ASSESSMENT 5 (2005), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2005/en/.
117. See Janel M. Curry-Roper, The Impact of the Timber and Stone Act on
Public Land Ownership in Northern Minnesota, 33 J. FOREST HIST. 70 (1989).
118. See DERRICK JENSEN ET AL., RAILROADS AND CLEARCUTS: LEGACY OF
CONGRESS’S 1864 NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD LAND GRANT 8 (1995) (describing
the nature of the land grant).
119. United States v. Northern P.R. Co., 311 U.S. 311, 336 (1940) (discussing
the congressional mandate and its conditions).
120. A Resolution authorizing the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to Issue
its Bonds for the Construction of its Road and to secure the same by Mortgage,
and for other Purposes, 16 Stat. 378 (1870) (describing the consequences of
financial failure).
121. After the first financial failure, Northern Pacific reorganized such that
“the existing mortgage was foreclosed, stock was substituted for outstanding
bonds [on the grant lands], and assets, including the [land] grant, were bought
by a committee of interested bond holders.” JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 12.
After the second financial failure, the grant lands were sold, as required, at a
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were they opened to settlement. Instead, millions of acres went
cheap to large corporations.122
These “private lands” were the primary source of early
industry development. Only after these lands were depleted, did
logging begin to pick up on public forest lands. The National
Forest System was created in 1905 to manage the use of public
forestlands,123 but until the mid-1940s only 5% of the timber
supply came from them.124 This all changed with the increase in
demand during World War II and the post-war building boom, a
demand that was managed by a Forest Service that evolved from
a custodian of the public forest to a “production agency.”125
public sale to the highest bidder. However, J.P. Morgan, controller of Northern
Pacific, and James J. Hill, owner of the Great Northern railroad, consolidated
the two lines. The new Northern Pacific railway company was consistently the
highest bidder. Id. at 12-14.
The Supreme Court later held that the
consolidation was an illegal restraint of trade in Pearsall v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 161 U.S. 646 (1896). However, by making individuals rather than a
corporation the owners of the new company, the ruling was subsequently
bypassed. See JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 13-14.
122. The land holdings of Plum Creek (the logging arm of Northern Pacific)
and the interlinked companies of Weyerhaeuser, Potlatch, and Boise Cascade all
came from the Northern Pacific land grant. Weyerhaeuser, for example,
purchased 900,000 acres of Northern Pacific grant lands in Washington State in
1899. The current holdings of Plum Creek, Potlatch, and Boise Cascade are all
based on the railroad grant lands. See JENSEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 3-4.
123. All public lands managed by the Forest Service are collectively known as
the National Forest System. The beginnings of the National Forest System can
be traced back to the Forest Reserve Act of 1891. In 1897 the Forest
Management Act or Organic Act was enacted, defining the purposes of National
Forests to be forest protection, predictable water supplies, and timber
production. In 1905, 63 million acres of federal forest land were transferred
from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau
of Forestry. The Bureau was subsequently renamed the Forest Service. Gifford
Pinchot became the first chief forester who is renowned for instilling a culture of
“wise use” into the agency and “conservation” rather than “preservation.” By
1910, the National Forests System had grown to 168 million acres. Today it
stands at 191 million acres. See GERALD WILLIAMS, THE FOREST SERVICE:
FIGHTING FOR PUBLIC LANDS 2-11 (2007); George A. Gonzalez, The Conservation
Policy Network, 1890-1910: The Development and Implementation of “Practical”
Forestry, 31 POLITY 269 (1998); Douglas MacCleery, The National Forest System:
Then and Now, EVERGREEN (Winter 2000), available at http://evergreen
magazine.com/magazine/issue/Winter_2000.html.
124. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 141 (1992).
125. As stated by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Monongahela National
Forest case, W. Va. Div. of Izaac Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522
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Between 1945 and 1966 the annual cut in National Forests
increased from 1 billion to 12.1 billion board feet.126 In response
to this rapid acceleration of logging, the Multiple Use Sustained
Yield Act was passed in 1960 with a mandate to consider a wider
range of values for the forests including recreation, fish and
wildlife habitat, and watershed protection.127 How these values
were to be reconciled, however, was left to the Forest Service and
its productionist organizational culture. With ongoing erosion of
forest lands, public environmental pressures led to the passage of
the Wilderness Act (1964), and the setting aside of 9.1 million
acres of wilderness under the National Wilderness Preservation
System. This was the “first time in history that any national
legislature in the world had mandated that land must be
maintained in a pristine state.”128 This public policy milestone
was, however, compromised with most wilderness selections
situated in rock and ice above the timberline, or in areas that
were difficult for resource industries to access.129
A decade later, with the environmental movement in high
gear, the National Forest Management Act (1976) was passed
following two high profile legal challenges to clear-cut logging
practices in the Bitterroot and Monongahela National Forests.130
F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975). See WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 143. Gonzalez notes
that the National Forests were always managed according to “practical forestry”
principles that emphasized the profitable harvesting but that, prior to the
Second World War, the timber industry itself supported limited harvesting from
National Forests to avoid depressing timber prices and destabilize the industry.
In the process, restricting access and production in National Forests excluded
small operators (who were dependent on public lands), leaving them available to
the timber industry in the postwar period. See Gonzalez, supra note 123, at 269,
290-91.
126. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 135-37.
127. The principle of sustained yield itself mandates the liquidation of
(ostensibly slow growing, “decadent”) old growth forests so that they could be
replaced by so-called “normal forests” of fast-growing, even-aged stands that
could maintain the level of timber harvest in perpetuity. In its single-minded
pursuit of steady volumes of forest “fibre,” the forest science to support this
supply was, by today’s standards, primitive in its lack of understanding of the
costs (in terms of loss of biodiversity, pests, fire, wood quality, etc.) of eroding
ecosystem complexity and function.
128. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 139.
129. See id.
130. See Charles F. Wilkinson, National Forest Management Act: The Twenty
Years Behind, the Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 665 (1997).
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The new Act amended the Forest Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974 and the Organic Act of 1897 in
order to “improve the quality of multiple-use management
planning on the national forests and to achieve better integration
of management needs with funding.”131 Clear-cutting was to be
used only where it was the “optimum” method of harvesting, and
had to be protective of other resource values such as soil, water,
fish wildlife, biodiversity, recreation, and aesthetics. Timber
production, nevertheless, remained the general policy thrust with
congressionally mandated harvest levels for each national
forest.132 Arguments for increasing harvest levels were put
forward on the grounds of economic efficiency, even though
accelerated cutting was shown in many cases to result in belowcost sales. A 1994 Congressional report concluded that timber
sales from 77 of the 120 national forests had lost money over a
five year period with half of them losing money every year.133

Decades of high-yield logging in the Bitterroot National Forest resulted in a
range of environmental problems. In 1970, a report was commissioned to
analyze logging in the area. The “Bolle Report” was critical of logging practices
and concluded that “the basic principle of sustained-yield management was
being violated.” Id. at 663. Congressional hearings on clearcutting ensued. This
was followed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals decision in Monongahela, W. Va.
Div. of Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1975),
which found that clearcutting violated the 1897 Organic Act. Both events acted
as catalysts for the enactment of the National Forest Management Act.
131. Charles Davis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: National Forest
Management Planning under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 25
REV. POL'Y RES. 37, 38 (2008) (quoting PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM:
MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO (1996)).
132. Some argue that the real intention of the Act was to get around the
Monongahela National Forest ruling that banned clear-cut logging on
significant portions of national forest land. See Miles Burnett & Charles Davis,
Getting out the Cut: Politics and National Forest Timber Harvests,1960-1995, 34
ADMIN. & SOC'Y 202, 209 (2002).
133. ROSS W. GORTE, BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES OVERVIEW 39 (1994), available
at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/forests/for-1.cfm. In an updated version of
the report, the author points to a variety of reasons for selling timber including
maintaining supplies of timber for local mills that maintain employment,
reducing fuel loading on the forest floor, and altering the mix of tree species.
ROSS W. GORTE, BELOW-COST TIMBER SALES OVERVIEW (2004), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32485.pdf.
See
generally
THOMAS J BARLOW & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, GIVING AWAY THE NATIONAL
FORESTS: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREST SERVICE TIMBER SALES BELOW COST
(1980).
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Subsidies for road access were a key reason for the losses, with
the Forest Service subsidizing the engineering, design, and
construction of literally hundreds of thousands of miles of logging
roads.134
Despite the introduction of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act, the National Forest Management Act, and an array of
protective environmental laws,135 the timber harvest remained
relatively steady into the 1990s at around 11 billion board feet.136
William Robbins notes, “in almost every legislative and
regulatory ‘conservation’ measure adopted at the federal level,
the needs of America’s expanding industrial economy is
apparent.”137 Reflecting on the situation, Wilkinson concluded:
The Forest Service will ensure amenity values, first-rate timberharvesting practices, unroaded backcountry, fish and wildlife
protection, economically justifiable sales and even protection for
the spotted owl . . . to the extent permitted by an allowable cut of
11 billion board feet. The quality of all Forest Service programs is
limited by the cut.138

A parallel situation can be seen in Canada with the early
land giveaways and unregulated exploitation followed by a
multiple-use sustained yield paradigm. And just as in the
American situation, the goal of sustained yield maximization
dominates throughout.139 With 94% of the forests in Canada
publicly owned, the same state-corporation, management-

134. In 2004, this subsidy was represented by a presidential budget request to
Congress of nearly $34 million. NAVIN NAYAK ET AL. & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
GREEN SCISSORS REPORT 2004 16 (2004).
135. For example, the Endangered Species Act and Clean Water Act both have
significant impacts on forestry practices.
136. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 146.
137. WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, LUMBERJACKS AND LEGISLATORS: POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE US LUMBER INDUSTRY, 1890-1941 11 (1982).
138. WILKINSON, supra note 124, at 158. With declining levels of old growth
forests and increasing public environmental consciousness, the National Forest
timber supply dropped to less than 4 billion board feet in the latter 1990s and
continued to decline to 2.6 billion board feet by 2010. FED. FOREST RES. COAL., IS
FEDERAL TIMBER STILL IN DEMAND? 5 (2011), available at http://www.
foresthealth.org/pdf/Federal%20Timber%20Demand%20Feb%202011.pdf.
139. See Chris Tollefson, Introduction to THE WEALTH OF FORESTS 5-10 (Chris
Tollefson ed., 1998).
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production linkages are apparent. One of Canada’s largest
industries, forestry, provides a major source of employment and
wages and an important source of foreign exchange earnings.140
Royalties from timber sales have historically been the largest
source of revenue for several provincial governments.141 This
state-production linkage is most clearly demonstrated in the
province of British Columbia (BC) where forestry was long the
main driver of the provincial economy.142 With the highest rate
of logging in Canada, BC companies cut over 90 million cubic
meters of timber in 2005-2006, and accounted for 7% of
employment and 15% of all economic activity in 2006.143
Government revenues from the BC forest industry in the form of
royalties,144 rents, and taxes amount to several billion dollars
annually.
Between 2000-2002, timber-based industries
contributed an average of $8.4 billion annually in GDP to the
provincial economy.145

140. The forest industry accounted for nearly 75% of Canada’s entire surplus
on merchandise trade well into the 1990s. See MELODY HESSING ET AL.,
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 166 (1997).
141. Id. at 49. In Canada, most matters pertaining to land and resources fall
under provincial rather than federal jurisdiction.
142. BRITISH COLUMBIA (MINISTRY OF FORESTS), THE STATE OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA’S FORESTS 7 (2006).
143. Id. at 8, 70. Figures include indirect and induced economic activity. By
comparison, in 1996, approximately 20% of all jobs in the province and 25% of
the provincial GDP were dependent on the forest sector. British Columbia (BC
Stats), Business Indicators December 2001, at 4, available at http://www.bcstats.
gov.bc.ca/Publications/PeriodicalsReleases/BusinessIndicators.aspx (follow the
links to 2001 and Dec.).
144. Public revenues are generated through stumpage. Often priced at only a
few cents on the cubic meter to keep logging costs low and amounting to only a
small part of forestry’s total contribution to government coffers, the total
typically hit around $1 billion a year up to 2008. However, revenues declined
considerably following the economic downturn of 2008. See The Council of Forest
Industries, BC Forest Product Industry at a Glance (2012), http://www.
cofi.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Copy-of-COFI-BC-Ind-At-A-Glance-2011March-31-20122.pdf (last visited May 21, 2012).
145. BRITISH COLUMBIA (MINISTRY OF FORESTS), supra note 142, at 134-35.
Timber-based industries include forestry and logging, wood product
manufacturing, and pulp and paper production. Id. The role of forestry and
logging in BC’s economy has declined significantly in recent years due to a
number of factors including the downturn in the U.S. housing market, a
protracted softwood lumber dispute with the U.S., the mountain pine beetle
epidemic, and decades of over logging. Id.
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The driving force of forest policy has always been the need for
corporate-based economic growth.146 The tenure system, the
province’s major policy instrument, was conceived as a broad
state-directed strategy of economic development which gave large
discretionary power to a handful of powerful corporate actors.147
There was minimal need to resort to coercive regulatory actions
since the government’s primary concerns were to facilitate the
province’s economic development and maintain the stability of
hinterland communities.148 For the same reason, stumpage rates
were kept low while annual harvest rates were set well above the
so-called sustained yield.
However, as old growth forests
disappeared, forestry conflicts began to erupt.149 Rising pressure
from First Nations and environmentalists in the 1990s combined
with the critique of the inability of existing forestry policy to
promote long-term prosperity in forestry-based communities, led
to demands for policy and tenure reform.150 Nevertheless, the
election of the left-leaning New Democratic Party in the early
1990s led to limited structural reform (for example, the corporate
tenure system was left untouched) because of the power of large
forest corporations.
146. See, e.g., R. Michael M’Gonigle, Structural Instruments and Sustainable
Forests: A Political Ecology Approach, in THE WEALTH OF FORESTS, supra note
139; see also PATRICIA MARCHAK ET AL., FALLDOWN: FOREST POLICY IN BRITISH
COLUMBIA (1999).
147. The tenure system is a set of contractual property rights whereby the
government retains ownership of the land while licensees get ownership of the
timber subject to a royalty fee or payment of stumpage upon cutting.
148. Requirements to facilitate these goals included the “use it or lose it” rule,
which required a licensee to use its assigned quota or forfeit it, and the
“appurtenance” clause, which generally required a tenure holder to build and
maintain a mill as a condition of receiving a tenure.
149. Among the most well-known is the 1993 battle at Clayoquot Sound, the
site of the largest mass arrest in Canadian history at the time with 800 people
charged. See A POLITICAL SPACE: READING THE GLOBAL THROUGH CLAYOQUOT
SOUND 42 (Warren Magnusson & Karena Shaw eds., 2003).
150. See TREVOR BARNES & ROGER HAYTER, TROUBLES IN THE RAIN FOREST
(1997); R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE ET AL., WHEN THERE’S A WAY, THERE’S A WILL –
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABILITY THROUGH THE COMMUNITY ECOSYSTEM TRUST (2001);
MARCHAK ET AL., supra note 146. For a study on the economic benefits of
community-based sustainable forestry, see PACIFIC ANALYTICS INC., & DON
HARRISON, REVITALIZING BRITISH COLUMBIA’S COASTAL ECONOMY: A NEW
ECONOMIC VISION FOR THE NORTH AND CENTRAL COAST AND HAIDA GWAII (2002),
available at www.pacificanalytics.ca.
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The situation in the forests globally is even more extreme.
On the Indonesian island of Borneo, over 30% of the forest cover
has been removed in the past two decades for timber exports and
the development of agricultural plantations.151 While nominally
“private” companies have done the cutting, local and national
governments have facilitated forest liquidation through granting
and renewing licenses that largely determine the rate of
Here, too, government provides generous
deforestation.152
subsidies to implement its official policy of opening up 90% of its
landmass for commercial logging and conversion to agriculture
and settlement.153 The Malaysian government has recently
licensed nearly a quarter of the state’s land mass to a dozen
logging companies to convert natural tropical forest into
plantations for the export of palm oil, one of the little known but
most destructive of agricultural commodities.154
Profits here accrue both to large corporations and the state.
The timber industry has been the economic backbone of economic
development across the region, and royalties have been an
important source of income for state governments. The revenue
generated by tenures, licenses, and taxes has been enormous,
151. In the mid-1980s, forest covered nearly three-quarters of Borneo, but at
the rate of harvest over the last twenty years, less than one-third of the island
would remain forested in 2020. MARIO RAUTNER ET AL. & WWF, BORNEO:
TREASURE ISLAND AT RISK 73 (2005).
152. Id. at 40 (6:6:1 policy). In Sarawak, concessions are usually awarded by
the ruling elite to political allies, relatives, and business partners, and then subleased to contractors (usually Chinese) who put them into operations. Thus, the
forests are a locus of not only economic but political power, giving political elites
the economic resources to maintain their grip on state power. See Amarjit Kaur,
A History of Forestry in Sarawak, 32 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 117, 140 (1998).
153. RAUTNER ET AL, supra note 151, at 46; see also CHARLES BARBER ET AL.,
THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA (2002).
154. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, MALAYSIAN PALM OIL - GREEN GOLD OR GREEN
WASH? 5 (2008), available at http://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/
publications/malaysian-palm-oil-report_0.pdf. Global palm oil production is
increasing by 9% every year, prompted largely by expanding biofuel markets in
the EU and by food demand in Indonesia, India, and China. Fitzherbert et al.,
supra note 109, at 538-45. The conversion of forests to palm oil plantations has
been dramatic. In Malaysian Borneo, the average annual growth rate of oil
palm areas was nearly 8% between 1998 and 2003. Over 1.6 million ha of oil
palms now exist in Sabah and Sarawak. In Kalimantan, the areas used by palm
plantations grew by 11.5% to nearly a million ha in 2003. RAUTNER ET AL, supra
note 151, at 7.
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with a number of state-owned forestry corporations profiting
directly from timber sales.155 In the Malaysian state of Sabah, on
the island of Borneo, the industry has at times generated more
than half of the state’s total revenue, while employing some
65,000 people.156 In neighboring Sarawak, the forest industry
sector is the largest source of revenue for the state producing 21%
of total external earnings.157 In Kalimantan, exports of woodrelated products accounted for $7.6 billion in 2002 alone.158
From the North to South, developing to industrialized
countries, an inherent conflict-of-interest arises with the
management of public forests. The responsibility for protecting
values that do not generate economic returns lies with
governments that also depend on the economic royalties,
revenues, and export dollars that arise from forest liquidation.
The inevitable conundrum is how the state, as the major
landowner and rent-collector, might also fulfill the duties of a
regulator where sustainable management might necessitate
reductions in jobs, corporate profits, and/or government revenues.
d.

Agriculture

Agriculture provides another instance where government
policies have played a major role in the development of an
economically “efficient” industrialized production system despite
its environmental and social costs. Just as industrial forestry
policy has emphasized maximum sustained yield of timber, so too
has the primary goal of industrial agriculture been maximum
sustained yield of single commodity crops. The past century has
seen the agricultural system in most northern countries become
increasingly concentrated, specialized, and industrialized. This is
particularly the case in the U.S., where 98% of the food supply
now comes from agribusiness-run, industrial farms specializing in
high-yielding monocultures using chemically-intensive farming

155. In Sarawak, the Sarawak Forestry Corporation was set up as a private
company, wholly owned by the Sarawak State Government. RAUTNER ET AL.,
supra note 151, at 40.
156. Id. at 58. Figure is for employment in the year 2000.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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methods.159
Downstream, corporate agriculture and food
processing has been linked to growing levels of obesity, heart
disease, and diabetes in Northern countries, and malnutrition
and hunger in the South.160
Agricultural policy in the U.S. has long emphasized
agricultural exports as a means of generating income. As the
push for commercial agriculture strengthened in the midnineteenth century, scientific methods were turned to as a means
of increasing production. In 1862, the newly formed U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) passed the Morrill Land
Grant College Act, which established agricultural colleges and
supported research into industrialized farming methods.161
When the depression-era farm crisis hit in the 1930s, the
first agricultural bill was enacted as a temporary measure to
protect small farms.162 The goal of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933 was to increase and stabilize farm incomes which it
tackled in large part through price supports for over 100 crops.163
In the following three years, these measures pushed gross farm
incomes up by some 50%, much of this increase resulting from

159. Kathryn Peters, Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution,
25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 203, 207 (2010).
160. William Eubanks II, Paying the Farm Bill: How One Statute Has
Radically Degraded the Natural Environment and How a Newfound Emphasis
on Sustainability is the Key to Reviving the Ecosystem, 27 ENVTL. F. 55, 56
(2010); see also DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO A FOOD AND
FARM BILL (2007); RAJ PATEL, STUFFED AND STARVED (2007).
161. New agricultural developments were disseminated to farmers through
the “Cooperative Extension Services,” a non-formal educational program
established by the Smith-Lever Act of 1914 with farmers expected to follow
recommendations for industrialized farming put forward by governmentsponsored researchers. As this report notes, tensions arose that continue to this
day since “public universities are often seen as promoting corporate priorities
instead of an unbiased form for debate on what research is in the public
interest.” DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE
UNITED STATES 6 (2003).
162. This farm crisis in part arose from an overproduction of crops in the
1920s leading to a steep drop in crop prices. See IMHOFF, supra note 160, at 3334.
163. Such commodity programs continue to be the most significant provision
in U.S. farm bills in terms of budget expenditure and political importance. Larry
Burmeister, Resilience and Vulnerability in US Farm Policy: Parsing the
Payment Limitation Debate, 25 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 183, 183 (2008).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

40

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1045

government subsidies.164 Over time, however, the commodity
programs produced increasing concentration and specialization as
subsidy payments were based on the production histories of each
farm and, as a result, “were scale-biased toward larger farming
operations and provided incentives for farmers to expand base
acreage in program crops.”165 Under the influence of a growing
farm lobby, the number of crops supported by commodity
subsidies gradually declined to only a handful that provided most
of their benefit to the big players. As the world market in basic
agricultural commodities expanded in the post-war period,
individual farmers were required to “aggressively optimize their
agricultural operations” in order to compete in an increasingly
competitive global market.166 This was achieved through largescale specialization and monoculture cultivation, made possible
by the widespread use of external chemical fertilizers, pesticides,
and enormous amounts of water. Public research again played a
large role in developing and promoting the use of these external
inputs, together with high-yielding hybrid seeds and
mechanization.167
By the 1970s, agricultural progress began to be measured
almost solely in terms of increases in commodity crop yields. The
drive for mega-farms and maximum production was promoted by
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, whose vision of
maximum production was summed up by his motto: “Get big or
get out.”168 At the same time, supply management programs,
which had been an important part of preceding farm bills, were
replaced by direct subsidy payments to farmers. The result was a
seemingly limitless supply of U.S. farm products that could be
sold at lower prices on the world market.169 These policies were
justified in terms of helping farmers remain economically viable,
164. Eubanks, supra note 160, at 58.
165. Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184.
166. Frederick Buttel, Sustaining the Unsustainable: Agro-food Systems and
Environment in the Modern World in HANDBOOK OF RURAL STUDIES 216 (Paul J.
Cloke et al. eds., 2006).
167. Id. at 216.
168. Tom Philpott, The Butz Stops Here: A Reflection on the Lasting Legacy of
1970’s USDA Secretary Earl Butz, GRIST (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.grist.org
/article/the-butz-stops-here/.
169. Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184.
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but the major beneficiaries were multinational agribusinesses,
such as Cargill, ADM, Monsanto, and John Deere.170 By the
1980s, the policy of maximum production led to overproduction
and falling commodity prices which combined with skyrocketing
interest rates to produce “the deepest rural crisis since the
Depression.”171 Many farms went bankrupt, leading to further
consolidation in fewer and larger farms.172 Under the influence
of a powerful agribusiness lobby, the number of crops receiving
price supports fell drastically to the point where only five crops—
corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, and wheat—now receive 84% of the
commodity subsidies.173 Rather than providing a safety net for
working farmers as originally intended, commodity programs
have become “a far flung infrastructure of entitlements.”174
The farm subsidy program has also benefited industrial
livestock operations. Since the Federal Agriculture Improvement
and Reform Act of 1996, the market price of soybeans and corn
has dropped below the cost of producing them.175 Between 1997
170. Burmeister notes that “firms are subsidized by commodity programs
through the indirect route of lower world market prices and higher aggregate
production levels than would occur in the absence of commodity programs,
increasing the profitability of their input supply, marketing, and processing
businesses.” Id. at 184.
171. Philpott, supra note 168, at 1.
172. Between 1950 and 1997, the number of farms in the U.S. declined from
5.4 million to 1.9 million. Whereas one farm supported the food needs of 15.5
people in 1950, one farm could support 140 people by 1997. USDA, About Us, at
¶14, available at http://www.csrees.usda.gov/qlinks/extension.html#yesterday
(last visited May 22, 2012).
173. Eubanks, supra note 160, at 60.
174. Id. (internal punctuation omitted). Eubanks notes that $25 billion were
paid out in farm subsidies in 2005, “almost 50% more than the amount [the
federal government] pays to families receiving welfare.” Id. at 61. At the same
time, approximately 67% of these subsidies went to the wealthiest 10% of
recipients, “namely large corporations, non-farming homeowners, and absentee
landowners.” Id. While three out of five farms receive no subsidies, the richest
5% receive $470,000 per year on average. Id.
175. ELANOR STARMER ET AL., FEEDING THE FACTORY FARM: IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES
TO THE BROILER CHICKEN INDUSTRY 11 (2006).
The 1996 Farm Bill based
payments to farmers primarily on the quantity of the commodity grown
decoupled from supply management provisions. The Government based this
policy on the projection that the Uruguay Round trade talks would lead to an
increase in commodity exports. Instead, the policy stimulated overproduction
and a collapse in commodity prices. The policies continued in the 2002 Farm
Bill (i.e., the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171) as
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and 2005, corn was sold at 23% below production cost while
soybeans were sold at 15% below production cost.176 This
converts into big gains for those industries that use these
commodities as raw material inputs, such as factory farms and
the food processing industry. Olson reports that between 2000
and 2004, commodity subsidies totaled an average of $4.5 billion
per year for corn and $2 billion per year for soy.177 As 60% of
corn and 47% of soy produced in the U.S. is used as animal feed,
the embedded subsidy to factory livestock production works out to
$3.6 billion per year, or $18 billion over five years.178 Such
figures suggest that “[c]urrent U.S. farm policies may be driving
industrialization in the livestock production system if they give
factory operations the appearance of being more cost efficient
than diversified, independent operations that grow their own
feed.”179

prices continued to plummet. See Burmeister, supra note 163, at 184; Matthew
Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the WTO’s Peace Clause,
27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 999, 1002-04 (2006).
176. STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 3.
177. INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, Below-cost Feed Crops: An Indirect
Subsidy for Industrial Animal Factories (June 2006), available at http://www.
iatp.org/files/258_2_88122_0.pdf.
178. Id. These figures are supported by STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 34, who calculate that between 1997-2005, the broiler chicken industry gained an
average of $1.25 billion in indirect subsidies each year, and suggest that similar
cost reductions were reaped by factory hog feeding operations.
179. STARMER ET AL., supra note 175, at 1. Vertical integration, consolidation,
and industrialization of the U.S. livestock sector have been facilitated by U.S.
agricultural market deregulation. The result is heavy concentration in the agrifood industry. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy notes that “[only]
[f]our companies – Cargill, ConAgra, Tyson and Smithfield – control the vast
share of livestock markets at all stages of production – from milling the feed, to
breeding and raising animals, to slaughtering, packing, and marketing.” INST.
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, supra note 177, at 2; see also PHILIP MATTERA,
USDA INC.: HOW AGRIBUSINESS HAS HIJACKED REGULATORY POLICY AT THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/USDAInc.pdf. He notes that when the top four firms control 40% or
more of the market there is a strong potential for market distortion. According
to his research, “the top four firms typically control 60-80 percent or more of the
market in sectors such as beef packing, pork packing, broiler production, flour
milling and soybean crushing.” Id. at 12; see also MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM
HEFFERNAN, CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS (2007), available at
http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/ 07contable.pdf.
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In addition to these production effects are the environmental
impacts. Agriculture accounts for one fifth of all fossil fuels usage
in the U.S.,180 as well as a massive reliance on chemical
fertilizers, toxic biocides, and large-scale irrigation that has
resulted in a serious decline in water quality and quantity. Much
of the nitrogen and phosphorous rich fertilizers applied to fields
end up in streams and rivers, creating threats to public health as
well as harm to aquatic species. Their impacts can reach far
beyond the farm as nutrients travel toward the ocean leading to
eutrophication and expansive dead zones.181 One of the worst
examples of this is the Gulf of Mexico, which has a “dead zone”
that reaches up to 8,000 square miles.182 Further, with their use
nearly tripling since 1964, pesticides were found in 60% of
shallow wells in agricultural areas.183 Large quantities of
manure are yet another source of water contamination. As a
result of “concentrated animal feeding operations” (CAFOs),
livestock in the U.S. now produce 200 times more waste than
humans.184 Manure applied to fields as fertilizer eventually runs
off into surface waters, in many cases at high enough levels to kill

180. IMHOFF, supra note 160, at 102. This figure includes the fossil fuel usage
for growing, processing, and distributing the food.
181. Nitrogen and phosphate are superfood for plankton, causing them to
quickly reproduce before dying and falling to the bottom of the ocean. There,
bacteria decompose them, consuming oxygen in the process. When oxygen
concentrations decrease to a certain level, the water takes on the effects of
hypoxia or oxygen shortage and aquatic life either leaves the area or dies. See
ALANNA MITCHELL, SEASICK: OCEAN CHANGE AND THE EXTINCTION OF LIFE ON
EARTH 16-33 (2009).
182. In 2011, the dead zone reached 6,765 square miles. The largest dead
zone was recorded in 2002, at 8,484 square miles. See Buskey & Nikki, Experts
Say More is Needed to Stop Dead Zone, HOUMA COURIER (Aug. 7, 2011),
available
at
http://www.gulfhypoxia.net/news/default.asp?XMLFilename=
201108230835.xml; Hypoxia in the News, MISS. RIVER GULF OF MEX. WATERSHED
NUTRIENT TASKFORCE, http://water.epa.gov/type/watersheds/named/msbasin/
gulfnews.cfm (last visited May 22, 2012).
183. However, only 1% of wells tested were deemed to have “unsafe” levels of
pesticides. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT DATABASE
12 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ncea/roe/docs/roe_hd/roe-hd-final-092008-ground_water.pdf.
184. J.B Ruhl, Farms, their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law,
27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 285 (2000).
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fish.185 Although farms are the major source of non-point source
water pollution in the U.S., they enjoy a range of exemptions
under the Clean Water Act.186
Buttel notes that “if
environmental regulatory authorities were to apply to agriculture
the same standards and penalties employed in regulation of
industrial pollutants, the penalties for noncompliance with
regulations would render monocultural and CAFO production
very expensive.”187
Meanwhile, agriculture continues to be the largest consumer
of water, accounting for around two-thirds of all freshwater usage
in the U.S.188
Despite the increasing frequency of water
shortages in the U.S., agricultural policy continues to favor
commodity crop farming over low-water farming strategies.
However, as the next section shows, it is not only agriculture but
the entire industrial economy that is dependent on a readily
available source of cheap and abundant water. And, once again,
government policy has worked to make it happen.
e.

Water

The phrase “water conservation” commonly brings to mind
low-flow plumbing fixtures, short showers, drought resistant
urban gardens, and so forth. Yet, in the U.S., nearly 90% of all
freshwater is consumed by agriculture and industry.189
Moreover, the U.S. is the highest per capita consumer of water in
the world.190
Excluding thermoelectric power,191 irrigation
185. Id. at 285-86. Ruhl notes that the concentration of ammonia in creeks in
California’s Central Valley is often 200 times the level that is toxic to fish.
Eubanks, supra note 160, at 65 (recalling the bursting of a waste lagoon in
North Carolina in 1995 that resulted in the release of thirty-five million gallons
of hog sewage into the New River and the death of nearly ten million fish).
186. The Clean Water Act focuses on “point sources” of pollution for the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System program, failing to regulate
nonpoint sources of water pollution deriving from industrial agriculture. See
Ruhl, supra note 184, at 295-303.
187. Buttel, supra note 166, at 223.
188. This does not include thermoelectric power use. See SUSAN HUTSON ET AL.,
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 (U.S. Geological Survey
Circular 1268) 35 (2004), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2004/circ1268/
pdf/circular1268.pdf.
189. CAHN, supra note 59, at 65.
190. Id.
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accounted for 65% of freshwater withdrawals in 2000, with 86%
of this occurring in 17 western states.192 To meet this demand,
rivers and streams have been diverted and dammed while
industrial wastewater has been allowed to pollute groundwater,
leaving many major rivers in the Western U.S. badly depleted. A
key to understanding the unsustainable use of water lies in a long
history of water law that shifts water from a public resource to
private property. This history was long based on riparian rights,
which gave use rights to water based on ownership of land
adjacent to a shoreline. At the same time, water was viewed as
common property and beyond ownership, giving those
downstream equal rights to use the water as those upstream.193
Central to this water allocation regime was the concept of “no
harm,” which dictated that “riparian landowners could use water
so long as they did not substantially impair either the quantity or
quality of water for downstream users.”194 While the intention of
the regime was to protect the water rights of downstream users,
it also indirectly provided protection for aquatic ecosystems by
ensuring a minimum flow of water.195 This system was adopted
by and continues to be used in the Eastern U.S. where water is
relatively abundant.
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the riparian rights
system was inadequate to meet the water demands of emerging
industrialism in the arid west. In its place, the doctrine of “prior
appropriation” arose, replacing the communal right to water with

191. Thermoelectric power is often excluded from water use calculations since
most of the water at power plants is used for once-through cooling, and is
returned to the surface water source once it has circulated through the system.
See HUTSON ET AL., supra note 188, at 35.
192. See id. at 7. The breakdown of total water withdrawals (both surface and
groundwater) as reported by Hutson et al. are: thermoelectric 48%, irrigation
34%, public supply 11%, self-supplied industrial 5%, and combination of selfsupplied domestic, livestock, aquaculture, and mining 2%. Id.
193. Chad A. West, For Body, Soul, or Wealth: the Distinction, Evolution, and
Policy Implications of Water Ethic, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J., 201, 219-20 (2007).
194. This was later modified to the “reasonable use doctrine,” which allowed
for more significant water withdrawals to promote large-scale agriculture and
industry if they were “reasonable relative to the equivalent right of other
riparian landowners.” Robert Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State
Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2010).
195. Id. at 18.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

46

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1051

individual property rights.196 To obtain a water right under
traditional prior appropriation principles, the water first had to
be diverted from its natural course for a “beneficial use.”
However, “beneficial use” was defined strictly in terms of
economic benefit,197 putting aquatic ecosystems, as well as those
who depended on the naturally flowing river for their livelihoods,
at a real disadvantage.198 Water-right holders obtained property
rights to a defined “amount, time, location, purpose and temporal
priority of use.”199 This assurance of continued access to water
was seen as necessary in order for investors to put money into
expensive diversion projects. But with its heavy emphasis on
water extraction and guarantee to senior users for a specified
quantity of water, there was no incentive for conserving water.
On the contrary, the “use it or lose it” tenet of prior appropriation
provided a strong incentive for users to fully exercise their water
rights even if use exceeded their needs.200
By the 1880s, it became increasingly difficult to meet the
escalating demands of irrigators. As a result, the water needs of
junior water rights holders suffered during dry seasons. At the
same time, without a guaranteed supply of water, homesteading
in the west slowed.
This was a major setback for the

196. The origins of the law can be traced back to the California gold rush and
a dispute over water between two miners which went to the Supreme Court of
California in 1855. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855). In its decision, the court
essentially recognized the “first in time, first in right” rule governing the mining
camps. Thus, “a legal system that arose from the relatively lawless mining
camps of the Wild West would come to be viewed as though it had been handed
down directly from God.” Reed Benson, A Few Ironies of Western Water Law, 6
WYO. L. REV. 331, 333 (2006).
197. Benson, supra note 196, at 332. Until recently, beneficial uses were
defined only in terms of “human economic purposes at the expense of instream
users and other environmental uses.” Adler, supra note 194, at 22.
198. Those most notably impacted by this requirement were the Native
Americans who were commonly left without the water resources they had relied
on for millennia. Benson, supra note 196, at 332.
199. Joseph Dellapenna, United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters, in
THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 196 (J.W. Dellapenna & J.
Gupta eds., 2009). These water rights typically last forever, assuming the
right’s holder fully exercises his or her right. Benson, supra note 196, at 34-35.
200. The purported reason for this is to ensure water is not being “wasted” by
preventing water rights from being held for speculative purposes only. Adler,
supra note 194, at 22.
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government’s aspiration of western expansion and development.
Consequently, the government stepped in with the Reclamation
Act of 1902, “one of the most influential statutes in the history of
the American West.”201 The Act provided federal funding for
large-scale water projects in the west, including dams, reservoirs,
and canals. It respected all existing prior appropriation rights
while creating vast new reservoirs that could provide secure
water rights for new users. The Act was itself a metaphor for
growth solving all the problems of conflict and inequity, and
doing so at the expense of the natural environment. As a result,
“[l]and entries spiked to their highest levels ever in the early
twentieth century.”202 At the same time, the landscape and
ecology of the west was radically changed, with several dams
sited on almost every major river.203 Robert Glennon remarks:
By the time the frenzy of dam building came to an end in the
1960s, most of the great rivers in the American West had been
transformed into quiet millponds – storage reservoirs that served
the needs of Western farms. None of these projects would have
been undertaken by the private sector because they made
absolutely no economic sense. But the federal government was
less interested in cost-benefit ratios than in encouraging the
development of agricultural communities throughout the
West.204

201. Charles Wilkinson, Introduction to the Culture of Water Symposium, 6
WYO. L. REV. 287, 289 (2006).
202. Id. Such water developments led to notorious cases of deception and
corruption. One of the more extreme cases occurred with California’s Central
Valley Project, a massive project to divert the Owens River to provide water to
Los Angeles. However, four times the amount of water actually required for Los
Angeles was pumped out of Owens Valley, with the excess water diverted to the
San Fernando Valley which it transformed from arid desert into fertile
agricultural land. Insiders who had bought up cheap land reaped a windfall as
the Owens River was virtually drained. For a rich account, see MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: WATER AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE 2 (1993).
203. There were nearly 10,000 reservoirs with a storage capacity of at least
100 acre-feet, while another 20,000 smaller reservoirs and stockponds brought
the grand total to over 30,000 dams. See DAVID GILLIAN & THOMAS BROWN,
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 40
(1997).
204. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing and Privatization, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1873, 1898-99 (2005).
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By the time legal protection for instream flows was
recognized in the 1970s, many of the major western rivers were
depleted and running almost dry in the summer.205 Even with
their introduction, instream flow protection policies are generally
limited to protecting what is left of a river by setting aside
unappropriated water or bringing in environmental concerns
under new water rights.206 With most western streams already
fully appropriated and the recognition of permanent property
rights to water under prior appropriation, the acquisition and
transfer of existing water rights to instream flows is difficult and
costly.207 Some recourse for instream flow protection has been
provided through the Endangered Species Act, which accords
protection of endangered species priority over water use.208 At
the same time, the Act prohibits any water user from causing a
“take” of an endangered species, but it has yet to have much
impact on water use. Reinforcing such inaction, the court in
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States found
for the first time that “restrictions imposed under the ESA
amounted to a taking of private property.”209 Once again, the

205. These include the Snake River in Idaho, Salt River in Arizona, the Rio
Grande in New Mexico, the Arkansas River in Colorado, and the San Joaquin
River in California, several of them located below a major dam. See GILLIAN &
BROWN, supra note 203, at 40.
206. See Reed Benson, Adequate Progress or Rivers Left Behind? Developments
in Colorado and Wyoming Instream Flow Laws Since 2000, 36 ENVTL. L. 1283,
1301-02 (2006).
207. See id. at 1302 (comparing instream flow protection in Colorado, one of
the most active state in protecting flows, and Wyoming where such protection “is
at best a low priority.”). Benson concludes that even in Colorado, where the
legislative toolbox has greatly expanded, practical progress to date has been
inadequate. Id. For a general overview of environmental flow policy, see
Lawrence MacDonnell, Return to the River: Environmental Flow Policy in the
United States and Canada, 45 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASSOC., 1087 (2009).
208. Landmark cases such as Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978), which stopped the completion of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee
River in order to protect the endangered Snail darter, or the threat of
enforcement of section 9 of the Endangered Species Act against irrigators in the
Walla Walla River Basin appear to hold out promise for inflow water protection.
See Reed Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the
Similarities Between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44
NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 44-45 (2004).
209. Benson, supra note 206, at 45; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).
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allocation of property rights to water use under prior
appropriations stands in the way of effective environmental
action. Nevertheless, despite much criticism over the past
several decades, prior appropriation continues to be the
foundation of western water law.
C. Patterns that Pervade
The list of resource sectors that could be covered in a similar
fashion is nearly endless, from coal bed methane, shale gas, and
mountain-top mining to fisheries, groundwater extraction, and
hydroelectric power. We have reviewed a few industries not
because (with the exception of energy) they are more important,
but simply as illustrations of patterns that are not incidental or
isolated but foundational. In short, the state has long been, and
continues to be, the biggest developer around. One might even
argue that, from the state’s perspective,210 environmental law is
essentially self-regulation, providing environmental protection
only to the extent that, like any industry, it does not seriously
interfere with its economic priorities. If so, this sheds light on the
conundrum facing environmental law today that, despite the best
efforts of environmental lawyers over several decades to halt
environmentally destructive activities, the environment at all
levels and in all parts of the world is spiraling downhill.
This general eco-crisis is now widely understood. It is
perhaps most clearly illustrated by a startling set of graphs of the
historic trends in resource use and environmental impacts found
in Gus Speth’s 2008 book, A Bridge at the Edge of the World.211

210. Some will understandably criticize this as a modernist formulation that
“reifies” the sovereign state as some fixed identifiable thing (the proverbial
billiard ball image of a solid core with fixed boundaries), rather than treating it
in a more post-structuralist fashion as a fluid, multi-faceted, porous process.
From the perspective of green legal theory, however, the concern is to uncover a
diverse, but more or less coherent, set of power logics that are inherent to this
form of governance that follows from its formally constituted character. For an
interesting treatment of the state’s inherent (bureaucratic and centralist) logic
that leads to the simplification of territorial diversity and the homogenization of
social structures, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998).
211. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD xx-xxi
(2008). Gus Speth, a former head of the Council of Environmental Quality in
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One graph that charts temperature changes is reminiscent of
Michael Mann’s controversial “hockey stick” graph which showed
temperatures rising only slightly over two centuries, then
shooting almost straight up over the last few decades.212 Climate
change deniers vehemently challenged the accuracy of Mann’s
graph. However, Speth presented not just one graph but sixteen
graphs, not just one hockey stick, but a locker room full of them!
From water, fertilizer, and paper consumption, to dam
construction, motor vehicles use, species extinctions, and loss of
tropical rainforest the story is the same: after increasing only
slightly over the preceding two centuries, the numbers suddenly
shoot up around the middle of the twentieth century. This
exponential increase translates, in the United States, to a level of
mineral and fossil fuel use over the last half-century that
surpasses the amount used by the rest of the world throughout all
of human history.213 The conclusion is clear: democratic states
have not only failed to stem this tsunami—they have created it.
These trends and what they say about the state of
environmental law alarms Mary Wood. The Philip H. Knight
Professor of Law at the University of Oregon, Wood begins the
abstract for a recent law review paper thus: “Modern
environmental law has proved a colossal failure, despite the good
intentions and the hard work of many citizens, lawyers, and
government officials.”214 She notes that, in the United States,
“[n]early every natural resource—including the atmosphere,
water, air, wetlands, wildlife, fisheries, soils, marine systems,
grasslands, and forests—is seriously degraded, and many are at
the brink of collapse.”215 She uses sub-headings with titles like
Washington and recent dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies, is one of the leading American environmentalists and environmental
lawyers of the modern environmental era. Faculty Directory: James Gustave
Speth, VT. LAW SCH., http://www.vermontlaw.edu/our_faculty/faculty_
directory/james_gustave_speth.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
212. Michael E. Mann et al., Global-Scale Temperature Patterns and Climate
Forcing Over the Past Six Centuries, 392 NATURE 779 (1998); see also MICHAEL
E. MANN, THE HOCKEY STICK AND THE CLIMATE WARS: DISPATCHES FROM THE
FRONT LINES (2012) (recalling the controversy triggered by the graph and the
science and politics that fueled it).
213. ANDREW DOBSON, GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT 58 (2007).
214. Wood, supra note 23, at 43.
215. Id. at 44-45.
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“ecological bankruptcy” (where she details a dizzying array of
statistics of declining fisheries, water quality, forests, and so on),
“climate emergency,” “realism,” and “the inevitability of
transformational change.” This dire assessment applies directly
to the United States, the jurisdiction with the world’s earliest,
most sophisticated, and farthest-reaching regulatory regimes.
Professor Wood highlights many of the specific problems in
overcoming the conundrum. Environmental law, she argues, is a
massive bureaucratic mess with “hundreds of thousands of pages”
of statutes that create a “disjointed and complex set of mandates”
for agencies whose “accumulated power . . . has stretched the
seams of democracy.”216 Trying to get a handle on the regulatory
complexity and “legal baklava” is impossible, so agencies succumb
to political pressure despite the “myth that the agencies operate
in good faith.”217 The result is that “the public has become
disenfranchised” while courts defer to the administrative
“discretion” of the agencies even where their decisions may be
“infected with political influence and bias.”218 The problem is
endemic; “something close to an administrative tyranny now
presides over Nature.”219
These problems with the bureaucratic context of
environmental law point to even bigger problems.
In his
appropriately
titled
book,
Unnatural
Law,
Canadian
environmental lawyer, David Boyd, identifies a number of what
he calls “systemic weaknesses” in Canada that range from the
usual factors (missing laws, excessive regulatory discretion,
inadequate implementation and enforcement, low agency
budgets) to more political problems such as the influence of
industry and labor, bureaucratic inertia, trade restraints, judicial
obstacles, and political caution.220 Boyd’s list of criticisms deepen
further, moving from institutional weaknesses to “root causes”

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 57, 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 61.
DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 228-72 (2003).
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including economic growth, excessive consumption, and
population growth.221
In response to the system-wide dysfunction that Wood
identifies, she suggests the implementation of a “public trust
doctrine” that would see government acting as the people’s
designated trustee of natural resources for public benefit rather
than private exploitation. Boyd proposes reforms such as a
constitutional right of every citizen to a healthy environment.222
These are certainly useful proposals at the cutting edge of
environmental law. Ultimately, however, the question becomes
about what is possible through the legal route itself insofar as it
forces us back inside the box, back inside the same regulatory
state that implements it—and that remains embedded in all the
problems discussed above.223 At stake, says Wood, is the
“paradigm of environmental law” itself, and the institutions that
embody it.224
The choice of the word “paradigm” is instructive. Developed
by Thomas Kuhn in the 1960s to explain changes in scientific
thinking,225 paradigms were seen to evolve through contradiction
and revolution. Whether they be chemists or biologists, doctors
or lawyers, Kuhn describes how scientific practitioners work
within a set of implicit rules (a paradigm) and way of
seeing/experiencing the world (a gestalt) of which they were not
fully aware but to which they were firmly attached.226 They
cannot see the paradigm precisely because they are so much a
part of it. It defined their world as they did their “normal
science,” extending the paradigm by tackling new problems—
221. Id. at 273-88.
222. See also DAVID BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAW,
ENVIRONMENT, POLITICS (2012).
223. For a fuller list of such proposals, see BURNS WESTON & TRACY BACH,
RECALIBRATING THE LAW OF HUMANS WITH THE LAWS OF NATURE: CLIMATE
CHANGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (2009). It addresses
innovative initiatives such as a “law of the ecological commons,” model
provisions for state constitutions, model legislation, cap and trade strategies,
the sovereign trust, common law reforms, special court-appointed officials, draft
UN General Assembly resolutions, proposals to improve the Kyoto Protocol, new
WTO rules, and compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice.
224. Wood, supra note 23, at 54.
225. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1962).
226. Id.
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“puzzle solving.” Then someone confronts an “anomaly” that
cannot be resolved within the paradigm. If that person is
persistent (and clever) enough, she uncovers the hidden premises
on which the paradigm depends, and that no longer work, and
she thus sets out to create a new paradigm that does. Not
surprisingly, this is not welcome news to the puzzle-solvers,
leading to the suppression of the contrary research and the new
conversation it inspires, with a new paradigm emerging only
through an intellectual and institutional revolution. If ever there
were anomalies to a paradigm, Speth, Wood, and Boyd have
identified them.
But where is the revolution? Without it, environmental law
must ask an allegedly benevolent state to regulate against its
own long history of economic expansion and notions of selfinterest. It is, thus, an ironic form of self-regulation that, by
continuing to place its faith in incremental state regulation, is
necessarily held hostage to a pre-regulatory vision of economic
growth and political power. Given the trajectory of the planet, it
would seem increasingly difficult for the field to avoid a critical
engagement with such a limiting context. Perhaps because the
field has been so integrated into the instrumental knowledge and
practice of the regulatory state, however, its practitioners seem
unable to see (and unable to respond to) the problematic in which
the field is situated.227 Environmental law textbooks continue to
touch on potentially destabilizing topics like the limits to growth,
or global and local inequity, but quickly bracket them as side
issues while they get on with the pragmatics of legal practice.228

227. Instrumental knowledge, as opposed to critical knowledge, is oriented to
the means rather than the preset ends and does not question the larger context
within which knowledge is developed. As such, it serves an unquestioned value
system, in this case, an economic system that prioritizes maximization of
production and consumption and a regulatory system that facilitates it.
228. A common pattern can be observed in leading American environmental
law text books: a brief introduction of five to ten pages of “perspectives” on
environmental law is followed by 1,000 pages of intra-systemic practice. See,
e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES,
READINGS (2008); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: PROBLEMS, CASES AND READINGS (2008); and NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD &
CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY AND ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING
THE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA (2008). Similarly, Richard Lazarus cites many
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Nowhere is this legal field explicitly situated within any critical,
let alone systematic, understanding of how diverse underlying
economic and political forces have created this environmental
problematic, or, to put this in GLT language, how their de facto
regulatory “logics” have developed “system dynamics” that
mandate it. Thus, GLT seeks to re-orient the attention now
directed to downstream “legal laws” to develop a new
understanding of the upstream constitutive “dynamics” of
material and cultural production that today lie largely
undisturbed behind the environmental law paradigm. Those few
incipient green legal scholars who have looked at this situation
confront a common challenge: that we must transcend the liberal
paradigm that bounds environmental law.229
V. LIBERALISM AND THE LAW OF MITIGATED
PRODUCTION
A. Reconciling the Two Faces of Liberalism
Although the character of liberalism has evolved through
various forms over the centuries,230 one can identify a common

problems with environmental law that could be deemed to be systemic in
nature, but he concludes that a revolutionary reworking of environmental law is
not needed, keeping the basic architecture as the basic mix of laws and
institutions is adjusted. Lazarus, supra note 25, at 225-26. Michael Kraft also
sees market mechanisms and command-and-control regulation as maintaining
their dominance in environmental law well into the future. KRAFT, supra note
27, at 139. Finally, Keith Hirokawa, though he recognizes the existence of
“radical” critiques of environmental law, prefers to “find better environmental
solutions that both effect a change in the way we treat the environment and are
practical enough to be adopted by our legal system.” Keith Hirokawa, Some
Pragmatic Observations About Radical Critique in Environmental Law, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 225, 281 (2002).
229. See, e.g., CAHN, supra note 59; GEOFFREY LEANE, Environmental Law’s
Liberal Roots: (Not) a Green Paradigm in GREEN PARADIGMS AND THE LAW 1
(Nicole Rogers ed., 1998); Cynthia Giagnocavo & Harvey Goldstein, Legal
Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of Environmental Rights, 35 MCGILL L.J.
345 (1990); and R. Michael M’Gonigle & Paula Ramsay, Greening
Environmental Law: From Sectoral Reform to Systemic Reformation, 14 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 342 (2004).
230. These include classical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries that led to the liberal democracy of the nineteenth and twentieth
century, and developed into the liberal welfare state from the 1920s and the
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set of cultural assumptions and values that have taken root in
Western industrial society and helped to propel its economic and
political successes.
This philosophical liberalism has also
facilitated its environmentally destructive behavior231 while
informing and constraining environmental law and democratic
processes more generally. Although it is difficult to summarize
the tenets of liberalism in a way that does full justice to its
evolving character, nevertheless we will consider it briefly to see
why a philosophical re-constitution is necessary for a green reformation.
The foundational concept of liberalism is that of the
autonomous (rational, self-determining) individual. It is argued
that when individuals are free to pursue their own vision of the
good life and to maximize their own personal “utility,” that
pursuit can also benefit society generally.232 This is certainly the
premise of a social reliance on self-directed interactions through
the marketplace, a marketplace that puts rationality,
individualism, and free competition at the center of social life.233
In turn, the state is limited, refraining from intruding upon these
individual strivings except in carefully constrained ways. One
acceptable intrusion is to put in place those conditions that can
neoliberalism of the 1980s. See, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1977); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (2006). For a
recent critique of the contradictions (or as he puts it, the hypocrisy) of
liberalism, see DOMENICO LOSURDO, LIBERALISM: A COUNTER-HISTORY (2011).
231. See, e.g., Margaret FitzSimmons et al., Environmentalism and the Liberal
State, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? (Martin O’Connor ed., 1994); ROBYN
ECKERSELY, THE GREEN STATE: RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY
(2004); Val Plumwood, Has Democracy Failed Ecology?, in ECOLOGY AND
DEMOCRACY (Freya Mathews ed., 1996); and VAL PLUMWOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL
CULTURE: THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS OF REASON (2002).
232. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 6-7; CAHN, supra note 59, at 4-5.
233. The concept of bounded rationality, however, points out that full
rationality is limited by both cognitive and emotional boundaries. Not only are
human cognitive capabilities quite limited, particularly in our globalized system
of production and consumption, emotional impulses may override conclusions
drawn from rational deliberations. See Richard Selten, What is Bounded
Rationality?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY - THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 13-36 (Gerd
Gigenzer & Reinhard Selten eds., 2002). On the process by which the market
moved from the periphery to the center of social ordering, see KARL POLANYI,
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). Polanyi draws attention in this work to the
destructive effects of this historical move, including its implications for state
action.
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facilitate the individuals’ ability to pursue their self-interest
including, first and foremost, state enforcement of private
property and contractual relations through both civil and
criminal laws. Similarly, an economic role for the state (its
“social welfare” function) is justified if it can help remedy
situations where the pursuit of such self-interest leads to
distortions in the market. For example, when “externalities”
(such as climate change) are left out of the market equation, state
intervention is useful to help “internalize” these omissions so that
the resulting market values reflect their full costs and benefits.
At a political level, state legitimacy is derived as well from
enhancing the individual’s freedom to choose the government
such individuals collectively desire, including related rights such
as the freedom of speech, freedom of association, the rule of law,
freedom to participate in the political process, and so on.
Citizens, through their participation, consent to be governed by
those who have been properly elected. Here, however, a clear
tension exists between the pursuit of liberalism in its economic
form (driven by the pursuit of individual self-interest) and in its
state democratic form (motivated to maintain the equality of each
citizen).
Liberal democracy can, therefore, be separated into its
economic and political aspects.
By examining the tension
between economic and democratic liberalisms, we can uncover the
constraints imposed upon the state that attempts to respond to
the ecological crisis. Since much of the pursuit of self-interest is
of an economic nature, free individuals make personal
consumption choices based on their personal values and desires,
while producers compete to meet those consumption demands.234
Decisions are taken on the basis of their existing economic
endowments. These are also the central elements of the capitalist
market economy which, as Matthew Cahn points out, share the
same central values of “private property, competitive selfinterest, economic liberty, and minimal government.”235 The
234. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 7.
235. CAHN, supra note 59, at 11. As David Held points out, “while different
variants of liberalism interpreted [freedom of choice] in different ways they were
all united around the advocacy of a constitutional state, private property and
the competitive market economy.” HELD, supra note 230, at 59.
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resulting system is characterized by allocative efficiency (as a
result of well functioning markets), wealth maximization, and
growth, all of which take on the appearance of value-neutrality
insofar as they build on the foundational (indeed, “naturalist”)
reference point of the rational individual.236 If all functions as it
should, the result, is economic equilibrium, social welfare, and
democratic stability.237
In a free and competitive market economy, capital demands a
return, whether in interest payments or returns on investment.
Thus, under capitalism, growth has a life of its own; it is inherent
to it. That is what capital does automatically, and must do, if it is
to perform its essential function. To any mainstream economist,
this is an obvious and uncontroversial truth.238 An individual
producer enhances his returns to capital by investing his
revenues in innovation and technologies that will generate costsaving efficiencies. If other owners of capital are doing likewise,
anyone who does not keep up with these improvements will see
their capital diminish in relative value. Under competitive
conditions, all producers continuously seek to reduce their costs
so that they might retain their market share against other

236. See LEANE, supra note 229, at 7. This naturalism can be seen, for
example, in the famous Lockean assertion that there is “a law of nature to
govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions.” John Locke,
An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 271 (1690/1988). Through this move, what is
today seen as the “positivist” character of liberal theory (founded in
individualism, reason, property) is ultimately situated within a “naturalist”
truth claim. In opening up today’s positivist ideology to critical re-examination,
a core task is to re-engage with this long (but falsely) rejected tradition of
philosophical naturalism (and natural law). Addressing this controversial and
difficult topic is beyond the scope of this paper except to note that it leads
ineluctably to a re-examination of such institutions as capitalism and the
modern state as assumed (“naturalized”) forms of social organization.
237. See CAHN, supra note 59, at 11.
238. See Richard Smith, Beyond Growth or Beyond Capitalism, 53 REAL
WORLD ECON. REV. 28, 31 (2010). The article highlights the rejection by Tom
Clougherty, executive director of the right-wing think tank, the Adam Smith
Institute, of the concept of a no-growth capitalism. Commenting on a proposal
for a Steady State Economy by the New Economics Foundation, Clougherty
asserts that it shows “a complete lack of understanding of economics.” Id. at 28.
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producers who are doing the same thing.239 This competition
tends to drive down prices for everyone (to the benefit of
consumers). In response, if all producers can expand the size of
the market as a whole (i.e. its overall growth), this will allow
them all to benefit by bringing in new consumers who can take up
the increased flow of products that result from these economies of
scale. In such a situation, more producers can survive the
pressures of competition.
This production treadmill of growth points, as we have seen,
to higher level, systemic dynamics that function as a culturally
constitutive mode of regulation. Maintaining such growth is a
core mandate of those business corporations with shareholders
who invest with the sole intention of maximizing returns on their
investment. Indeed, this mandate is legally enshrined in a
business corporation act.240 With growing new markets a key
safety valve for capital, economic colonization is another
“dynamic” of capitalism, as is the corollary drive to break down
legal barriers to liberal economic freedom so that competitors can
more easily access new pools of cheaper labor and more
consumers throughout the world. This is why the recent bout of
economic globalization is also termed “neo-liberalism” insofar as
it repeals state controls in favor of (corporate) economic freedoms.
These material processes also have culturally constitutive effects
insofar as ordinary individuals in capitalist economies have
invested their savings (their capital) in pension funds and
investment portfolios with the insistent expectation that their
investment will grow, increase their wealth, and carry them
through their lives.
As a neutral ideology rooted in the rational individual,
economic liberalism takes existing individual endowments as
given, regardless of how unequally wealth is distributed. In the
early years of industrialism, only a minority of the state’s
population owned the capital that produced goods so that great

239. Marx discussed this process in light of how it translated into a “tendency
of the rate of profit to fall.” KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOLUME 3: THE PROCESS OF
CAPITALIST PRODUCTION AS A WHOLE (1967/1894).
240. See Smith, supra note 238, at 34, 31; see generally FRED MADOFF & JOHN
BELLAMY FOSTER, WHAT EVERY ENVIRONMENTALIST NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT
CAPITALISM (2011).
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inequality existed between such owners and those who had to sell
their labor for wages. This historical mal-distribution of income,
wealth, and power again reflects the difference between economic
liberalism (where individual inequality is inherent) and
liberalism in democracy (with its formal equality of each voting
citizen). The potential for political discord arises if economic
differences become too great as we have recently seen with the
Occupy movement.241 Again, economic growth plays an essential
political role here by helping to mitigate the effects of economic
inequality not by redistributing social wealth (that is, by slicing
the existing economic pie differently) but by expanding it overall
(so that more benefits accrue to everyone from a larger pie). As
the neoliberals mantra goes, free trade is good because “a rising
tide lifts all boats.”242
The state also has a role to play in addressing problems of
inequity, for example, through imposing progressive taxes on
income and providing social services for all, but this function is
limited. As it is commonly expressed, the redistribution of
income (e.g. differential tax rates) is liberal; the redistribution of
wealth (e.g. nationalization) is radical. The flip side of the liberal
response is, however, that a significant re-distribution of wealth
(and not just of income) would be a pre-requisite for the state that
hopes to escape its dependence on continuous economic growth
with all its damaging environmental effects. As it is, a static or
shrinking national economy effectively determines the nature of
state action—stimulus—because, in the absence of radical
economic equity, all modern democracies must pursue growth as
the basis upon which its political aspirations for social welfare
can be met. In short, the inherent growth dynamic of capitalism
is foundational to contemporary economic, political, and social life
such that regulatory economic actions are subsidiary to (deeper)
constitutive ecological ones.243
241. See About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 11, 2013).
242. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 64 (2007).
243. In this light, advocacy for new forms of the “commons” or for “cooperative” new forms of economic organization should be appreciated not just as
another set of “legal reforms” for social justice, but as potentially foundational
“constitutive re-formations” because they address the underlying logics of
dominating systems, the underlying system dynamics. This shift in “legal”
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It is not surprising, therefore, that a primary function of the
modern state (especially from the advent of industrial capitalism
in the 18th century) has been to provide the conditions for
capitalist growth—enforcing contracts, protecting property rights,
providing public infrastructure and public administration,
backing colonial projects internally and externally to the state,
and so on.244 These functions today are even more diverse, from
ensuring access to a well-qualified labor force, to supporting
improvements in technology, or subsidizing resource-extracting
activities. But the liberal democratic state has to be responsive
not only to the demands of capital but also to those who are
exploited, marginalized, or in some other way harmed by the
inequalities embedded in the economic system. To do this, the
state relies on tax revenues (themselves a product of the growth
economy) to fund programs and policies such as social security,
health care, or public education that can address social and
economic ills. A growing economy allows for more social spending
with lower taxes and leads to high public approval. As a result,
democratic state “legitimacy” is dependent on maintaining a high
level of economic growth. A capitalist economy without growth
leads not only to an economic but a political downturn.
Consequently, the promotion of economic growth, as Gus Speth
noted, “may be the most widely shared and robust cause in the
world today.”245

understanding entails as well, of course, the embrace of a new set of
knowledges, discourses, processes, alliances, and strategies that reaches beyond
existing environmental legal concerns.
244. In England, for example, internal state colonialism was especially
important in the thousands of “acts of enclosure” that were promulgated by the
English Parliament to allow for the privatization of communal lands to facilitate
the wool trade, while external state colonialism involved the assertion of Crown
title over foreign lands (the basis of the early development of the United States)
in order to gain access to new resources and lands. Interestingly, the colonial
expedition encountered forms of indigenous governance that were so unlike the
European state that they were not recognized and their lands were conveniently
treated as “empty” (terra nullius). Again, these colonial processes can be
understood as driven not by some ad hoc political choices but by the constitutive
dynamics by which the dominating systems of social organization inherently
operate.
245. SPETH, supra note 211, at 47. Or, as historian J. R. McNeil argued, “the
overarching priority of economic growth was easily the most important idea of
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To the environmentalist, of course, problems arise with the
physical consequences of such growth. In an open (frontier)
landscape, such problems can be tolerated; in a closed (full) world,
they cannot. Clearly, an economy cannot continue to expand
indefinitely in a bounded environment without profound
repercussions. Indeed, signs that we have reached the limits of
growth are mounting all around us, from collapsed fisheries and
massive forest loss to ocean dead zones and climate change.
Nevertheless, the ideology of growth is so entrenched (as a
constitutive mandate) and so functionally important that to speak
of the limits of growth is still economic heresy and political
suicide.246 In this situation, the state inevitably has a double
role: promoting economic growth and accumulation on the one
hand, while it cleans up the resulting environmental problems on
the other. But if a state were to dramatically seek to reduce or
eliminate environmentally destructive economic activity, it would
risk setting off multiple crises from job loss and business
shutdowns to capital flight. Thus, no liberal democratic state has
been willing to advance environmental protection to such an
extent that it risks economic growth. As Eckersley writes, “the
boundaries of successful policies are invariably set by the
buoyancy of the economy.”247
In today’s shrinking world, the massive size of the global
economy and its inequitable character pose unique challenges for
state management framed by this conundrum. On the one hand,
we cannot do without growth. On the other hand, if the liberal
democratic state fails to respond to the environmental concerns of
its citizens, it also risks losing legitimacy. This tension between
the “liberal” goal of promoting capital accumulation and the
“democratic” need to maintain legitimacy is the fundamental

the twentieth century.” J.R. MCNEIL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 336
(2000).
246. For a recent discussion of how this imperative has even undermined the
critical field of ecological economics that was intended to challenge the growth
commitment, see Blake Anderson & R. Michael M’Gonigle, Does Ecological
Economics Have a Future? Discourse and Contradiction in the Age of Climate
Change, 84 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 37 (2012).
247. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 55. This fact is obvious in the minimal
progress made at recent rounds of international climate talks despite
widespread acknowledgement of the urgent need to address climate change.
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contradiction embedded in “liberal democracy.”248 To date, the
answer has been, argues Colin Hay, for the state to “respond at a
largely tactical or a cosmetic level,” that is, to “respond to
subjective perceptions of crisis rather than to the contradictions
and discontinuities that precipitate such threats to legitimacy.”249
This is the connection that Matthew Cahn also makes between
tactical or “symbolic” politics and environmental law.250 In a
manner similar to our discussion above of various regulatory
fields, Cahn demonstrates how environmental regulations from
the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and several acts addressing
solid and hazardous waste have been designed to “satisfy public
anxiety while maintaining a commitment to traditional liberal
Consequently, governments
economic development.”251
encourage (and subsidize) technological developments that make
deep-water drilling safer and cars more fuel efficient; develop
complex regulatory schemes that mandate scrubbers on new
thermal plants and phased-in retrofits on old ones; and subsidize
“green” windmills—always seeking to balance accumulation with
legitimation through a regulatory infrastructure “in which people
are eager for reassurance that they are being protected and
therefore eager to believe that publicized government actions
have the effects they are suppose to have.”252
That we can in fact square the circle of healthy economic
growth with healthy environmental stability is the underlying
faith of environmental law and its active mission. The goal is not
to challenge the liberal economic order, but to make it work in
harmony with the environment. In other words, environmental
law works as a kind of law of mitigated production, the primary
248. For a critical analysis of this core dynamic of ensuring “accumulation”
while maintaining the nexessary “legitimation,” see Margaret FitzSimmons et
al., Environmentalism and the Liberal State, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? 198
(Martin O’Connor ed., 1994); Colin Hay, Environmental Security and State
Legitimacy, in IS CAPITALISM SUSTAINABLE? 217 (Martin O’Connor ed., 1994);
JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973); JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL
CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
249. Hay, supra note 248, at 221. The environmental crisis is therefore
addressed as “a particular and transient political rationality as opposed to a
crisis of capitalist accumulation per se.” Id.
250. See CAHN, supra note 59, at 18-28.
251. Id. at 28.
252. Id. at 19.
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goal of which is to improve existing processes and structures of
production but without fundamentally challenging the context in
which they operate. This was the legal ideology driving President
Obama as he confronted the BP blowout in the Gulf of Mexico.
But it infuses virtually every environmental and resource
management regime on the books, and it does so everywhere in
the industrialized world.
B. Mitigating Production Through Efficiency
In the 1980s, the ambition to square this circle was given a
name, “sustainable development.” Its message was simple: in a
world divided between developed economies (with strong
environmental standards and quality environments) and
underdeveloped economies (with neither), economic growth was
the pathway to both development and environmental quality. In
the 1990s, this formulation was refined through the terminology
of “ecological modernization” that saw sustainable development
being achieved even for Western countries by engaging in
environmentally-beneficial growth through enhanced resource
efficiencies—doing more with less—so that the negative
consequences of growth would not arise in the first place. Within
this large-scale project of social engineering, environmental law
has played an essential, supportive role in its constant quest to
internalize externalities through the market.
This managerial model builds on well-established economic
principles of a free, competitive market system that is designed to
produce outcomes that will be “Pareto optimal.”253 This means
that the system “inevitably allocates resources, distributes
income and apportions consumer goods among consumers so that
no reallocation of resources through changes in consumption,
exchange, or production could unambiguously augment the value
of the commodities being produced and exchanged.”254 This
253. See E.K. HUNT, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 473 (1992).
254. Id. at 476. This is based on a number of assumptions including a large
number of buyers and sellers, no uncertainty about the future, perfect
knowledge, and markets that are always in equilibrium. Once a Pareto optimal
situation is achieved, the position of one individual cannot be improved without
harming or worsening the position of another. This situation takes the existing
distribution of wealth, income, power “as given,” just as it does the
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result of “allocative efficiency” can be achieved only if the correct
price signals are sent to the market. But negative social and
environmental “externalities” such as pollution or illnesses
distort prices.
Welfare economics does not, however, see
externalities as arising from economic growth per se but as a
result of specific instances of (correctable) “market failures.”
From this understanding, environmental “goods” are abused
because they are free, a situation that could be corrected if they
were (properly) priced and paid for. To restore the system to a
state of Pareto optimality, the government intervenes as an
impartial arbitrator to enact a tax or provide a subsidy such that
the unpriced externality is neutralized. Hence, “the solution to
any problem faced–from global warming and biodiversity loss to
terms of trade and income distribution–is a secondary outcome of
‘getting the prices right.’”255 This understanding of “market
failure” provided the intellectual justification and procedural
tools for the wave of environmental regulations that took hold in
the 1970s and even more so in the 1980s and 90s. It still drives
thinking today.256
This principle of allocative efficiency underlies the field of
law and economics which eschews substantive (political) concerns
of distributive justice or environmental health as well as the
larger concerns about growth that follow from a critical political

accompanying legal system, moral values, and institutions for granted. See id.
at 478-80.
255. John Gowdy & Jon D. Erickson, The Approach of Ecological Economics,
29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 207, 209 (2005).
256. This underlies the burgeoning field of pricing “ecosystem services,” a
movement that is (ironically) being driven by ecological economists who question
growth but not the mainstream economic tools (i.e. prices) of the capitalism that
demands such growth. For more general discussions of the nature and promise
of the economic methodology of ecosystem services pricing, see James Boyd &
Spencer Bazhaf, What are Ecosystem Services? The Need for Standardized
Environmental Accounting Units, 63 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 616 (2007); Robert
Constanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997); and Rudolf DeGroot, A Typology for the
Classification, Description and Valuation of Ecosystem Functions, Goods and
Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 393 (2002). For a recent discussion of this
thinking as it relates to the failure to achieve international targets for
biodiversity conservation, see Charles Perrings et al., Ecosystem Services,
Targets, and Indicators for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity, 9 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY ENV’T. 512 (2011).
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economy. Instead, this school focuses on procedural processes
and “objective” calculations of the efficient allocation of
resources.257 For example, in situations where the market breaks
down (where, for example, a new form of nuisance arises from a
novel technology), the state may be required to assign legal rights
to one party. Such assignments, law and economics scholars
pointed out, will allow the state to affect ab initio the efficiency of
resource allocation and so require a guiding principle to
neutralize the potential redistributive effects of that initial
allocation. Richard Posner, one of the field’s central scholars,
proposed that legal authorities should assign property rights to
those parties who would have secured them through market
exchange.258 By doing so, law would be able to promote efficiency
by “mimicking the market”259 and thus avoid tricky questions of
the distribution of wealth and power.
This championing of market forces is not merely some rightwing conspiracy to avoid the big questions; its logic is pervasive
within market society. At the risk of repetition, this logic is, from
a GLT perspective, presently ignored as having a constitutive (i.e.
regulatory) effect that operates beyond the “legal law.” The
embrace of this regulatory logic led to the adoption of Anthony
Giddens’ “Third Way” by both the liberal Clinton administration
in the U.S. and the Blair Labor government in the U.K.260 in
their attempts to achieve both the social goals of liberal
democracy and the efficiency goals of liberal economics without
the distortions that accompany direct state management or
control.261 As Giddens succinctly put it: “Securing greater social
justice depends upon a robust economy, not the other way
around.”262 This, he argued, was because “a competitive economy

257. See Jules Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the
Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649 (1984).
258. Id. at 662.
259. Id.
260. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY (1998).
261. See Anthony Giddens, It’s Time to Give the Third Way a Second Chance,
THE INDEPENDENT (June 28, 2007), http://www.politicsforum.org/forum/
viewtopic.php?f=28&t=79097.
262. Id. He points out, moreover, that all successful left-of-center leaders are
moving toward the political center. One can appreciate the ideology in this
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is the necessary condition of job creation and the goal of
sustaining full employment.”263 Unlike the more combative focus
of progressive politics on material inequalities and the
redistribution of wealth, the Third Way presented the structuring
imperatives of capitalism and economic globalization as selfevident, neutral, and even inevitable. Social problems are to be
resolved within the existing social order through improved
economic efficiencies that utilize market forces.264
Despite the catastrophic recession of 2008-2009, itself
arguably the product of the failure of neoliberalism, the
market/managerial lineage continues as strongly as ever, the
zeitgeist of the still dominant neo-liberal age. Following along
are the new, policy-relevant environmentalists who have
embraced the paradigm of ecological modernization to resolve
what might be seen as structural problems not with structural
solutions, but with internal reform technologies based on
economic efficiency and market forces.
C. Neoliberal Environmentalism
Accompanying the wave of neoliberalism (and de-regulation)
that swept through Western governments (and international
agencies) in the 1980s and 90s, ecological modernization became
the strategy for dealing with environmental problems but not
through after-the-fact regulatory interventions but in advance of
their even arising by reshaping economic growth itself. It
revolved around the idea that the state can “enhance the
competitiveness of industry by unilaterally increasing rather
than decreasing the stringency of environmental regulation.”265
The basic philosophy is summed up by the motto “pollution
prevention pays.” Ecological modernizers argue that “under the

statement by inverting it as follows: “Securing a just society is the prerequisite
for a robust social economy.”
263. ANTHONY GIDDENS, WHERE NOW FOR NEW LABOUR? 78-79 (2002). This
evidently ignores the structural or sociological barriers that place actors at
different levels of power and advantage.
264. See Shane Fudge & Stephen Williams, Beyond Left and Right: Can the
Third Way Deliver a Reinvigorated Social Democracy? 32 CRITICAL SOC. 583
(2006).
265. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 69.
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proper political, economic, and technological conditions,
competition among capitalists can be redirected so as to achieve
pollution-prevention eco-efficiencies within the spheres of
From this
production and, ultimately, consumption.”266
understanding, not only are industrialization, technological
development,
and
economic
growth
compatible
with
environmental values, they are the “key drivers of environmental
reform.”267 Consequently, rather than constraining the economy,
environmental regulations differently designed and oriented are
seen to maintain and even enhance economic growth while
By allowing
simultaneously improving the environment.268
businesses more flexibility to internalize real environmental
costs, “[m]ore production and consumption in economic terms
(GNP, purchase power, employment) do not have to imply more
environmental devastation (pollution, energy use, loss of
biodiversity).”269
A range of approaches exist within ecological modernization
from the technocratic, cost minimization strategies of “weak”
ecological modernization to the more critical and potentially
transformative
understandings
of
“strong”
ecological
270
modernization.
Originally, ecological modernization was
266. Michael Carolan, Ecological Modernization Theory: What About
Consumption? 17 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 247, 250 (2004). This is in the same
spirit as the influential 1987 report, “Our Common Future,” considered to be one
of the paradigm statements of ecological modernization (but with far less of the
modernizer’s focus on technological innovation and efficiency). See WORLD
COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987); see also MAARTEN HAJER,
THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE: ECOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION AND
THE POLICY PROCESS 26 (1995); Arthur Mol & Gert Spaargaren, Ecological
Modernization Theory in Debate: A Review, 9 ENVTL. POL. 17, 23 (2000)
(presenting a more nuanced position on an ecological modernization focused on
“redirecting and transforming ‘free market capitalism’ in such a way that it less
and less obstructs, and increasingly contributes to the preservation of society’s
sustenance base in a fundamental/structural way.”).
267. Richard York & Eugene Rosa, Key Challenges to Ecological
Modernization Theory, 16 ORG. & ENV’T 273, 274 (2002).
268. See Albert Weale, Politics of Ecological Modernization, in DEBATING THE
EARTH: THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS READER 237-249 (John Dryzek & David
Schlosberg eds., 1998).
269. Mol & Spaargaren, supra note 266, at 36.
270. See Peter Christoff, Ecological Modernization, Ecological Modernities, 5
ENVTL. POL. 476 (1996); see generally Mol & Spaargaren, supra note 266; and
HAJER, supra note 266.
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conceived as an approach to operationalizing the controversial
precautionary principle that also emerged in the late 1980s. This
principle emphasizes the need to avoid damages to the natural
world even where there is no conclusive scientific understanding
of the threat posed by a new technology, industrial emission, or
production practice.271 Weak versions of ecological modernization
focus on the role of technology and the market to help reach
existing industrial objectives and new environmental goals
through production that is technologically “smart” and
economically hyper-efficient, achieving “clean production”
through “closed-loop” technologies. In contrast to this reformist
industrial model, the “strong” version critically reflects on the
industrial goals themselves, seeking to shift from a technocratic
model of efficiency-oriented management to a more
interventionist model of wholesale industrial redesign.272 Such a
shift would be attained not only through technological and costeffective economic innovation, but through new forms of
environmental governance and institutional reflexivity.273
Not surprisingly, the stronger conception has not taken hold.
Instead, as two scholars trenchantly argued, the popular rhetoric
and practice of ecological modernization has tended toward “a
joyful fairy tale of low-hanging £10 notes and . . . an undue
preoccupation with company innovations only at the margin of
traditional production
practices.”274
Weak
ecological
modernization thus infuses corporate strategies of eco-efficiency
and green consumerism (e.g. electric cars) but it does so by
eschewing more dramatic approaches that would lead to
wholesale industrial rethinking that might entail significantly
reduced levels of consumption and growth (e.g. displacing private

271. See Mikael Skou Anderson & Ilmo Massa, Ecological Modernization –
Origins, Dilemmas and Future Directions, 2 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 337, 338
(2000).
272. For an interesting discussion of the science behind current environmental
policy versus an alternative precautionary science more consistent with the
precautionary principle, see Katherine Barrett & Carolyn Raffensperger,
Precautionary Science, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT –
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 106 (Carolyn Raffensperger &
Joel Tickner eds., 1999).
273. See ECKERSLEY, supra note 247, at 71.
274. See Anderson & Massa, supra note 271, at 338.
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cars within designated urban boundaries).275 The difference is
manifest, for example, in the embrace of enhanced risk
management as opposed to systemic risk reduction (especially
where the latter is undertaken for larger socio-economic goals
that cannot be justified in advance as being “cost effective”). The
dominant approach matches with the common objective of
ecological modernization to “reconcile the tensions between
technology and ecology, economic growth and ecology, and
Achieving such a
competitive market and ecology.”276
reconciliation draws on two complementary approaches:
technological innovation from within business and the use of
market-based instruments within governments to internalize
environmental costs.277
One of the best known books to espouse the benefits of ecoefficiency is Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and Hunter Lovins’
Natural Capitalism (1999). The book’s central premise is the
need for a resource productivity revolution that could be brought
about through radical changes in design and technology.278 The
authors note the important outcomes that can be achieved by
taxing, rather than subsidizing, environmentally destructive
activities. They also point out that restructuring in some sectors
is “gaining its momentum not from regulatory mandates, taxes or
subsidies but rather from newly unleashed forces of advanced
technology,
customer
demands,
competition
and
279
entrepreneurship.”
They point to a supposed transformation in
the car industry (touting its development of the super-light and
fuel-efficient “hypercar”), proclaiming that “if this industry can

275. See Nicholas Ashford, Government and Environmental Innovation in
Europe and North America, 45 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 1417, 1417-18 (2002);
and David Schlosberg & Sara Rinfret, Ecological Modernization, American Style,
17 ENVTL. POL. 254 (2008).
276. Valerie Fournier, Escaping from the Economy: The Politics of Degrowth,
28 INT. J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 528, 530 (2008); see also I. Blüdhorn & I. Welsh, EcoPolitics Beyond the Paradigm of Sustainability: A Conceptual Framework and
Research Agenda, 16 ENVTL. POL. 185 (2007).
277. At the risk of repetition, GLT inverts this approach by addressing the
inherent dynamics of the economic systems underlying these regulatory
strategies.
278. PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM (2d ed. 2010).
279. Id. at 22.
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fundamentally change, every industry can.”280 Dow Chemical is
held up as a model for energy efficiency, reaching a savings of $9
billion in energy costs through a $1 billion investment in efficient
“Protecting the climate is not costly but
energy use.281
profitable,” they assert, “because saving energy costs less than
buying it.”282
This movement has hit its stride in recent years in response
to the climate crisis where government “command and control”
regulation has been limited, but economic innovations in the law
have been plentiful. A variety of pricing mechanisms are seen as
capable of reducing the generation of carbon-based externalities.
One is the carbon tax that places an escalating charge on the use
of carbon-based fuels such as gasoline. As the charge increases
over time, say from an initial 5 cents/gallon to 20 or 30
cents/gallon or more, producers will be encouraged to improve
fuel efficiency or to switch to hybrid electric motors. Another is
the cap-and-trade system that sets a cap on the maximum
amount of carbon that might be emitted by an industry, say steel
manufacturing, and then allows steel manufacturers to trade an
allocated set of carbon credits amongst themselves so that the
firm that is best placed to improve its efficiency in a cost-effective
fashion does so, partly financed by selling its credits to other
firms that cannot make those changes as easily. By continually
reducing the size of the cap over time, new improvements will
always be needed, the continuing pressure continuously driving
up the value of the credits, thus keeping the momentum going.283

280. Id. at 23. As arch-critic of Hawken and the Lovins, Vaclav Smil points
out the hypercar has yet to materialize. VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY MYTHS AND
REALITIES: BRINGING SCIENCE TO THE ENERGY POLICY DEBATE 48 (2010). For his
devastating contemporary review of Natural Capitalism, see Vaclav Smil, Rocky
Mountain Visions: A Review Essay, 26 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 163 (2000).
281. Id. at xiii. But see PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK, DOW CORPORATE PROFILE
(2000), available at http://www.panna.org/resources/corporate-accountability
/profiles/dow (last visited May 22, 2012). Dow Chemical is more likely to be
associated with the hazardous chemicals it produces (including agent orange
and DDT) rather than environmental stewardship. Dow and its subsidiary,
Union Carbide, have been named by the EPA as responsible parties for 136
hazardous waste sites. Id.
282. HAWKEN ET AL., supra note 278, at xiii.
283. Emissions trading is also recommended as a cost-effective option for other
air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. See SUSTAINABLE
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Following this logic even further is the use of carbon offsets that
allow individuals and companies that cannot reduce their carbon
emissions directly (because of costs) instead to contribute to
others who promise to absorb them in other ways and places
(where it is cheaper to do so).284 For example, the Costa Rican
national government in the 1990s paid landowners to preserve
forested land or to reforest degraded land. The government then
sold this “carbon storage capacity” to volunteer markets. It later
established Certified Tradable Offsets to expand the sale of
carbon sinks from its forests.285 The primary role of the state is,
thus, to “create markets rather than replace them,”286 the
expected result of these market mechanisms being an explosion of
innovation that reduces greenhouse gases but also improves
economic efficiency and economic growth.287
This approach is embodied in the work of a sophisticated new
Canadian environmental organization, Sustainable Prosperity.288
Pricing carbon, they contend, “is the most effective and efficient
measure for reducing [the] carbon emissions” in addition to
providing many indirect economic benefits. In a recent interview
its founder recalls battling on the front lines of environmental
legislation for twelve years before coming to the realization that
“[m]ost CEOs would love to lower their environmental impacts if
they could still make a profit. The problem is that we operate in
a bad system–one that fails to reward good environmental
PROSPERITY, OPTIONS FOR MANAGING INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION IN CANADA: THE
USE OF MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS (2011), available at http://www.
sustainableprosperity.ca/article1489.
284. At a smaller scale, individuals who cannot reduce their carbon footprint
may purchase offsets through a fee—such as a charge on an airplane ticket—
that will then be allocated to some project that can offset the flyer’s impact, such
as planting carbon-absorbing trees.
285. TAMRA GILBERTSON & OSCAR REYES, CARBON TRADING – HOW IT WORKS AND
WHY IT FAILS 25 (2009).
286. Keith Stewart, Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons: Green Governance
Through the Market or the Public Domain?, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN?: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER (Daniel Drache
ed., 2001), available at http://www.yorku.ca/drache/talks/pdf/apd_stewartfin.pdf.
287. Carbon Pricing, Climate Change, and Fiscal Sustainability in Canada
(Policy Brief), SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (Dec. 2010), http://www.sustainable
prosperity.ca/dl290&display.
288. Why Green Business is Crucial, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/article251.
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behaviour.”289
In the true win-win spirit of ecological
modernization, the organization declares: “Nobody should have to
make sacrifices in order to do things that are good for the
environment. For individuals doing the right things should be
cheaper than doing the wrong thing. For business, it should be
more profitable.”290 The key is “to design regulations differently,
so they promote eco-efficiency.”291
Market-based strategies, like green tax shifting or emissions
trading are central to Sustainable Prosperity’s approach.
Emissions trading is seen as not only necessary to avoid runaway
climate change, but as an important way to assist poor countries
to develop in environmentally friendly ways–“like foreign aid but
better.”292 Developing a range of ecosystem markets is highly
encouraged. These would include such things as conservation
banking which compensates for plants and animals species
harmed by a development by creating a habitat that provides for
a similar number of species or plants; wetland mitigation banking
that allows a developer to compensate for damage to a wetland in
one place by restoring or enhancing a degraded wetland in
another place, preserving an existing wetland, or even creating a
new wetland; or biodiversity offsets which create new protected
areas or conservation projects outside an area that is negatively
impacted by development.
Other trading schemes include
nutrient trading, where industrial polluters pay farmers to
reduce their nutrient loading of a waterway in place of limiting
their own discharges; and renewable energy credits that allow
energy companies to meet renewable energy targets by buying

289. Lynn Moore, We Operate in a Bad System, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 5,
2010 (interview with Stewart Elgie), available at http://www.sustainable
prosperity.ca/article251.
290. What We Do, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, http://eoesi.com/docs/
Sustainable%20Prosperity/Sustainable%20Prosperity-Web%20Material.pdf (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
291. 2010/11 Report 2, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, http://www.sustainable
prosperity.ca/dl453 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
292. Stewart Elgie & Dan Gagnier, Emissions Trading: Like Foreign Aid but
Better, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 21, 2007, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/
2007/iisd_innovator_may_2007.pdf. Incidentally, Dan Gagnier was Chair of the
International Emissions Trading Association at the time the article was written.
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credits from elsewhere.293 These strategies are designed to
overcome the failure to accord priced values to nature’s services
by bringing market values to nature.294 The aim is to create the
right conditions so that “market forces reward investments in
ecosystem services” thereby creating a positive feedback loop
where “increased investments in ecosystem services leads to
increased production of ecosystem goods, eventually fuelling both
sustainable economic growth and ecological restoration.”295 This
approach, as Sustainable Prosperity’s website notes, is firmly
situated within “non-controversial, standard microeconomics.”296
Many other environmentalists have also turned to the
“realistic” strategies of ecological modernization aimed at
greening market valuations rather than more problematic
attempts to transform the basic dynamics of growth and capital
accumulation that provide the over-riding context for market
pricing and behaviors. The discourse of efficiency has provided a
bridge for environmental groups to cooperate with government
and corporations rather than staying locked in an uphill battle
against them with limited chances for success.297 As Arthur Mol

293. Alex Kenny et al., Advancing the Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity in Canada: A Survey of Economic Instruments for the Conservation
and Protection of Biodiversity, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY (2011), available at
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/dl534&display; see also, Eco Markets
Introduction: Conservation Backgrounder, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, http://
www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/web.page.php?page_name=e_m
arkets_intro&section=about_us (last visited May 22, 2012).
294. Kenny et al., supra note 293, at 9 (Prices should, theoretically, “reflect the
marginal change in value of the affected ecosystem service due to its use.”
While acknowledging that calculating the value of ecosystem services can be
“tricky,” they maintain that such challenges should not stop policy makers from
creating incentives based on prices).
295. Id. at 3, 4 (Ecosystem services are defined as “the benefits people obtain
from ecosystems,” and include such things as food, genetic resources for
pharmaceutical research, bees for pollination, forests for controlling flooding and
soil erosion, watersheds that produce clean water, etc.); see also, Ecosystem
Services, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/
pages/dynamic/web.page.php?page_id=7182&section=about_us&eod=1#es_3
(last visited May 22, 2012).
296. Background Paper, Smart Budget: A Background Paper on
Environmental Pricing Reform for Local Governments, SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY
(2010).
297. See JOHN DRYZEK, GREEN STATES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
ENVIRONMENTALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY AND

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

74

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1079

observes: “A change in ideology and strategy seemed to provide
environmental NGOs with better access to both the general
public and the core of policy communities in the environmental
And so environmental groups from Sustainable
field.”298
Prosperity to WWF, Environmental Defense, and Greenpeace
now partner with major corporations to further their “shared”
economic/environmental agendas.299
In short, ecological modernization and the allegiances it
generates has become the dominant strategy of the age. By
making a case for the “greening of business” as not only a feasible
solution to the environmental crisis but a profitable one,
ecological modernizers appear to overcome the contradiction
between economic growth and environmental quality. After all,
who would disagree with steady-state economist, Herman Daly,
when he says that “the market is the most efficient institution we
have come up with.”300 Who would want to refuse the prospect of
solving the environmental crisis not by questioning the capitalist
growth model, but by intensifying it? As Hawken et al. put it, “It
is easier . . . to ride a horse in the direction it is going.”301

NORWAY (2003) (the extent to which the environmental movement engages with
the state on ecological modernization depends on the degree to which a state
allows for their inclusion. For example corporatist arrangements encourage
moderate environmental organizations and other “stakeholders” to accept the
agenda of a weak ecological modernization while more exclusionary
arrangements force social movements to pursue their goals outside the state).
298. Arthur Mol, The Environmental Movement in an Era of Ecological
Modernisation, 31 GEOFORUM 45, 49 (2000). This in turn led to the
marginalization of more radical elements of the environmental movement
resulting in the polarisation of positions within the movement between the
“fundamentalists” and the “realists.”
299. See Michael Dorsey, Climate Knowledge and Power: Tales of Skeptic
Tanks, Weather Gods, and Sagas for Climate (In)justice, 18 CAPITALISM, NATURE,
SOCIALISM 7, 10 (2007). He notes, for example, Environmental Defense’s
cooperation with BP-Amoco in 1999 to pilot the first major corporate greenhouse
gas emissions trading scheme; Greenpeace’s collaboration with the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development (chaired by the ex-chair of Royal
Dutch Shell) to promote ratification of the Kyoto Protocol at the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development; and WWF’s eager promotion of carbon
trading.
300. HERMAN DALY & JOHN B. COBB, FOR THE COMMON GOOD 46 (2d ed. 1994).
301. HAWKEN ET AL., supra note 278, at 166.
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VI. ECOLOGICAL CONTRADICTIONS
As we turn here from liberal apologia to green critique, let us
recall two basic lessons of the case studies with which we began
this article. First, externalities are not accidental events but
pervasive cost shifts that are inherent to the design and success
of entire industrial structures. Second, these structures were
directly shaped, extensively financed, and continuously supported
by the state that is now to be the vehicle for the new modernizing
innovations. These lessons have profound implications for our
social/environmental relations generally and, more particularly,
for the future character of environmental law. And so the
question remains: does the challenge for environmental law lie in
developing responses to markets that do not presently reflect full
economic valuations or state-of-the-art efficiencies? Or do we
need to address the basic dynamics of the industries from which
market failures flow and for which enhanced efficiencies seem to
offer insufficient potential?
In other words, can the
environmental challenge be solved by perfecting the “economics”
and passing new “legal laws” promulgated within an accepted
political/economic context? Or must environmental law (or
whatever it evolves into) go further in order to address the
“constitutive dynamics” of a constructed “political economy” of
industries that inherently generate structural economic (and
environmental) consequences that resist correction, especially by
a state itself so implicated in the history and functioning of these
industries?
Hawken’s horse may be saddled with a more
compliant rider, but what help is that if it is simply racing faster
toward an abyss?
A. Lessons from Ecological Theory
Throughout this paper, we have articulated a new “green
legal” critique intended to shift analysis beyond the bounds of
both the neoclassical/mainstream economic calculus and liberal
theory to one informed by what might be understood as an
“ecological political economy.” The following discussion, though of
a more general nature that addresses economic and political
dynamics, is directly relevant to environmental law because it is
in this larger context where new larger forms of socially-
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constitutive (e.g. legal writ large) regulation must be developed.
Certainly, efficiency has an important place in an ecological
economy. Using less energy and fewer resources to do the same
thing makes obvious sense—why generate needless waste?
Moreover, great improvements can be made in efficiency and, to a
degree, even leading to some sort of industrial conversion. The
Germans trumpet their achievements with, in 2012, 20% of their
energy coming from renewables that they promise will completely
displace nuclear power by 2030.302 As well, organizations like
Sustainable Prosperity make many useful proposals for reform in
such areas as development cost charges in urban development,
energy efficiency, and so on. Meanwhile, dramatic reforms such
as constitutionalizing the right to a healthy environment can
have significant incremental impacts.303
As we have also seen, however, after more than two decades
of a market- and technology-based approach, ecological
modernization has been unsuccessful in altering the trajectory of
ecological collapse. Within an unproblematized economic/political
context, efficiency gains easily lead to their opposite, more
growth. As Richard Smith notes, “under capitalism, the whole
point of using resources efficiently is just to use the saved
resources to produce even more commodities, to accelerate the
conversion of even more natural resources into products . . . so the
cycle can begin all over again.”304 Throughout history efficiency
302. See CHRIS TURNER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE TORONTO (2007) (describing
the German green industrial strategy); see also Chris Turner, Germany’s
Sustainable Revolution, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 30, 2012, at B9 (original source for
figures in THE GEOGRAPHY OF HOPE TORONTO). It bears repeating that
“renewables” are not unproblematic in their impacts and costs. In its praise of
state-sponsored corporate innovation and growth, this article makes no mention
of overall reductions in levels of consumption, the externalities generated by
renewables, their high costs and the huge subsidies they demand, the
continuing impacts of economic growth on energy demand, and so on.
303. See BOYD, supra note 222 (noting in a review of over 100 countries, that
the constitutional right to a healthy environment has led not only to stronger
environmental laws, but also legislation and litigation that compels
governments to provide basic environmental services such as clean drinking
water, sanitation, and waste management); see also id. at 238 (noting the
constitutional right to a healthy environment has led to compensation of
citizens, whose health has been detrimentally affected by industrial pollution in
countries such as Peru, Russia, Romania, Chile, and Turkey).
304. Smith, supra note 238, at 40-41.
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gains in technology have, in fact, often translated into increasing
levels of consumption overall. This is recognized by mainstream
economics as a beneficial result, increasing productivity in order
to get more (not the same) for less.
The original explanation for this seeming paradox was
provided by the nineteenth century British coal economist,
William Stanley Jevons, in his classic work, The Coal Question.305
Jevons observed that technological advancements leading to more
efficient use of coal did not result in a decrease in coal
consumption but rather made coal a more cost effective energy
source for generating more profits and further economic
expansion.306 Taking the example of iron manufacturing, he
explained that if the quantity of coal used in a furnace declines in
comparison to the unit of production, profits will increase, new
capital will be attracted and the price of the product will decline,
which will in turn create an increase in demand for it. Thus, any
reduction in the use of coal as a result of improved efficiency will
eventually be overtaken by a greater number of furnaces and
expanded production.307 Jevons wrote: “It is wholly a confusion of
ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a
diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth.”308
(Instead, Jevons’ counter-intuitive explanation is fully compatible
with the mandate for market expansion necessitated by
competitive capitalism, as discussed above.)
“Jevons’ paradox” or the “rebound effect” as this insight is
also known, has been on full display in places like the U.S. where,
at both a micro- and macro-economic level, economic growth
repeatedly overtakes efficiency gains. As Juliet Schor notes,
“demand is rising fastest in those sectors that have had the
biggest efficiency gains–transport and residential energy use.”309
For example, people driving bigger cars over longer distances

305. William Stanley Jevons, Of the Economy of Fuel, 14 ORG. & ENV’T 99
(2001) (reprint of chapter 7 of WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE COAL QUESTION
(1865)); see also Blake Alcott, Jevons’ Paradox, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 9 (2005).
306. Jevons, supra note 305.
307. Id. at 100.
308. Id. at 99.
309. JULIET SCHOR, PLENITUDE: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF TRUE WEALTH 91
(2010).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

78

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1083

overtook the savings gained from improved fuel efficiencies in car
engines in the 1970s.310 Similarly, although fuel efficiency in
aviation improved by more than 40% since 1975, fuel
consumption grew by 50% as a result of more passenger
flights.311 The building industry is another sector applauded for
its notable gains in energy efficiency, yet energy use since 1978
has actually increased by 30% for residential buildings and over
65% for commercial buildings in the U.S.312 Energy efficiency has
been overtaken by such things as larger building size, air
conditioning, exercise rooms, swimming pools, home saunas, and
a plethora of appliances and home electronics.313 In other words,
efficiency gains actually fuel macro-economic growth, and are
widely praised for such an effect.314

310. See KRAFT, supra note 27, at 169 (including note 10) (noting that between
1995 and 2001, Congress ensured that fuel economy standards for vehicles were
not reviewed or changed despite the fact that the average fuel economy of
American vehicles was at the lowest level since 1980. He further notes that the
2003 model of cars and passenger trucks had an average fuel efficiency of 20.8
miles per gallon—6% less than the fuel efficiency high of 15 years earlier. In
2006, a modest increase in fuel economy standards was announced for SUVs,
pickup trucks, and vans with projected fuel savings of 8%).
311. SCHOR, supra note 309, at 9.
312. Jeffrey Harris et al., Don’t Supersize Me! Toward a Policy of
Consumption-Based Energy Efficiency, in 2006 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY
PROCEEDINGS (2006), http://epb.lbl.gov/homepages/rick_diamond/sufficiency%
20aceee%2006.doc.pdf.
313. Id.
314. GREENPEACE INT’L, HOW DIRTY IS YOUR DATA? A LOOK AT THE ENERGY
CHOICES THAT POWER CLOUD COMPUTING 11 (2011), http://www.greenpeace.org/
international/Global/international/publications/climate/2011/Cool%20IT/dirtydata-report-greenpeace.pdf (Resource efficiency is also touted as a major benefit
resulting from the revolution in information and communication technologies.
However, as a recent Greenpeace report notes, if the internet were a country it
would rank fifth in electricity usage just behind Japan.); see also Kris De
Decker, The Monster Footprint of Digital Technology, LOW-TECH MAGAZINE (June
16,
2009),
www.lowtechmagazine.com/2009/06/embodied-energy-of-digitaltechnology.html (moreover, while computers have become smaller and more
energy efficient in their operation, they are nevertheless constructed out of
exotic (“rare earth”) elements and require increasing amounts of energy to build
them. The energy embodied in a single laptop’s memory chip alone “exceeds the
energy consumption of a laptop during its life expectancy of three years.”); Eric
William et al., The 1.7 kg Microchip: Energy and Material Use in the Production
of Semi-Conductor Devices, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5504 (2002); Eric Williams,
Environmental Impacts in the Production of Personal Computers, in COMPUTERS
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Reudiger Kuehr &Eric Williams eds., 2003) (an analysis

79

1084

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

As a transitional strategy, enhanced resource efficiency has
much to offer but only when approached as a first step to larger
changes within a larger context. As Fournier puts it, “The
problem is not with these eco-efficiency technologies themselves
. . . but with their inscription within a paradigm of growth: their
deployment towards increased consumption and production.”315
This is because a strategy of eco-efficiency in an economy of
growth is time-limited and quickly self-defeating as improved
efficiencies become ever more costly to attain, at the same time as
they are quickly outrun by expanded production. Indeed, unless
eco-efficient growth is oriented to creating new institutions that
do not themselves depend on growth, the result will be to create a
still larger, over-extended economy but without the inefficiencies
that are now available to cushion a transition. Thus would fuel
efficiency lead not to car-free cities but to more (bio)diesel or
battery-powered automobiles funneling onto ever more congested
freeways for ever greater numbers of downtown office complexes
remote from where people live. With resources going to maintain
or extend the infrastructure of “automobility” (e.g. freeways and
overpasses), that money and physical resources are not available
to build rail or tram lines or a bicycle infrastructure, let alone to
rebuild the economy that demands such mobility in the first
place. Such systemic changes require collective political choice,
not just individual economic decisions.
This is a general problem with market mechanisms as they
may work well to make incremental decisions but not to make
collective, transformative ones. Changes in degree do not easily
lead to changes in kind and, in fact, often work to pre-empt them.
The latter requires a collective attention to the basic systems
themselves, including the ability to address the historical
economic benefits and dependencies that they have generated,
and that in turn generate resistance to change. And, of course,
prices are a poor guide to system change as prices themselves
reflect the existing distributions and dependencies of established
industrial systems, and of the associated attitudes and values
of energy and material inputs reveals that for every gram of a microchip, 630
grams of fossil fuels are required. This means that the memory chips for a
single computer embody roughly 94 kg of fossil fuel.).
315. Fournier, supra note 276, at 532.
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that are socially-constructed by them. This is why GLT points to
a paradigm shift away from manipulating the internal
mechanisms of neoclassical economics (e.g. carbon taxes that lead
to hybrid cars) to developing external strategies that can foster a
new ecological political economy (e.g. eco-industrial programs to
phase out the urban automobile).
The potential benefits from enhanced resource efficiency thus
cannot be separated from the larger contexts within which these
efficiencies actually accrue, especially that generated by the
dynamics of capitalist economics. Taken from the perspective of
the production unit, “the most efficient production method,
technology, or economic system is the one that gets the most
output from the least input, so produces the cheapest widgets and
generates the most product/sales/wealth for a given investment of
labor and raw materials.”316 On this calculus, mountain top
removal may well be the most “efficient” method of mining coal
even though it results in extensive destruction of forests, habitat,
watersheds, and communities.317 Similarly, it may be most
efficient for fishing trawlers to use satellite-guided navigation
systems to maximize their catches even though it leads to the
overexploitation and collapse of fisheries.318 And if industrial
agriculture’s use of toxic pesticides and synthetic fertilizers can
bring higher yields, then it must be the most efficient method of
farming even if it depletes soil, pollutes water, and strips food of
its nutritional value.
One can construct all the scenarios for internalizing these
costs as one might want—but today’s prices reflect past patterns
not future realities, as do political interventions. Given the costshifting nature of state-constructed regimes, many core industrial
activities such as plastics manufacturing, metal mining, car
316. Smith, supra note 238, at 39.
317. Id. at 40; see also PLUNDERING APPALACHIA: THE TRAGEDY OF
MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL COAL MINING 1 (Tom Butler & George Wuerthner eds.,
2009) (The process of mountaintop mining in Appalachia is described as turning
“an entire region into an undeclared national energy sacrifice zone”).
318. Smith, supra note 238, at 40; see also Ransom Myers & Boris Worm,
Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280
(2003); Heike Lotze, Repetitive History of Resource Depletion and
Mismanagement: The Need for a Shift in Perspective, 274 MARINE ECOLOGICAL
PROGRESS SERIES 282 (2004).
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manufacturing, and oil extraction could well go out of business if
they were to internalize their full social and environmental
externalities. Serge Latouche remarks, “with proper prices, civil
aviation would come to a halt, and there would probably not be
many cars in the world.”319 If “efficiency” were considered from a
broader standpoint than a neoclassical calculus—personal and
community and ecological health, global equity and security, even
collective “utility”—a very different picture would emerge. But
such changes would entail actively reducing market demand
(inimical to the growth economy) so that coal-fired power plants
could simply be closed and collective decisions made to build
trams and close freeways (inimical to established industrial
systems). These are issues of collective decision, not technocratic
calculation, of “re-formation” not reform. That there is a choice
here is not because reforms are inherently useless; it is because
the re-formative context for their proper functioning is absent.
B. Lessons from Economic Practice
a.

The Case of Carbon and Green Development

If all this seems obvious to the sympathetic reader, it is not
so to anyone working in the bureaucratic let alone corporate
corridors of power where system maintenance and extension is
the “realistic” context. It is thus not surprising that the actual
experience with market-based schemes that are supposedly
designed to reduce climate impacts has instead provided for the
very opposite—for “new outlets for accumulation” through
financializing a hitherto unpriced entity where the primary goal
is to make profits from carbon emissions, not to reduce such
opportunities by taking actions that would slash such
emissions.320 Some critics go so far as to argue that, rather than
contributing to a solution to climate change, pricing strategies
that underlie carbon taxes, trading, and offsets may actually

319. SERGE LATOUCHE, FAREWELL TO GROWTH 74 (2009).
320. Giorgos Kallis, In Defense of Degrowth, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 873, 878
(2011).
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contribute to the problem.321 Gilbertson and Reyes note that all
carbon trading schemes to date have started by awarding the
worst polluters with the largest numbers of free pollution
rights.322 This amounts to “one of the largest projects for the
creation and regressive distribution of property rights in
history.”323 In many cases, governments have handed over more
pollution rights than polluters needed to meet their legallymandated targets. For example, in the first phase of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (the world’s largest and longest
established carbon trading scheme) polluters were allocated an
extra 130 million tonnes of carbon permits over what they
actually emitted.324 With a surplus of permits, firms had little or
no incentive to cut back emissions.325 The next five-year period of
the trading scheme which ended in 2012 is expected to result in a
mere 0.3% reduction in total emissions.326 Even this small drop
is a telling indicator of the real source of the carbon problem (and
its solution) insofar as the reduction was attributable to the 20082009 economic slowdown that resulted in a drop in emissions in
traded sectors by 6% in 2008 and a stunning 11.6% in 2009.327
Similarly, carbon emissions in the U.S. dropped by 7% in 2009
321. See Larry Lohmann & Sarah Sexton, Carbon Markets: The Policy Reality,
10 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 9 (2010); GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285.
322. GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 10.
323. Id. at 10.
324. Id. at 34. Carbon permits were over-allocated by 36.9% in 2005, 26.9% in
2006, 25% in 2007, and 31.7% in 2008. Id. at 43; see also Questions and Answers
on the Revised EU Emissions Trading System, EU COMM’N (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796
(last
visited May 22, 2012) (the EU itself acknowledges the failure noting that “The
environmental benefit of the first phase may be limited due to excessive
allocation of allowances in some Member States and some sectors…”).
325. See GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 35, 43-44 (while the EU
blames the over-allocation on a lack of accurate emission projections, the
concern not to overload the constraints on the economy is omnipresent. As well,
corporate influence undoubtedly played a significant role, and the sale of excess
profits has led to windfall profits).
326. DAMIEN MORRIS & BRYONY WORTHINGTON, CAP OR TRAP? HOW THE EU ETS
RISKS LOCKING IN CARBON EMISSIONS 7 (2010), available at http://www.sandbag.
org.uk/site_media/pdfs/reports/caportrap.pdf; see also GILBERTSON & REYES,
supra note 285, at 315.
327. MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 5; see also David Gabel, US
Cut its CO2 Emissions by 7% Last Year, ENVTL. NEWS NETWORK (May 6, 2010),
http://www.enn.com/pollution/article/41295 (last visited May 22, 2012).
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which corresponded to a 2.4% drop in GDP. According to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration, it was the largest drop in
carbon emissions since the agency began keeping comprehensive
records in 1949.
The European scheme also allows a corporation to “bank” its
allocated permits. As a result, the decreased industrial output
during the recession meant that big polluters could carry over
their surplus permits into the next phase of the trading scheme in
2013. For the top ten most over-allocated companies in 2008,
their surplus of permits could allow them collectively to increase
their emissions by 50% above 2009 levels by 2020.328 A report by
the non-governmental organization, Sandbag, comments:
As the essence of the scheme is to distribute carbon allowances to
private companies, there is little recourse for reclaiming excess
permits once they have been allocated. Furthermore, there is
considerable inertia in the scheme with decisions affecting future
fixed supplies of permits dictated many years in advance making
them vulnerable to incorrect assumptions and unexpected
events.329

Once again, efficient allocation becomes its opposite: “With
emissions now below the level of the cap, the cap has become a
trap–guaranteeing high levels of emissions into the future rather
than working to deliver reductions.”330
Even more controversial are carbon offset mechanisms that
allow emissions reductions to take place outside the capped area
through “emission-savings projects.” The UN Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) is the largest offset scheme with projects
ranging from hydroelectric dam building and biomass projects to
palm oil plantations and even coal-fired power plants. It has
worked by allowing companies and governments in the northern
industrialized countries to meet their emissions reductions
mandated by the Kyoto Protocol by buying relatively inexpensive

328. MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 9. Among these top 10 overallocated companies (in proportion to their emissions), most are steel and
cement companies. The most over-allocated company, SSAB Steel, is projected
to be able to increase its 2009 emissions 250% by 2020.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 5.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/4

84

2013]

LIBERAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1089

carbon credits or offsets from projects developed in low income
countries.
In many cases, however, the project’s claimed
emissions reductions reflect hypothetical scenarios that cannot be
proven.331 But even where the claimed reductions turn out to be
accurate, they simply cancel out the carbon emissions produced
by the buyer of the offset. Thus, in a perfectly implemented
system, the net result would be neutral. However, since a
significant proportion of projects sold as offsets would have
proceeded regardless of funding, and the credits they generate
allow an industry elsewhere to exceed their emissions cap, the
CDM actually ends up increasing rather than decreasing global
carbon emissions.332 This is another instance of the pattern
common to the state-guided development that we have seen in
our earlier case studies of these very industries.
Even worse, some of the offset projects lead to significant
environmental or social costs in the host country, such costs
effectively subsidizing production in the industrialized country
that bought the offsets. In the Greater Mekong subregion, eight
hydropower projects have applied for CDM credits.333 With the
majority of people dependent on the rivers for their livelihood,
culture, and food security, most of these projects will, on top of
the threats they pose to important biodiversity and fish migration
routes, have devastating impacts on communities that live along
these rivers. For example, one of the first to apply for CDM
credits was the Xeset 2 Hydropower Project, and it will dewater
the Xeset and two other rivers.
As a result, the NGO,
International Rivers, complains that more than 18,000 people
including many indigenous peoples “will lose domestic water
331. See Larry Lohmann, Toward a Different Debate in Environmental
Accounting: The Cases of Carbon and Cost-benefit, 34 ACCOUNTING, ORGS. &
SOC’Y 499, 504ff (2009); see also MORRIS & WORTHINGTON, supra note 326, at 56
(a project simply has to prove that “it is cleaner than the norm for existing
power production in the region or country where it is located. As new plants are
generally more efficient than old ones, this is rarely a difficult task.”).
332. GILBERTSON & REYES, supra note 285, at 53. Chapter 4 covers a range of
case studies of the Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil, Indonesia, India,
and Thailand exposing how such projects routinely support ineffective and
socially unjust projects.
333. They are part of the more than 100 major dams, diversions, and
irrigations projects planned, and thousands smaller schemes already in place in
the Mekong River Basin.
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sources, wild fisheries, irrigation water, vegetable gardens, water
for raising fish, and recreational and income generating
opportunities.”334 While the government of Laos claims to have
conducted consultation processes, “in a one-party communist
state that does not tolerate dissent, consultation processes are
rubber-stamping devices where communities feel afraid to speak
out or raise concerns due to fear of repercussions.”335 If Xeset 2 is
approved, “it could open the floodgates for similar non-additional
and poorly designed and developed hydropower projects.”336
Another example is the Allain Duhangan Hydropower Project in
Himachal Pradesh, India, one of the largest hydropower projects
to get credits under the CDM. Like villages along the Xeset 2, the
village of Jagatsukh will be detrimentally affected by the 192 MW
dam that will divert creeks that farmers depend on for their
livelihood and food security.337 Despite strong local opposition to
the dam since its inception in 2003, the project is slated to receive
around 4.94 million Certified Emissions Reduction credits.338
334. International Rivers Comments on Xeset 2 Hydropower Project, Lao PDR
1, INT’L RIVERS (Aug. 7, 2009), http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/
comments-to-bv-cert-regarding-xeset-2-hydropower-project-laos-3121
(last
visited May 22, 2012).
335. Id.
336. Id.; see also Philip Hirsch, The Changing Political Dynamics of Dam
Building on the Mekong, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 312 (2010).
337. About 2,000 people live in the village of Jugatsukh and almost all oppose
the project. The project will also destroy habitat used by threatened, rare or
endangered species. See Terri Martin, Muting the Voice of the Local in the Age of
the Global: How Communication Practices Compromised Public Participation in
India’s Allain Dunhangan Environmental Impact Assessment, 1 ENVTL. COMM.
171, 176 (Nov. 2007); Comments on the ESIA of the Proposed Allain Duhangan
HEP, SOUTH ASIAN NETWORK OF DAMS, RIVERS AND PEOPLE (2003),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/flawed_environmental_and
_social_impact_analysis_pdf.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012).
338. The 4.94 million credits derive from the total estimated reductions of
4,946,648 tonnes of CO2 over the project's 10 year period. UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CDM Project Design Document
Form (for Allain Duhangan Hydroelectric Project) 5 (2007), available at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/L/Y/Z/LYZSN7J5RUYNO8DZTC236SF3POYN
WK/PDD.pdf?t=ZFZ8bWxmMzQyfDB92RmTymFGCyS3ip3Wo-sE (last visited
May 22, 2012); The 75 Million Dollar Fraud, SOUTH ASIAN NETWORK ON DAMS,
RIVERS AND PEOPLE, http://www.sandrp.in/comments_CDM_HEPs/
Allain_Duhangan.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012) (using the 2010 EU ETS
average market rate of around U.S. $16 per credit, this would come out to
around $75 million).
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With larger plans to add 150,000 megawatts of hydropower to the
Himalayan region, the situation risks being repeated hundreds of
times throughout the region.339 While these and other major
hydroelectric developments are promoted as being “in the public
interest” most projects are developed not to meet local needs for
electricity, but to feed the growing demand of South Asia’s urban
industries and middle classes.340 The real decision makers,
moreover, are global corporations and their institutional financial
backers.341 The overriding motive is to increase energy supply for
producing computers, textiles, and other consumer goods for the
world’s wealthy, while literally hundreds of small-scale
communities are vanquished, taking with them diverse ways of
living, knowledge systems, and cultural practices.
The examples go on. Although the topic deserves more
detailed analysis than can be presented here, it is important to
note how the massive offset program, REDD (or Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) follows this same
pattern and on a grand scale. In this case, southern countries sell
the carbon-sink capacity of their forests to northern countries.
These top-down models increase expert and state control over
forests thus amplifying the risk of violating the sovereignty of
indigenous peoples and their right to prior, free, and informed
consent. As a result, these schemes are strongly opposed by
many indigenous and forest peoples who fear that such policies
will lead to “anti-people and exclusionary models of forest
conservation . . . to protect lucrative forest carbon ‘reservoirs.’”342

339. See SHRIPAD DHARMADHIKARY, MOUNTAINS OF CONCRETE: DAM BUILDING IN
HIMALAYAS
(2008),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/ir_himalayas.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012).
340. Id. at 1.
341. Philip Hirsh, Beyond the Nation State: Natural Resource Conflict and
“National Interest” in Mekong Hydropower Development, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 399, 411 (1999).
342. TOM GRIFFITHS, SEEING ‘RED’? ‘AVOIDED DEFORESTATION’ AND THE RIGHTS
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES (2007), available at http://
www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2010/01/avoideddeforestationre
djun07eng_0.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012); For a critique of a project widely
considered to be a model for REDD, see ARIANA DENSHAM ET AL., CARBON SCAM:
NOEL KEMPFF CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT AND THE PUSH FOR SUB-NATIONAL FOREST
OFFSETS (2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/report/2010/1/carbonscam-noel-kempff-clima.pdf (last visited May 22, 2012).
THE
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This large scheme, the many specific projects worldwide, and the
whole array of carbon markets and offset mechanisms all reflect a
common, double-edged phenomenon. On the one hand is the
displacement of substantive action to address real environmental
problems and its accompanying problematic. On the other hand
is the promotion of the pricing mechanism as a procedural tool
with the technical allure that rewards enviro-capitalism while it
lets the state off the hook for substantive action. This pervasive
process is now reaching into the tiniest of ecological crevices with
the growing application of pricing to all manner of ecosystem
services. As Dempsey and Robertson note, such strategies
“simplify the complexity of natural ecosystems, prioritize single
exchange values over ecological complexity, and mask the
unequal social relations embedded in the process of buying and
selling environmental services.”343
b.

When Clean Energy Meets Economic Growth

The rush to clean energy production reflects a similar pattern
where, again, historical interests and imperatives prevail, and
incrementalism confronts systemic obstacles. As Vaclav Smil
argues, it is one thing to hypothesize a revolution in energy
production, and another thing to attain it.344 For example, a
clean energy revolution based in renewable production would
“greatly increase the fixed land requirements of energy
production and necessitate more extensive rights-of-way for
transmission.”345
In addition, since the energy density of
343. Jessica Dempsey & Morgan Robertson, Ecosystem Services: Tensions and
Developments within Neoliberal Environmentalism, PROGRESS IN HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY (forthcoming); Inge Røpke, Trends in the Development of Ecological
Economics from the Late 1980s to the Early 2000s, 55 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 262,
279 (2005) (contingent valuation provides decision makers with a simplistic
technical solution that may be used to justify policies while simultaneously
evading fundamental moral and political dilemmas. The source concludes that
“prices are not worth much” since not only are many factors unquantifiable and
incommensurable, but prices are necessarily a reflection of historical and
existing power structures).
344. See Vaclav Smil, Twenty-first Century Energy – Some Sobering Thoughts,
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Dec. 2006), at 22-23, http://www.
oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2083/21st_century_energy:_Some_soberi
ng_thoughts.html.
345. Id.
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renewable fuels is lower than fossil fuels, no readily available
renewable energy source of a large enough scale presently
exists.346 There are also the problems of intermittency of
renewable flows, lack of storage, and uneven distribution of
favorable sites.347 Even if there were alternatives immediately
available, the financial cost for broad deployment would be
enormous and would mean writing off the existing infrastructure
for extracting, transporting, and refining fossil fuels worth well
Moreover, even with extraordinary
over $5 trillion.348
commitment, such a transition requires decades. One of the most
committed countries like Denmark, after 30 years, still gets 20%
of its power from windmills and 80% from coal.349 On the other
hand, while addressing global warming is critical and urgent, a
complete and rapid switch to clean energy (or dubious sources of
“cleaner” energy such as the energy now touted as coming from
346. Ottmar Edenhofer et al., Summary for Policy Makers, in IPCC SPECIAL
REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION (O.
Edenhofer et al. eds., 2011) (refuting such claims with its projection that
renewable technologies could make up 80% of the world’s energy by midcentury. While the report asserts that “there are few, if any, fundamental
technological limits” to developing the renewable energy technologies outlined,
it also notes that “the substantial increase of renewables is technically and
politically very challenging.”); see also World Energy Outlook 2011 Factsheet 2,
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite
/2011/factsheets.pdf (the immense challenge involved in shifting away from
fossil fuel to renewable fuel sources is underscored by the International Energy
Agency’s 2011 World Energy Outlook. Its central scenario projects that by 2035
world oil demand will increase by 15 million barrels per year while the use of
coal will rise by 65%. The report points out that because of the long economic
life of much of the world’s energy-related capital stock such as power stations,
buildings, and factories, some of this infrastructure will need to be retired early
in order to limit global carbon emissions to 450 ppm. It contends: “This would
theoretically be possible at a very high cost, but is probably not practicable
politically.”).
347. SMIL, supra note 280, at 22-23.
348. See Vaclav Smil, Moore’s Curse and the Great Energy Delusion, THE AM.,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-decembermagazine/moore2019s-curse-and-the-great-energy-delusion (last visited May 22,
2012). “Moore’s Law” refers to the tendency (observed by Intel cofounder,
Gordon Moore) for a computer’s power to double every 18 months. While some
people have extended this observation to energy systems more generally, Smil
emphasizes that the rapid technical innovation in computer processing does not
represent the norm for energy systems.
349. Id.; see generally JEFF RUBIN, THE END OF GROWTH (2012) (discussing
Denmark’s progress).
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“fracking”) would not stop destructive mining and forestry
practices, nor overexploitation of global fisheries and water
resources, nor the production of toxic chemicals and excessive
garbage. On the contrary, “given the Jevons paradox, the advent
of cheap, clean energy could even accelerate these trends.”350
One can understand the popularity of these strategies
because, again, they promise to marry prosperity in the old mode
with production in a new one. But no matter how great the risks
entailed in achieving them, they cannot work for a simple reason:
in a world driven by the relentless pursuit of economic growth,
the benefits generated by clean technologies will be overtaken by
the external costs inflicted by economic growth. For the green
economy, this is the definitive party crasher. The governmentappointed UK Sustainable Development Commission report,
“Prosperity Without Growth,” makes this very clear. It notes that
energy intensity (that is the amount of primary energy needed to
produce a unit of economic output) has overall declined worldwide
by 33% since 1970.351 The drop in energy intensity for the U.K.
and U.S. was even more dramatic—a 40% decline since 1980.352
At the same time, however, because of overall economic growth,
world carbon emissions from fossil fuels increased by a stunning
80% since 1970.353 Despite commitments within the Kyoto
Protocol to bring greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by
2012, current measurements of carbon emissions are 40% higher
than they were in 1990.354
It is tempting to point the finger at rapidly industrializing
countries such as China for the increase in emissions since

350. Richard Smith, Green Capitalism: The God that Failed, 56 REAL-WORLD
ECON. REV. 112, 126 (2011).
351. TIM JACKSON, PROSPERITY WITHOUT GROWTH 48 (2009), available at
http://www.sd-commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/prosperity_without_
growth_report.pdf.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 50.
354. Id. In the Kyoto Protocol, thirty-seven industrialized “Annex I” countries
agreed to reduce their average greenhouse gas emissions by 5% from 1990 levels
by 2012. These targets exclude emissions from aviation and shipping. See Press
Release, Industrialized Countries to Cut Green House Gas Emissions by 5.2
percent, U.N. Press Release (Dec. 11, 1997) available at http://unfccc.int/cop3
/fccc/info/indust.htm (last visited May 22, 2012).
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according to standard data, developed countries have reduced
their collective emissions by almost 2% between 1990 and
2008.355 However, a recent report on international emissions
transfers shows that wealthy countries have been lowering their
emissions by sending production overseas.356 The Kyoto Protocol,
developed at the height of the neoliberal era when heavy
production was being moved offshore, assigns emissions to the
country where they are physically released during production of
goods. However, when emissions embedded in imports and
exports are taken into account, developed countries end up with a
collective increase in emissions of 7% while China’s emissions
drop by almost 20%.357 As a result, “emissions from increased
production of internationally traded products have more than
offset the emissions reductions achieved under the Kyoto
Protocol.”358 This means that “even if all the unenforceable
pledges made in the Copenhagen Accord were honored, carbon
cuts by the rich nations between now and 2020 would be
cancelled out by their imports from developing countries” and
“nothing will have been achieved.”359
This is no incidental concern as economic growth remains the
main policy goal of almost every government in the world. Speth
notes that the size of the world economy has quadrupled from

355. See Duncan Clark, New Data on Imports and Exports Turns Map of
Carbon Emission on its Head, GUARDIAN, (May 3, 2011), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/environment/datablog/2011/apr/28/carbon-emissions-imports-exports-trade
(discussing a summary of changes in carbon emissions between 1990 and 2008,
both with and without consumption emissions, for individual countries and
Annex B and non-Annex B countries collectively).
356. Glen Peters et al., Growth in Emission Transfers via International Trade
from 1990-2008, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8903 (2011),
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/04/ 19/1006388108.full.pdf+
html; see also Stephen Davis & Ken Caldeira, Consumption-based Accounting of
CO2 Emissions, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 5687-92 (2010).
357. Duncan Clark, Carbon Cuts by Developed Countries Cancelled out by
Imported Goods, GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2011/apr/25/carbon-cuts-developed-countries-cancelled.
For
example, once trade is included, the UK’s emissions go from a reduction of 28
million tonnes in standard calculations to an increase of 100 million tonnes.
358. Id.
359. George Monbiot, Pass the Parcel, GUARDIAN (May 23, 2011),
http://www.monbiot.com/2011/05/23/pass-the-parcel/ (commenting on the Peters
et al. report).
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around $10 trillion in 1960 to more than $40 trillion in 2000.360
With this continuing momentum, economic activity is projected to
quadruple again to $160 trillion by mid-century.361 Assuming the
same rate of growth, by the end of the century the economy will
be 80 times what it was in 1960.362 This is obviously impossible
considering that the economy’s five-fold increase in size over the
past half a century has already resulted in serious erosion of 60%
of the world’s ecosystems.363 As one critic remarked, “[I]n the
face of mounting ecological disasters worldwide, from droughts to
floods, desertification to species extinction, the continued
insistence on the efficacy of technological and market solutions
and the concomitant denial that the capitalist principle of infinite
growth is unsustainable can only be qualified as pathological.”364
To further illustrate the point, Jackson and colleagues
estimated the level of technology that would be required to meet
an atmospheric carbon concentration of 450 ppm by 2050, as
suggested by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report.365 This would
require a reduction in carbon emissions by 4.9% per year between
now and 2050.366 Using the I=PAT formula,367 they calculated
that in a business-as-usual scenario, a decline in carbon intensity
(T) of 0.7% per year (the average decline since 1990) would
balance out the expected 0.7% per year growth in population (P)
(based on the UN’s mid-range projection).368 Carbon emissions (I)
360. SPETH, supra note 211, at 4.
361. Id. at 4.
362. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 102.
363. Id. at 102.
364. Fournier, supra note 276, at 530.
365. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 53-54.
366. Id.
367. See Paul Ehrlich & John Holdren, Impact of Population Growth, 171 SCI.
1212 (1971). Where I = environmental impact, P = population, A = affluence or
economic growth, and T = technological intensity of economic output. Relative
decoupling requires that the T factor be decreasing relative to A (the main focus
of ecological modernization) while absolute decoupling requires that the I factor
be going down as well. The IPAT formula was developed forty years ago by Paul
Ehrlich and John Holdren.
368. See United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.210, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_highlights.pdf
(this population growth rate is based on the UN’s mid-range estimate for world
population which projects a total of 9 billion people by 2050).
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could then be expected to grow at about the same rate as the
average global annual income (A) which is projected at 1.4% a
year.369 At this rate, by the year 2050, carbon emissions would
have increased to 80% over current levels.370 In order to reduce
carbon emissions by 4.9% per year, technology would need to
improve by 7% per year or nearly 10 times current levels.371
This situation points to a major contradiction for economic
growth. If one were to assume continued economic growth of even
just 2% per year (well below the macro-economic optimum of 3%)
from 2050 to the end of the century, then “to all intents and
purposes, nothing less than a complete decarbonisation of every
single dollar will do to achieve carbon targets.”372 That is,
instead of the “relative decoupling” that allows for reduced energy
use for every unit of growth, what is needed is “absolute
decoupling” that allows for energy use to decline overall even as
growth continues. This is especially necessary if, as many
scientists state, the necessary level of carbon in the atmosphere
should be 350 not 450 ppm. For Jackson the conclusion is
inescapable:
[S]implistic assumptions that capitalism’s propensity for
efficiency will allow us to stabilize the climate or protect against
resource scarcity are nothing short of delusional. Those who
promote decoupling as an escape route from the dilemma of

369. See JACKSON, supra note 351, at 53. This is based on the average increase
in per capita income (in real terms) since 1990.
370. Id. at 54.
371. Id. This would mean that by 2050 there would need to be a 21-fold
improvement in the current average carbon content of economic output. Keep in
mind that this is to reach a target of 450 ppm which many would consider far
too high to stabilize the climate.
372. Id. at 56. If population growth decreases, it will relieve some of the
pressure on technology improvement. Conversely, population could increase
even more and hit the UN’s high range forecast of 11 billion people by 2050.
However, with approximately 20% of the world’s population consuming 80% of
the its resources, lowering the consumption of the affluent 20% combined with
truly equitable global redistribution would be vastly more efficacious. As
greater social equity decreases the need for, and pressure on economic growth
while inequity drives economic growth through the rising tide principle, the
latter is a more “rational” economic policy.

93

1098

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

growth need to take a closer look at the historical evidence – and
at the basic arithmetic of growth.373

This conclusion poses a direct challenge to the ideology that
underpins today’s environmental law, ecological modernization,
the central premise of which is the ability to harmonize economic
and environmental objectives through enhanced efficiency.
Breaking free of the economic imagery of capitalism is clearly
not easy, and even those who challenge the economics of growth
often still do so within the bounds of a capitalism that they see as
capable of being reshaped if not by visionary corporate leaders
then by progressive state-based legal reforms.374 Indeed, most of
the proponents of the “heterodox” field of ecological economics
that was founded on the limits of growth explicitly eschew a
challenge to capitalism. Under the influence of neoliberalism,
they have increasingly adopted the discourse and strategies of
mainstream neoclassical economics (e.g. pricing ecosystem
services).375 Even the burgeoning “degrowth” movement that
specifically targets exponential growth and growth-based
solutions to environmental degradation does so within careful
bounds. A strategic explanation of this situation comes from one
of degrowth’s primary exponents who suggests that the concept of
degrowth is really “a conceptual or ideological weapon . . . that
fosters a spirit of critique.”376 Serge Latouche argues that society

373. Id. at 57.
374. Id. Jackson’s critical report falls prey to this. His proposed “policies” and
reforms include sharing available work, strengthening the planning capacity of
local communities, creating and protecting public spaces, increasing taxation on
high earners, instituting a Tobin tax on international financial transactions,
improving access to quality education, and banning advertising to children.
Jackson acknowledges that such a transition would require fundamental
changes to underlying structure, but contends that such changes are possible
through government action.
375. See Anderson & M’Gonigle, supra note 246 (discussing how this situation
has been manifested).
376. Fournier, supra note 276, at 532; see also LATOUCHE, supra note 319
(providing a review and analysis of the concept of degrowth and explores how it
can be implemented at various levels. Latouche argues that degrowth is the
“only political project capable of renewing the left” as it provides a “radical
critique of consumption and of development . . . ipso facto a critique of
capitalism.”); see also Serge Latouche, Can the Left Escape Economism?, 23
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is so locked into the paradigm of growth that “imaginative
thinking outside the box is impossible.”377 This requires us, first
and foremost, to “decolonize” our imaginations. Degrowth’s
emphasis, therefore, is not so much on policy as it is on creating
“a political alternative that seeks a popular mandate for radical
Recognizing the impossibility of implementing
changes.”378
degrowth under the current configuration of power, it appeals in
the first instance not to powerful politicians but to a new cultural
narrative that can lead to the development of autonomous spaces,
both intellectually and physically, for social interaction,
production, and experimentation.379
C. Lessons from State Practice: Carbon Democracy
If it is difficult for environmental lawyers (and anyone for
that matter) to break out of the economic imaginary that infuses
the theoretical underpinning of environmental law (ecological
modernization), it is well nigh impossible for us to break out of
the political imaginary that infuses its practical possibilities (the
state). This form of political organization has so colonized our
political (and “regulatory”) visions as to become “naturalized.”
The state is all that there is, and all that is possible to be. And
so, writes Tim Jackson: “The state is society’s commitment device
par excellence, and the principal agent in protecting our shared
prosperity.”380 He argues that by shifting the macro-economy
CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 74, 75 (2012). The limited degrowth critique is
a telling manifestation of “discourse hegemony.”
377. Serge Latouche, Why Less Should be So Much More: Degrowth
Economics, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE – ENGLISH EDITION (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://mondediplo.com/2004/11/14latouche.
378. Kallis, supra note 320, at 878.
379. Id. This is in line with David Korten’s model of revolutionary change
where new cultural narratives are cultivated that “nurture a culture of
partnership, redefine prosperity and security, affirm the possibilities of the
higher orders of human consciousness . . . .” In contrast to imperial narratives
and the culture of domination it nurtures, these “earth community stories” open
up new cultural spaces to experiment with relations of partnership and
cooperation essential for creating a new era; see DAVID KORTEN, THE GREAT
TURNING: FROM EMPIRE TO EARTH COMMUNITY 302-12 (2006).
380. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 11. The proposed changes would require
unprecedented levels of state regulation and involvement in running the
economy and significant reductions in business activity.
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away from the structural requirements of growth, the state will
be freed to “play its proper role” and protect the long-term
interests of society and ecology.
Others, such as the
environmental theorist, Robyn Eckersley, concur. In The Green
State, Eckersley calls for a dramatic environmental turn by the
state: “There are still few social institutions that can match the
same degree of capacity and potential legitimacy that states have
to redirect societies and economics along more ecologically
sustainable lines.”381 Furthermore, the state’s role as “final
adjudicator and guarantor of positive law” puts it in the most
powerful position to discipline market actors and consumers, as
well as to redistribute resources.382 Eckersley and, indeed,
almost everyone concerned for such a conversion agree that “the
key . . . lies in deepening the democratic accountability and
responsiveness of states to their citizens’ environmental concerns
while also extending democratic accountability to the
environmental concerns of transnational civil society,
intergovernmental organizations and the society of states in
general.”383
As we have seen in our initial review of diverse resource
regimes, the contradictions of capitalism have long molded the
shape of governmental policies and laws to accommodate the
state’s own dependence on the growth generated by these
regimes. As governments became the macro-managers of the
economy over the past century, this dependence deepened
particularly as economic crises were transformed into political
crises for which governments were held responsible. As a result,
like environmental lawyers, governments have become not more
but less empowered to engineer an environmental conversion.
This is why we must now look beyond “legal laws” to consider the
higher level, law-like dynamics of systems and institutions that
are both authoritative (i.e. regulatory in effect) and socially
constitutive (i.e. determinative of our material and cultural
character). What more binding social law could there be today
than that of the imperative of economic growth? And was such a

381. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 7.
382. Id. at 12.
383. Id. at 15.
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social law not “created” by society such that it could/should be
capable of social “re-form” (i.e. systemic reformation)?
Undoubtedly, the most common panacea for what ails the modern
world—a dramatically invigorated democracy—must be at the
center of an eco-conversion, but one must query what sort of a reformed democracy it might take, within what sorts of new
economic contexts, with what new forms of cultural and
discursive institutions, and what sorts of knowledges and social
processes to support them? And how to achieve (to “constitute”)
these? To interrogate what we now have, and what new forms
might be necessary, is a primary contribution for a future GLT
that takes us beyond the limits of environmental legal analysis as
we have come to know it.
For example, with serious
384
Eckersley argues that her “green
constitutional amendments,
state” would act as a radical extension of liberal democracy rather
than a radical departure from it.385 She describes her proposals
as embracing a new “reflexive modernization” that is similar to
widely discussed proposed new forms of legal rights for nature,
constitutional rights to a clean environment, public trust
doctrines, and new procedural obligations. But, as we have seen,
all these proposals would, if effective, inherently pose a common
threat to growth, to capitalism and, inevitably to the liberal state
itself. This prospect undermines the proponents’ claims of
adopting a “realistic” strategy that implicitly fits within the
liberal mold, in comparison with more “radical” and unrealistic
proposals that challenge this tradition and its associated
384. Eckersley’s central proposal is to create a green constitutional framework
which has as its central reform the constitutional entrenchment of the
precautionary principle. A green constitution would also include such things as
a commitment to protect biodiversity and the earth’s integrity, environmental
rights for citizens, rights to negotiate environmental standards, and rights to
information regarding risk-generating proposals. The precautionary principle
would, she argues, be the single most effective means for controlling the adverse
impacts to future generations, non-citizens, and the non-human world; see id. at
135-36, 243; see also BOYD, supra note 222 (discussing similar hopes on a
constitutional right to a healthy environment. Others similarly speak of “earth
rights” and “ecosystem rights.”); see generally EARTH LAW CENTER,
http://earthlawcenter.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). This discussion is
reminiscent of the longstanding critique of “rights discourse” that is well
rehearsed in other areas of critical (feminist, race) legal theory.
385. ECKERSLEY, supra note 231, at 137. Eckersley characterizes it as “postliberal” rather than anti-liberal.
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institutional embodiments. This naturalization of the state is but
another historical trend that accompanies the historical “loss of
innocence marked by a step back from an anarchist rejection of
the state.”386
But recall that the translation of the rise of the state into
liberal democracy derives from two related traditions: economic
liberalism and liberal democracy. As Chantal Mouffe notes,
“[t]here was no necessary relation between those two distinct
traditions but only a contingent historical articulation.”387 The
central value of economic liberalism is individual autonomy;
under capitalism, economic inequality is unavoidable insofar as
only a small minority owns productive capital and the majority
are required to labor for others. At the same time, the capitalist
system allows for superior productivity and thus the possibility
for mobility. By contrast, the original meaning of democracy is
“rule by the common people” where the lowest and largest class
holds greatest sway.388 In its modern incarnation, it has as its
core principles state sovereignty and political equality, the former
freighted with particularly suspect historical baggage.389 The
renowned political theorist, C.B. Macpherson noted that, until
about 150 years ago, democracy was feared by “everybody who
was anybody” since, as he put it, they “knew that democracy, in
its original sense of rule by the people or government in
accordance with the will of the bulk of the people, would be a bad
thing–fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces of civilized

386. MATHEW PATERSON ET AL., GREEN THEORY IN THE STATE: THEORIES AND
ISSUES 135, 135 (Colin Hay et al. eds., 2006). The environmental political
philosopher, Mick Smith, similarly criticizes Eckersley’s green state on the basis
that state sovereignty is “by no means as flexible as Eckersley suggests” and, on
the contrary, when “it deems its own security is threatened” will be the vehicle
by which “states of emergency and antipolitical technocratic solutions” will be
exercised; MICK SMITH, AGAINST ECOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY: ETHICS, BIOPOLITICS
AND SAVING THE NATURAL WORLD 201 (2011).
387. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 3 (2000).
388. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1965).
389. See KARENA SHAW, POLITICAL THEORY AND INDIGENEITY: SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICAL (2008); SMITH, supra note 386. Both authors
address sovereignty as a cultural/philosophical construct, a practical effect of
which was to define, exclude, and control the non-human “other,” in Shaw’s case,
Indigenous peoples and, in Smith’s case, nature.
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living.”390 Consequently, the merging within “liberal democracy”
of the very different logics of economic and political liberalism
resulted in contradictions and tensions arising from democracy’s
commitment to socio-political equality, and economic liberalism’s
tendency to create immense economic inequality.391
So-called “liberal” markets were in place nearly two centuries
before the advent of representative democracy, and this form of
governance developed only on the prior foundation of the values
generated by these markets.392 More particularly, the open
democracies in which most Westerners live today developed on
the basis of the almost boundless wealth generated by the rise
and expansion of industrial capitalism, wealth that could satisfy
the worker as it also enriched the capitalist.
All of the
accoutrements of modernity (below in italics) were only made
possible with the development of dense energies, first coal and
then oil–industry with its new machinery and vast labor force
that was centered in the swelling manufacturing cities and drew
on a globe-spanning transportation network that carried incoming
raw commodities and outgoing produced goods. In turn, this
productivity machine was directed to process a vast storehouse of
non-fuel resources—forests, fish, rivers, geological landscapes—
into the commodities of lumber, food, and ore that is the stuff of
wealth. Only with this physical deluge of natural wealth was
democracy itself transformed from a threat to the liberal state
and market capitalism into a stabilizing force that could now

390. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 1. As conservatives during the English
civil war argued, there were five times more people without landed property
than those with. Thus, “if the master and servant shall be equal electors . . . the
majority may by law . . . [enact] an equality of goods and estate” and result in
chaos; Hanna Pitkin, Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance, 27
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 335, 339 (2004) (quoting A.S.P. Woodhouse 1951). In
the U.S., James Madison argued in The Federalist Paper #10 that “pure
democracies . . . have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention: have
ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property;
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths.” James Madison, Federalist No. 10 ¶13 (1787), available at
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm (last visited May
22, 2012).
391. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 7; ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998);
see also HELD, supra note 230.
392. MACPHERSON, supra note 388, at 6.
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reward the masses who were willing to “take their fully and fairly
competitive place within those institutions and that system of
society.”393 Thus does liberal democracy rest on a very specific
historical foundation, with particular on-going needs and
expectations that cannot merely be assumed.
To maintain this stability, the liberal democratic state
necessarily became the central defender and developer of
capitalism. The flows of energy and nature-based commodities
that it demands are essential for the development of current
forms of political and economic life ranging from new forms of
urbanization and governance to modern modes of eating,
building, working, moving, playing—in short, the whole of
modern life, including the global financial order upon which the
post-war West has developed. Ours is literally a “fossil fuel mode
of governance,” that is, a “carbon democracy.”394 This whole
package underpins the idea of an economy that can be both
sustainable and inequitable as long as it can keep growing. Thus,
while fossil energy made possible the huge increases in economic
production and growth, it also shaped the boundaries and
expectations of the modern social and political imagination.
If abundant supplies of energy have provided liberal
democracies with seemingly limitless growth, material
abundance, global financial order, and the emergence of
democratic politics, the passing of the era of dense fuels (whether
from exploitable limits in supply or environmental costs in their
use395) portend an uncertain future for liberal democracies that

393. Id. at 11. While those who gained the vote demanded various services
from the state such as education, health and welfare, and regulation of the
economy, Macpherson argues the state would have eventually had to provide
these things regardless of democratic franchise. Social services, he notes, are
necessary in order to quell social unrest and ensure the stability of the state,
while regulation of the economy, as the great depression of the 1930s showed, is
required to keep the economy operating.
394. See Matthew T. Huber, Energizing Historical Materialism: Fossil Fuels,
Space and the Capitalist Mode of Production, 40 GEOFORUM 105 (2008)
(discussing an analysis of the “fossil fuel mode of production”); see also Timothy
Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, 38 ECON. & SOC’Y 399 (2009).
395. See James Murray & David King, Climate Policy: Oil’s Tipping Point has
Passed, 481 NATURE 433 (2012) (arguing that the wild fluctuations in fuel prices
that has led (currently and historically) to economic crises, is more likely to
motivate a move away from fossil fuels than limited supply or climate change).
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are unable to move beyond the capitalist metabolism from which
they have emerged and have since become dependent upon. With
ecological scarcity, can the liberal state respond in a way that
preserves both its liberal and democratic character? History does
not give cause for optimism, including the recent history of
neoliberalism which, through a so-called “new constitutionalism”
of global institutions such as the WTO and on-going free trade
regimes, moved economic management beyond the reach of
democratic politics.396 As access to resources and the continued
operation of the “free” market inevitably comes under increasing
pressure, and with modern societies so highly leveraged (both
economically and environmentally), normal economic cycles of
expansion and contraction (recession) become real threats to
system stability. This does not bode well for calls to expand
democracy, green the state, de-grow the economy, or even merely
to maintain those constraining forces (such as environmental law
and social welfare regimes) that arose in periods of more robust
growth.
Here again, this assessment demands that “legal”
understandings reach beyond assumed philosophical premises,
long established institutional arrangements, and pre-existing
power relations that underpin our liberal order. Leading political
theorist, James O’Connor, suggested years ago that
environmentalism itself was essentially “sub-theoretical”397
because it took on the tenets of liberal economics and democracy
in a naturalized manner that is almost Fukuyamian in
character.398 From its birth in the 1960s to the present day, the
396. On the constitutive rule-making of this “new constitutionalism” (also
called a new “constitutionalism beyond the state”); see ISABELLA BAKKER &
RACHEL SILVEY, BEYOND STATES AND MARKETS: CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL
REPRODUCTION (2008); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE (2008).
397. James O’Connor, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism: A Theoretical
Introduction, 1 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 11 (1988). O’Connor notes that
in failing to comprehend the dynamics of capitalism, the legal successes of
environmental lawyers in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the
migration of polluting industries to the global south where associated
environmental damage has been more severe, both locally and globally.
398. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). We
refer here to Fukuyama’s highly touted, but controversial book, and its thesis
that liberal democracy marks the final triumph of a single mode of thought and
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panoply of laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines that fall
under the general rubric of environmental law and policy remains
rooted in, and propels forward, the “modernist project.” Its
assumptions pervade environmental law: that (neutral) science
can provide the knowledge to control environmental problems,
and technology can provide the means; that markets can
“internalize” externalities, and governments can act to make sure
that they do if only they have “political will;” that progress is still
possible under conditions and thinking inherited from an age long
passed. All we really need is to do what is rational. According to
English legal theorists Sean Coyle and Karen Morrow:
The question of the ‘philosophical foundations’ of environmental
thinking in law may strike the lawyer, as well as the legal
philosopher, as a strange one. For while a search for the
philosophical
commitments
of
environmental
thinking
undoubtedly makes sense in the context of ethics, or political
theory, environmental law (it might be felt) lacks any such
philosophical underpinning . . . . [T]here is not (on this view) to
be found any deeper rationale or overarching principle beyond
this purely instrumental concern with human wellbeing.399

This situation for environmental law contrasts with the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement that, beginning in the
1970s, propelled a transformation in legal theory beyond the
narrow confines of the old jurisprudence. Environmental law has
been absent from this movement because it is embedded within
the dominant liberal paradigm and has nothing to offer it.400 Yet
social organization that will put past ideological battles to an end. His thesis
was widely attacked as another in series of failed end-of-history promises
especially as it was quickly displaced by an on-the-contrary “clash of
civilizations” thesis that actually seemed to be playing out. Nevertheless, the
continued dominance—indeed, the pervasive “naturalization”—of capitalist
ideology and state management suggests that the Fukuyamian thesis of butone-way-forward does in fact prevail (and, in a strange contradiction, actually
helped to generate and sustain the clash of civilizations).
399. SEAN COYLE & KAREN MORROW, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND NATURE 1 (2004).
400. Supportive evidence for this assertion can be found in the texts
accompanying the long history of critical legal studies (CLS), and its evolution
into a diversity of theorizing—from feminist legal theory to postmodernism and
the law—where environmental law is scarcely to be found; see generally GARY
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S
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its absence is bizarre on both sides as the exploitation of the
environment with which environmental law is concerned props
up the unjust modernism with which critical theory is concerned.
While CLS flourished, however, environmental law took root as a
reformist project that avoided the critical concerns of “race, class,
and gender” and the postmodern insights of late twentieth social
thinking and practice. As a result, the Left largely dismissed it
as a bourgeois field concerned primarily with middle class
quality-of-life concerns. This failure to engage from either the
inside or outside of the field has left environmental law
impoverished. Despite its countless challenges to particular
economic and political developments, it remains bereft of a larger
critical theoretical base, and thus absent the ability to be selfreflective. At the same time, the Left has still only partially
embraced the values of “nature.” It is time for this to change on
all sides.
VII.CONCLUSION: TOWARD A GREEN LEGAL
THEORY
Two days after delivering his 2012 State of the Union
address, President Obama hit the campaign trail with a central
message: the need to expand domestic oil production. Speaking
at a fuelling depot for UPS air parcel transport planes in
Colorado (a metaphor for modernism if ever there was one),
Obama exhorted: “We need an all-out, all-in, all-of-the-above
strategy that develops every source of American energy.”401 This
includes expanded production in the Gulf of Mexico and
“fracking,” as well as new sources that are “cleaner and cheaper
and full of new jobs.”
The same day, on the other side of the Atlantic, Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper addressed the World Economic
Forum. At home, Harper was in the midst of a media storm after
he labeled environmentalists as “radicals” who were enemies of
Canada for their opposition to a proposed pipeline to carry Tar

END (1995); REZA BANAKAR & MAX TRAVERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
SOCIAL THEORY (2002) (an example of its absence).
401. Shawn McCarthy, Obama Touts Domestic Oil, Gas, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan.
27, 2012, at A8.

103

1108

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Sands bitumen through the mountains to ports on the West Coast
for export to Asia.402 In Davos, the Prime Minister outlined a
“grand plan” for his next five years that included enhanced
energy exports and the need to reduce “regulatory delays for
mining and energy projects.”403 On that same day, on the front
page of the Business section of the national newspaper, a federal
document was leaked where environmental organizations and
aboriginal groups were described as “adversaries” while industry
associations, energy companies, and the National Energy Board—
which is supposed to serve as an independent government agency
evaluating new proposals—are listed as “allies.”404 Meanwhile,
the federal environment minister was reported to have addressed
the Calgary Chamber of Commerce, an “audience packed with
some of the top oil patch executives,” where he stated that
“Environment Canada is a strategic partner to everyone in this
room . . . . I’m not here to kill your buzz.”405 His message to was
to streamline the regulatory process to avoid blockages to
hydrocarbon development.406
This paper has analyzed the common frame that bounds
these two political leaders despite their positions at seeming
opposing ends of the ideological spectrum: a frame where the
sustainability ideals of state-based environmental law blends
with the material dynamics of the state to produce the central,
and seemingly irresolvable, contradiction of modernity. We have
attempted to understand this contradiction by considering how it:
 has historically shaped the structural character of
various resource sectors;
 has
produced
patterns
of
development
and
environmental impacts that reflect commonalities
across these sectors;

402. David Ebner, Oil-Sands Pipeline Hits its Highest Hurdle, GLOBE & MAIL,
Jan. 9, 2012, at P. A1
403. Joe Friesen & Bill Curry, Harper’s Grand Plan, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 27,
2012, at A1.
404. Federal Documents Spark Outcry by Oil Sands Critics, GLOBE & MAIL,
Jan. 27, 2012, at B1.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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 continues to embody a liberal economic and political
rationality that, today as in the past, limits the
conditions of future possibility;
 inherently defines “green” initiatives so that they
support continued economic growth and capital
accumulation while excluding consideration of systemic
alternatives, and;
 effectively defines environmental law to function as an
incremental instrument of reform within bounded
parameters that themselves undermine the efficacy of
reform.
In summary, GLT is based on the premise of “legal laws” as
not the true (or at least not the most important) sources of social
regulation because they are themselves products of “higher” level
systems, the needs and dynamics of which provide the truly
authoritative momentum and direction of social evolution. Thus,
the hope for effective regulatory “re-formation” demands a diverse
set of new understandings about, and approaches to, the
dynamics of constitutive material and cultural forces—from the
internal needs of capital, to the spatial compulsions of the state,
to the hegemonic effects of dominant discourses. The need is, in
several ways, for a new theoretically-based critique and
theoretically-informed understanding of “law” itself.
First, a new critical theory could fill the void that exists in
environmental law, contribute to a broader range of legal theory,
and open up new transformative possibilities.407 We have
addressed how the philosophical and ideological origins of the
liberal democratic state (its ideal foundations) continues to frame
legal thought while its material base in the natural world
provides an essential but minimally theorized context for
virtually all aspects of modern law. The very act of creating the
specialist field of environmental law itself tended to segment
consideration of this reality rather than seeing nature’s
presence/absence across the range of the legal system. In
response, green legal theory is needed for environmentalists and
407. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in systematic detail its
character. This is discussed more fully in M’Gonigle, EARTH RULES: ON THE
NATURAL LAW, BEHIND THE SOCIAL LAWS, THAT HOLDS US TO ACCOUNT, supra note
24.
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environmental lawyers while the greening of legal theory is
necessary more generally.408
Second, GLT opens up to environmental legal scholars the
analysis of constitutive social systems and dynamics that exist as
law even though they exist above or behind the “legal law” as it
has been narrowly conceived, and beyond the legal preoccupation
with the rule of rules. This dominating conception has been
much challenged in recent decades with, for example, Michel
Foucault’s concept of the self-disciplinary character and micro
reach of “governmentality” (as compared to the more explicit
sanctioning quality of central government enforcement). It is also
evident in the rise of legal pluralism that recognizes how laws are
created by non-state actors, from organized religions to
indigenous communities to the family. GLT takes this expansion
further by looking at the effectively legal (i.e. socially structuring)
impacts inherent in the dynamics of meta-systems such as
capitalism and the sovereign state.
Understanding these
dynamics in this regulative way offers important, and timely,
work for the GLT scholar.409
Third, and following from the broader insights of the
“cultural turn” of which Foucault was a signal contributor, GLT is
not about legal reform. This is perhaps its most difficult
challenge to the environmental lawyer. To understand why this
must be so, consider the invocation of Paul Kahn in The Cultural

408. It might be noted that this double bind contributes mightily to their
having been no paradigm revolution in environmental law with environmental
lawyers not being critical theorists, and vice versa.
409. The range of this examination necessarily reaches to the very foundations
of modern legal positivism. Although based in a strongly materialist critique, it
is at this intersection with the nature and limits of positivism that GLT engages
with the more “idealist” (that is philosophical) basis of “wild law” and its “earth
jurisprudence.” See CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH
JUSTICE (2d ed. 2011); see also Judith Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral
Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2008). The limits of a
philosophically-based green jurisprudence can be seen in Koons’ espousal of
morally-based reforms to corporate practices. Id. at 325. Despite the much
greater situatedness of GLT in a critical political economy, wild law and GLT
share a prospective concern to develop a post-positivist “naturalism.” See R.
Michael M’Gonigle, A New Naturalism: Is There a (Radical) ‘Truth’ beyond the
(Postmodern) Abyss?, 8 ECOTHEOLOGY 8 (2000).
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Study of Law that a “new discipline of legal study must abandon
the project of reform.” He states:
We cannot trust our conclusions if we are writing for an audience
to which we have ceded a power over our own personal interests.
We cannot study law if we are already committed to law. We
cannot grasp the law as an object of study if the conceptual tools
we bring to the inquiry are nothing but the self-replication of
legal practice itself . . . .
A new discipline of law needs to conceive its object of study and
its own relationship to that object in a way that does not, at the
same moment, commit the scholar to those practices constitutive
of the legal order . . . . Understanding the constructed character
of the rule of law allows us to see its contingent character and to
understand that law’s claim upon us is not a product of law’s
truth but of our own imagination—our imagining its meanings
and our failure to imagine alternatives. 410

This turning away from reform seemingly makes no sense—
and yet is obvious. On the one hand, no theorist concerned with
the economy/environment contradiction would want to eschew
issue-specific reforms where important natural amenities are
threatened. On the other hand, to seek systemic reforms (like
challenging growth) is “deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists
and revolutionaries.”411 Instead, what reforms are permitted
increasingly only reinforce the contradictions that pervade their
implementation. Under a vigorous neoliberalism, problems are to
be “resolved” not through the old battles of a Left/Right dissensus
over possible futures, but through the embrace of a “post politics”
that seeks a managerial consensus where the fundamental
conflict in values and vision is no longer seen as necessary, or
tolerable.412 And so environmental lawyers now embrace what

410. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 27, 39 (1999).
411. JACKSON, supra note 351, at 102.
412. This loss of the benefits of politics-as-dissensus is most notably associated
with the work of the French political theorist, Jacques Ranciere. See Erik
Swyngedouw, The Antinomies of the Postpolitical City: In Search of a Democratic
Politics of Environmental Production, 33 INT. J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 601
(2009) (discussing this in the context of urban environmental politics).
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they once decried—green growth, corporate self-regulation,
market-based solutions—as the “realistic” way forward in the era
of neoliberal closure.
Ironically, the promise of theory is to help activists break out
of this self-imposed box of ineffective practice. As the English
literary theorist, Terry Eagleton, explained it, the value of theory
is akin to that offered by a new person who quietly enters a room
through a hidden passage and encounters a group of people
arguing about how to find a way out. After listening for a while,
“it occurs to her that though some of the talk is indeed
constructive, much of it is more of a symptom of the situation
than a strategic response to it.”
What she needs to do is fashion a form of discursive intervention
which will somehow succeed in illuminating the relation between
the talk and the situation; she must find some ‘meta-discourse’ . .
. which will persuade her trapped fellows to grasp their talk as
bound up with their material conditions rather than simply as a
potential solution to them . . . . In this situation, the new
individual is the theorist, and the ones already in the room are
the ideologues.413

The theorist here is thus not some irrelevant interloper, some
high-minded abstractionist but maybe the most practical one in
the place. After all, the task is still the same—to get out of the
room by discovering its trap. So it must be with environmental
law and GLT. But first, as they say, we must change the
conversation.
Of course, a still skeptical reader might ask what any of this
grand speculation has to do with the real world of environmental
law where new coal mines are being opened every day, carbon
concentrations keep increasing in the atmosphere, species keep
going extinct—and we must act to challenge these now! Despite
the depth of the present critique, the development of a green legal
theory toward which this critique points ultimately is not directed
to a rejection of environmental law but its transformation within
a larger framework of theoretical understanding and strategic
action. As we have acknowledged from the start, GLT is certainly

413. TERRY EAGLETON, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEORY 36-37 (1990).
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not seeking to replace the role of environmental law as resistance,
although it would definitely question its role as reformer. Given a
new understanding of the limitations of environmental law’s
capacity for prospective action, a corollary need exists to open a
new, critical, and theoretically-informed landscape beyond intrasystemic “reform” and toward larger “re-forms.” Still addressing
the real world of the present but opening up the discourse, GLT
should help to unveil a “new narrative” of our past, a more
informed context for environmental action in our present, new
imaginaries of possible futures and, above all, new strategies for
getting there. In the process, the practice of environmental law
would evolve into a praxis, that is, a practice that is theoreticallyinformed and committed to manifesting where that theory leads.
Neither can this discussion be dismissed as environmental
lawyers “being realistic” while green legal theorists engage in
mere speculation. As we have argued, social practice without an
explicit theoretical frame is blind, and easily leads to outcomes
that contradict its own avowed goals as environmental law now
does with its promulgation of carbon taxes, ecosystem pricing,
green energy, and so on. Action without the right frame is akin to
an American in London in a hurry to cross the road, looking left
as he steps off the curb, not having taken the time to learn the
new frame that demands that one must look in the other
direction because cars there are on the “wrong” side of the road.
The result is mission failure. At the same time, social theory
without a practical commitment easily becomes detached and
self-indulgent. Having said that, however, the yawning gap that
exists in critical legal theory provides sufficient justification on
its own for GLT in its general green(ing) function to address all
aspects of the modern legal order, not just environmental law.
GLT has immense practical value, for example, in helping to
understand why democracy is necessarily imperiled and how we
might begin to address new “constitutive” arrangements that
could actively constitute new economic and political
imaginaries.414 At more immediate levels of action, it would
414. Without delving into a prospective green legal theoretical analysis here,
one example of such an imaginary can be found in a recent article. Wes
Nicholson, Getting to Here: Bioregional Federalism, 40 ENVTL. L. 713 (2010). As
well, insofar as it is motivated by making the state accountable to a “natural
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situate environmental reforms (for example, for the industrial
sectors discussed in the opening pages of this article) within an
agenda of the broader, post-industrial re-formation. In this task,
it would also help identify principles not for legal law reform but
for what might be seen as the re-formation of culturally
constitutive logics. Merely by way of illustration, such principles
might include: radical demand reduction (as compared with
incremental eco-efficiency); displacement of capital dependence
(as compared with capital growth); substantive project
assessments (as compared with price-based assessments) and so
on. As guiding principles for responding to climate change, their
goal would not be to internalize or create new rights that
legitimate the problematic context, but to re-form that context.
Thus, green legal re-form would explicitly work not for energy
efficiency for a new generation of hybrid cars but to escape the
“social economy” of automobility.
In his recent book about climate change, Anthony Giddens
complained that “we have no politics of climate change” because
the politics being applied to this global threat remain rooted in a
world now past, a world still stuck in a set of naturalized
economic and political realities that lead people to believe that a
deal to resolve climate change will “be reached as soon as the
nations of the world see reason.”415 Such a world would, of
course, turn to environmental law to enshrine this reason—but
this world is now past. If there is no politics, there is certainly no
law of climate change, just a law of symptoms. This paper has
begun to hint at the vast new conceptual, analytical, and
practical spaces that need to be opened up, spaces that would
allow environmental lawyers to make common cause with the
wide new array of constituencies and knowledges pointing the
way to the needed “legal” reformations. Humanity is at a turning
point, but we fail to embrace its possibilities. Instead, in the wellworn phrase of American cultural theorist, Frederic Jameson, “it

law” order (i.e. where the state is seen as accountable beyond its own positivist
constitution), Mary Wood’s application of the public trust doctrine has a green
legal character. Wood, supra note 23. What is significant with both of these
approaches, independent of the problem of implementation, is the new
“constitutive” (and constitutional) context in which they situate the state.
415. ANOTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 209 (2009).
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is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of
capitalism.”416
Like Giddens, Mitchell comments that “the
democratic machineries that emerged to govern the age of carbon
energy seem to be unable to address the processes that may end
it.”417 At the liberal limits of environmental law, the time is upon
us to move beyond a bounded heritage so that we might let loose
new imaginaries without which our shared goals will fade from
the world.

416. Fredric Jameson, Future City, 21 NEW LEFT REV. 65, 76 (2003).
417. Mitchell, supra note 394, at 399.
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